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 Abstract 
 
This thesis looks into the land use and natural resource management systems of 
Basarwa communities in Ngamiland in the northwest of Botswana. The study 
specifically focuses on Basarwa communities living in and on the edges of the 
Okavango Delta.  The link between these communities and their natural resources is 
explored using the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework and the Adaptive Renewal 
Cycle.  The core assumption in this thesis is that livelihood strategies are constantly 
renewed and adapted to promote resilience in ecological and social systems. Fieldwork 
data collected between May 2000 and July 2001 and secondary data is used to deliberate 
on this point. 
 
The thesis confirms that the Basarwa’s livelihood strategies were adaptive only in as far 
as traditional livelihoods are concerned. The thesis traces the changes that the Basarwa 
have experienced as a result of policy restrictions through the different phases of the 
adaptive renewal cycle. The period following Independence in Botswana saw a policy 
shift which resulted in the Basarwa becoming landless. With mainly land-based 
livelihood strategies, the Basarwa were faced with new forms of crises and vulnerability 
which their traditional adaptive strategies were not designed for.  It comes to the 
conclusion that the Basarwa are currently stuck in a reorganisation phase; however, the 
CBNRM Draft Policy of Botswana offers a glimpse of hope as it provides an 
opportunity for the Basarwa to progress through the full cycle of reorganisation, 
renewal, conservation and release.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis looks into the land use and natural resource management systems of 
Basarwa communities in Ngamiland in the northwest of Botswana. The study 
specifically focuses on Basarwa communities living in and on the edges of the 
Okavango Delta.  Basarwa is a term used in Botswana to refer to a group of people 
widely known as the San/Bushmen in academic terms. The link between these 
communities and their natural resources is explored.  The study investigates the links 
between past and present social and ecological systems (Westley, et al 2002; Berkes and 
Folke, 1998) in the livelihood strategies, defined as activities that generate the means of 
household or individual survival through a combination and use of human, social, 
natural and physical assets (Ellis, 2000, DFID, 1999; Carney, 1998) of these 
communities. The core assumption in this thesis is that livelihood strategies are 
constantly renewed and adapted to promote resilience in ecological and social systems 
(Madzwamuse and Fabricius, 2004; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Ellis, 2000; Berkes 
and Folke, 1998). The data used to deliberate this point were collected between May 
2000 and July 2001.  
 
The Okavango Delta is characterised by constant ecological change.  Fire, flooding, 
drought, animal migration, and seasonal fluxes in the abundance and availability of 
plant and animal products are typical of this dynamic ecosystem. This state of flux 
imposes exceptional knowledge and adaptation requirements on humans wishing to 
subsist here permanently.  The Basarwa people living in the area have over many years 
evolved a body of knowledge and practices about the Delta’s ecosystems and their 
functions to enable them to deal with constant change in those ecosystems.  These 
include a nomadic lifestyle (rarely followed today), flexible livelihood strategies, a 
heavy reliance on social capital (e.g. customs and traditional institutions), and adaptive 
ecosystem management (the deliberate use of fire to enhance wildlife habitat, selective 
and opportunistic harvesting methods, and lifestyles that are independent of financial 
capital (Madzwamuse, 1998; Saugestad, 1998; Cashdan, 1993 and Lee, 1972).  The 
Basarwa’s nomadic lifestyles have more recently been replaced by sedentary lifestyles 
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in rural settlements created under government-sponsored resettlement schemes.  Land 
and conservation policies that have been introduced since Independence (in 1966) have 
undermined their traditional land use and natural resource management strategies.  
These factors have placed considerable constraints on their ability to cope with social 
and ecological changes.   
 
A combination of the adaptive renewal cycle (Holling and Gunderson, 2001; and Folke 
and Berkes, 1998) (see Figure 1), and the sustainable rural livelihoods framework, 
formulated by DFID (1999), is used to analyse the renewal of the Basarwa’s livelihood 
strategies.  Based on the analysis, I submit that the Basarwa in the Okavango Delta are 
currently in a re-organisational phase, after experiencing a rapid collapse of their social 
and natural capital as a result of land and conservation policies in Botswana.  The two 
methodologies are discussed in more detail in Section 1.2.l. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
 
The livelihood strategies of the Basarwa in relation to their use of land and natural 
resources is affected by their resettlement, and lack of rights and access to land and 
natural resources.  This is a result of the assumption held by Government that people 
and wildlife cannot live side-by-side (Gaborone, 1997) as this proximity will lead to a 
serious reduction in wildlife numbers.  The Basarwa, on the other hand, argue that they 
have been living amongst wildlife for centuries without seeing wildlife numbers 
dwindle.  In the case of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), a wildlife reserve 
of some 52 145km2, set aside by the colonial government in 1961, for example, 
Government made the assumption that relocating people would ensure resource 
conservation (and thus promote tourism) in the Reserve.  This assumption is in direct 
contradiction to the present Botswana Tourism Policy (Gaborone, 1997) as well as the 
concept of community based natural resource management that the Tourism policy aims 
to promote (ibid).  Furthermore, it is not compatible with the draft Community Based 
Natural Resource Management Policy (2001), the Revised National Policy for Rural 
Development (2002), nor with Section 9n of the 1992 Wildlife and National Parks Act, 
(this calls for community stakeholder participation in the management of protected 
areas).  
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The position taken by the Government reflects, in my opinion, an incomplete 
understanding by policy makers and legislators of the Basarwa’s land tenure system.  
According to Gaborone (1997), the CKGR, the third largest game reserve in the world, 
was originally established as a means of protecting both the rights of the residents 
(Basarwa) and natural resources.  At the time of its declaration, approximately 5000 
people, many of them Basarwa and Bakgalagadi, lived in the Reserve.  There has been a 
steady exodus of Basarwa from the CKGR, which intensified in 1997 as a result of the 
Government of Botswana's decision made in 1986 to relocate them outside the reserve 
(Cassidy et al. 2001; Currington, 1999). This is perceived by some to be a government 
strategy to develop the tourism potential of the game reserve (Cassidy et al. 2001).  
More recently Government has been accused of relocating the Basarwa in order to open 
the area for diamond prospecting, although Government has denied such a causal link 
(Cassidy et al. 2001; Gaborone, 1997). 
 
In Ngamiland the Basarwa have also experienced resettlement as a result of 
Government land policy, namely the establishment of the Moremi Game Reserve in 
1963 (Bolaane, 2004; Alexandra, 1993). The community of Khwai, for instance, has 
been relocated twice in response to the creation of the Moremi Game reserve, and once 
outside this area they have continued to experience pressure on the land available to 
them as a result of competition from the tourism industry (Taylor, 2002; Bolaane, 
2004). Some of the Basarwa were also relocated to “serviced” areas under the 
controversial Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) which was first 
established as the Bushman Development Programme in 1974 and changed to RADP in 
1977 (Saugestad, 1998; Wily, 1994). RADP is a settlement scheme intended to provide 
Basarwa with access to land, water, clinics and schools and to provide land tenure 
(Saugestad, 1998).  As a result of these forces the Basarwa communities often find 
themselves sandwiched between private land and protected areas, where access to land 
and land use is restricted and controlled (Taylor, 2002).   
 
Other Government policies have disempowered Basarwa in a less obvious manner. 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), for example, are areas reserved under Tribal 
Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 1975. They now cover roughly 22% of Botswana, in 
thinly populated, remote and poor western and northern parts of the country (Arntzen, 
2003).  Rozemeijer and Van der Jagt (2000) view the presence of the Basarwa in 
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WMAs as a blessing in disguise because natural resource utilisation is the main land use 
allowed within the WMAs, which matches the hunting and gathering lifestyle of the 
Basarwa. According to Rozemeijer and van der Jagt (2000), this situation puts the 
Basarwa in a better position to benefit from the CBNRM Policy because they occupy 
most of WMAs. However, the view that WMAs are a blessing for Basarwa 
communities is somewhat naïve, in the sense that it ignores the fact that hunting and 
gathering is hampered by restricted access to resources outside these designated 
community areas, which are substantially smaller than the traditional hunting and 
gathering territories of the concerned Basarwa communities. Furthermore, some 
WMAs, especially those in western Botswana, are resource-poor areas.  Hence, the 
extent to which WMAs are able to sustain and improve local livelihoods is questionable 
(Arntzen, 2003).  This point will be discussed further in Chapter 6, where it is argued 
that traditional resource use depends on extensive use of land to accommodate seasonal 
mobility. 
 
The residents of Khwai have also been relocated after they were transferred out of the 
Moremi Game Reserve. They were again resettled because of a perceived 
incompatibility between people and wildlife (Alexandra, 1993), despite the fact that this 
area was the only land that was accessible to the Basarwa communities as they do not 
have any tribal land designated to them (each of the “major” tribes in Botswana, none of 
which is a Basarwa tribe, has a land area designated to them). This point is elaborated 
on further in Chapter 2.  
 
The type of disempowerment discussed above obviously invites hostilities between 
Reserve authorities and local communities. From the perspective of Reserve officials 
and conservationists, the conflict is precipitated by livestock trespass, illegal hunting, 
wood theft and the perceived ecological costs of these transgressions.  For local 
Basarwa communities, on the other hand, the conflict revolves around reduced access to 
ancestral lands, restrictions on customary resource use and crop damage caused by 
wildlife (cf. Neumann, 1998). This conflict also applies to the Basarwa who live within 
and on the borders of protected wildlife areas, such as the communities of Khwai and 
Xaxaba, who can be described as ecological refugees. 
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Although, as stated above, traditional communities such as the Basarwa have been 
dispossessed of their lands, it is widely recognised that they have excellent land use and 
natural resource management systems.  Documentation of traditional land use and 
natural resource management systems should serve to inform current community based 
natural resources management projects, as it has been widely argued that the secret of 
the success of CBNRM lies in traditional knowledge and methods of natural resource 
management (Alcorn and Toledo 1998; Gunderson, 1997; Berkes and Folke 1994; 
1998; Gadgil, et al. 1993; Berkes, 1989; Holling, 1986). 
 
Local knowledge of the management of natural resources by the Basarwa and other 
indigenous communities has until recently been ignored.  The draft CBNRM policy and 
related programmes in Botswana (GoB, 2001) is an indication that Government has 
recognised the ability of communities to manage their local resources, and has thus 
decentralised this responsibility. Several CBNRM projects are in operation throughout 
Botswana. There are projects in Ngamiland, the Chobe Enclave and in the Kgalagadi 
District (CBNRM Status Report, 2003) (Table 1).  This recognition has great potential 
since the knowledge and practice that can be derived from traditional communities has 
yet to contribute in a systematic way to natural resource management policies and 
strategies.  For example, the role played by traditional institutions in natural resource 
management, local beliefs relating to rights of access to resources, and Basarwa and 
other local communities’ day to day interactions with their ecosystems, are generally 
overlooked.  This in itself is a threat to the success of CBNRM, and while communities 
need to learn new ways of resource management, there is also a need to utilise and build 
on the knowledge that they already have. 
 
It is widely recognised that indigenous people’s knowledge is largely undocumented 
(Bock, 1998; Matowanyika and Sibanda, 1998; Matowanyika and Marongwe, 1998; 
Larson, 1998; IUCN-ROSA, 1997; Matowanyika, 1997; Matowanyika et al., 1995).  
Hence, efforts are being made to record this local knowledge and incorporate it into the 
mainstream natural resource management systems (Berkes, 1999; Folke and Berkes, 
1998). Documenting traditional knowledge however has problems, stemming from the 
fact that this often has a political dimension (Berkes, 1999). Different actors relate in 
different ways to the resource, and define knowledge in different ways.  Berkes (1999) 
argues that the use of indigenous knowledge is political because it threatens the power 
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relationship between indigenous groups and dominant society, governments, 
developers, conventional resource management scientists and dominant ethnic groups.  
The use of the term ‘indigenous’ itself in reference to the Basarwa in Botswana has 
been problematic, with politicians being quoted as stating that all Batswana1 are 
indigenous to the country (Saugestad, 1998). 
 
As mentioned earlier, communities are likely to participate actively and effectively 
when they employ methods of managing natural resources they are familiar with.  
Further, active participation is essential for the sustainability of CBNRM. Ideally, for 
CBNRM to be successful and sustainable, communities need to be involved in 
interactive participation and ultimately self-mobilisation participation (Fabricius, 2004; 
Adams and Hulme, 2001). In terms of interactive participation, people participate in 
joint analysis; for this to happen they need to be in a position to make use of their own 
knowledge and skills, and be in a position to apply local regulations and restrictions 
(Leach et al. 1997; Pretty et al. 1994). The ecosystem management rules held by 
communities are, however, changing, and the changes are influenced by several factors 
(climate; policies and laws; human, wildlife and livestock population trends; economic 
trends, etc). The implications are that the local communities have to adapt new 
livelihood strategies in order to cope with change (Ellis, 2000).  It is, therefore, 
important to understand the roles played by local institutions in communities with 
regard to natural resource management, their beliefs and rules relating to access rights, 
and the learning process that helps to govern their interactions with the environment 
(Berkes and Folke, 2002; Ellis, 2000). 
                                                 
1 Batswana in this thesis is used to refer to the people of Botswana, which includes the Basarwa, whereas Tswana is 
used to refer to an ethnic group. 
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 Table 1: A typology of participations 
Type of participation Description 
1. Passive participation People being told what is going to happen or has 
already happened. Unilateral announcements 
without any listening to people’s responses. The 
information being shared belongs to external 
professionals. 
2. Participation in information giving 
 
People answering questions; questionnaire surveys 
or similar approaches. People do not have the 
opportunity to influence proceedings; findings are 
neither shared nor checked for accuracy. 
3. Participation by consultation 
 
People are being consulted and external agents 
listen to views. External agents define both 
problems and solutions; may modify these in light 
of people’s responses but are under no obligation to 
do so. 
4.Participation for material incentives 
 
People participate by providing resources (e.g. 
labour) in return for food, cash or other material 
incentives. It is very common to see this being 
called “participation” yet people have no stake in 
prolonging activities when incentives end.  
5. Functional participation People participate by forming groups to meet 
predetermined objectives. Such involvement tends 
to commence after major decisions have been 
made. This form of participation tends to be 
dependent on external initiators and facilitators. 
6. Interactive participation People participate in joint analysis, which leads to 
action plans. Tends to involve interdisciplinary 
methodologies that seek multiple perspectives. 
These groups take control over local decisions, and 
so people have a stake in maintaining the 
structures. 
7. Self-mobilisation People participate by taking initiatives independent 
of external institutions. 
(Source: Pretty et al (1994) 
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Traditional communities rely on local and ecological knowledge to build social and 
ecological resilience (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Berkes, 1999).  Generational linkages are 
built upon this knowledge to enable communities to continue with livelihood strategies 
that are suitable to their local environment.  
 
As most Basarwa are located in rural areas where livelihoods are still predominantly 
land-based, it has been argued that their land issues are issues of human rights and 
social justice (Wily, 1994). Land for the Basarwa is also an issue of access to and 
control over natural resources, which is crucial for adaptive livelihood strategies. 
Ng'ong'ola (1997) argues that the Basarwa have been depicted as the most marginalised 
of all ethnic groups in Botswana, and that securing rights to land and natural resources  
is critical for the improvement of their socio-economic and political position. 
Gulbrandsen (1991) attributes the miseries of the San not just to ecological 
encroachment but also to economic marginalisation. 
 
Whereas local and indigenous communities such as the Basarwa are said to have 
knowledge that could contribute to sustainable natural resource management (Berkes, 
1999; Berkes and Folke, 2002), these communities continue to be disempowered from 
managing natural resources in their areas.  Their participation is often restricted and far 
removed from the decision-making structures responsible for natural resource 
management, while their livelihood strategies are directly and often dependent upon 
such resources.  Community based natural resource management strategies strive to 
involve local communities in the management of natural resources, but the success of 
these strategies lies in addressing some of the fundamental questions that this thesis, 
using the Basarwa of Khwai and Xaxaba as a case study, seeks to address. 
 
As Neumann (1998) argues, the establishment of national parks and associated 
protected areas has criminalised many customary land and natural resource uses for 
communities across Africa.  In addition, the responsibility for managing natural 
resources has been shifted from communities to government structures.  Some of the 
rules and regulations for land use within the game parks, such as the hunting 
regulations, are contradictory to the traditional land use systems applied by local 
communities such as the Basarwa.  In this situation fundamental questions are; 
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a. What effect has the shift of management of natural resources from communities 
to Government had on natural resources use by the Basarwa? 
b. How is CBNRM likely to influence their livelihood strategies?  
 
A number of specific issues need to be addressed in order to arrive at answers to the 
questions above, such as: 
a. What type of livelihood strategies were applied in the past? 
b. What types of livelihood strategies do the Basarwa follow to maintain 
resilience? 
c. How do past and present livelihood and management strategies affect the 
resilience of Basarwa’s livelihood assets (natural, social, physical, and human 
capital)? 
d. How have present livelihood and management strategies been influenced by 
changes in formal policies and institutions?  
e. How can such policies and institutions be adapted to promote the resilience of 
the Basarwa’s four types of livelihood assets? 
 
It is argued in this thesis that the means for communities to effectively participate in 
managing land and natural resource-based livelihood strategies can be found in 
understanding their livelihoods and the factors which build their resilience, and thus 
make it possible for such communities to continue surviving.  As the system approach 
(introduced in the previous section) postulates, the effective performance of natural 
resource management requires an emphasis on social aspects such as institutional roles, 
property rights and cultural practices, hence the relevance of questions d and e above.  
Furthermore, in order to formulate recommendations regarding improving the situation 
of poverty-ridden Basarwa, one needs to look into structural socio-economic issues such 
as lack of land rights that constrain the ability of the Basarwa to cope with social and 
ecological change.  
 
The Basarwa communities studied in this thesis are constantly renewing and adapting 
their livelihood strategies in order to cope with the changes discussed above.  However, 
it must be emphasised that often they are forced into these changes through rapid 
adaptation.  The external nature of the causes of change, such as Government land 
policies, weakens the social resilience of the Basarwa, as they have no control over the 
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nature and pace of change.  A key focus of the study is therefore the strategies that the 
Basarwa have adopted in a situation where flexibility in resources use, diversity and 
seasonal mobility is hampered by the restrictions imposed by land tenure and 
conservation laws and policies of Botswana. 
 
The current shift in natural resource management policy towards more adaptive and 
participatory approaches warrants studying in greater detail the management strategies 
of indigenous peoples who have traditionally practised adaptive management.  
Hitchcock (1980) discusses the changes that have occurred in hunter-gatherer societies 
as a result of the local depletion of natural resources and sendentism (the abandonment 
of nomadic living patterns).  These changes include a reduction in sharing, reciprocity 
and the size of the exchange network, as well as increased malnutrition and disease.  
Hitchcock does not, however, discuss the impacts these changes have had on the 
systems of land use or the management of natural resources.  Osaki (1984) states that 
sedentarisation has brought along with it changes in hunting methods.  Bows and arrows 
are no longer used by the CKGR Basarwa, who have now adopted horses and rifles for 
hunting.  Meat obtained by this form of hunting is not shared with all members of the 
settlement because of the influence of trading, cash income and the increase in 
population around the settlement. The sharing Hitchcock refers to is, according to Kent 
(1993), a characteristic of many foragers and is often thought to mitigate the unevenness 
of hunting returns.  Although there might be an economic component behind sharing 
patterns, the author suggests that the fostering of social returns is more important, as this 
form of egalitarianism reinforces the social bonds in forager societies.  The findings by 
Cashdan (1980) nonetheless illustrate that this is not the case for all Basarwa 
communities in other forager societies.  Contrary to most ethnographic data, the //Gana 
of the north-eastern Kalahari show evidence of economic and political inequity, which 
appears to have arisen from the fact that the //Gana, unlike other Basarwa groups, 
supplement their hunting and gathering strategy with keeping livestock and growing 
food. The result has been less sharing of food and a consequent weakening of the 
egalitarian forces found in those nomadic groups for whom sharing is a survival 
insurance strategy.   
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1.3 Conceptual Foundation 
 
This section discusses the theoretical framework for analysing land and natural resource 
management in the social milieu of traditional, subsistence societies.  The section sets 
out a conceptual framework showing how the adaptive renewal cycle and the livelihood 
strategy framework are used in this study.  The sustainable rural livelihoods framework 
(DFID, 1999) and adaptive renewal cycle (Folke and Berkes, 1998; Holling and 
Gunderson, 2002) are combined to address the questions this thesis sets out to address.  
 
The adaptive renewal cycle provides one framework (although not the only one) 
through which management practices and their social mechanisms can be systematically 
investigated in order to explore the dynamics of ecosystem–social system linkages 
(Folke and Berkes, 1998; Gunderson & Holling 2001).  Central to the adaptive renewal 
cycle, and of especial importance to this study, are the concepts of ‘resilience’ and 
‘surprise’.  
 
Resilience refers to the buffer capacity or the ability of a system to absorb disturbances 
by changing the variables and processes that control its behaviour, before that system 
changes its structure. In other words, the scale or magnitude of a disturbance or 
disturbances that a society or ecosystem can absorb, before significant changes must be 
made, is a measure of its resilience.  Resilience results in the conservation of 
institutional ecological and social memory (e.g. information, knowledge, skills such as 
hunting experience and wisdom), which makes organic re-organisation and innovation 
possible.  It may also be seen as a measure of the opportunities conserved by the system 
for novelty and renewal.  A social and/or ecological system conserves information, 
knowledge and experience, and can be referred to as the ‘memory’ of that system. 
Conserving this memory is a prerequisite for recovery from shock, stress or surprise 
(see below) and it also maintains opportunities for innovation and renewal in social and 
ecological systems (Gunderson et al. 1997 in Folke and Berkes 1998).   
 
Berkes and Folke (1998) summarise resilience as simply the capacity of a system to 
buffer, incorporate and survive disturbance.  Resilience expands as the phases of the 
adaptive cycle proceeds; it shrinks as the cycle moves towards K (see Figure 1) where 
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the system becomes more brittle and expands during the reorganisation phase (Holling 
and Gunderson, 2002). However, where resilience or the buffering capacity of the social 
and ecological system declines, flexibility is lost and therefore the linked social–
ecological system becomes more vulnerable to surprises or crises (Berkes and Folke, 
1998). Gunderson and Holling (2002) point out that resilience is not an ideal in itself as 
it may serve to preserve maladaptive systems, that the challenge to minimise a system’s 
vulnerability to surprise instead lies in conserving the ability to adapt to change and to 
be able to respond to surprise and crises in a flexible way.  
 
Surprise - Gunderson (1999) refers to three types of surprises: 
• “local surprises” can be created by broader scale processes for which there is little 
or no previous knowledge (e.g. dealing with variability in natural resource 
availability as a result of global warming and climate change). A local surprise can 
be resolved by a broader scale of observations and historical accumulation of 
knowledge. Often indigenous communities are known to rely on their knowledge 
of the ecological system to deal with local level surprises (Folke, et al. 1998).  
• “cross scale surprises” are the most common and controversial types of surprise, 
and are often the source of policy crises (see Chapter 6).  These are similar to local 
surprises but differ in that larger scale fluctuations intersect with slowly changing 
internal variables to create an alternative stable (local) system state.  For example, 
the sudden emergence of new diseases caused by large scale land use changes 
which may have taken place over a long period of time and human population 
growth coupled with expanding economic activities (Holling, Berkes and Folke, 
1998).  
• “true novelty surprise” refers to something that is genuinely unique, in which new 
variables and processes transform the system into a new state. In these surprises, 
little or no experience exists for either understanding the transformation or 
structuring management actions in response to that transformation. 
 
 In a nutshell Gunderson (1999) defines surprise as: 
“…a qualitative disagreement between observations and expectations, when an 
ecosystem behaves in an unexpected manner”.   
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The adaptive renewal cycle is also known as “Holling’s figure eight”. This model, first 
proposed by Holling (1973) to explain change in non-equilibrium ecosystems, was 
adapted by Gunderson, Holling and Light (1995), Folke and Berkes (1998) and 
Gunderson and Holling (2002) to explain changes in integrated social ecological 
systems (i.e. ecosystems in which people live and are used by people).  The model 
suggests that social-ecological systems go through cycles of adaptive renewal, 
characterised by a build-up of “capital” (tangible assets, biomass) and “connectedness” 
(complex organisational hierarchies, species richness), to a point of climax (‘K’ in 
Figure 1), where after they inevitably release this built-up capital.  
 
The release phase could be triggered by a surprise event like a fire in the case of 
ecosystem, or political change in the case of social systems.  The cycle varies 
unpredictably: whereas one can be fairly certain that ‘release’ (Ω) will invariably follow 
‘conservation’ (k), the timing between phases is largely unpredictable.  The events that 
trigger a shift from one phase to the next also vary in their predictability. The ‘knock-
on’ effect of events at higher spatial scales on local level processes (e.g. a major shift in 
policy, or regional climatic change) is also unpredictable and poorly understood.  The 
release phase is often followed by a phase of reorganisation (α), firstly to rebuild stored 
capital, and secondly to build up connectivity.  The adaptive renewal cycle enhances the 
ability of both social and ecological systems to recover after surprising events, such as 
forced removals, floods and droughts (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Holling and Gunderson, 
2002).  
 
The above model is represented by the systems approach and parts of evolutionary 
biology that extend the analysis of populations, ecosystems, landscape structure and 
dynamics, to include the interactions of social systems with natural systems (Berkes and 
Folke, 1998).  Berkes and Folke (1998), for example, state that in a savannah ecosystem 
there is a dynamic four–stage cycle of exploitation, conservation, release and 
reorganisation.  Exploitation is the stage where the establishment of pioneering species 
occurs, and conservation where accumulation and storage takes place (species mature 
and become complex), eventually becoming ‘brittle’ (Holling and Gunderson, 2002; 
Berkes and Folke, 1998).  Such brittleness lowers the system’s capacity to absorb 
environmental surprises such as fire, rainfall or the elephant over-population problem 
(in the case of northern Botswana). When surprise happens in resilient systems, 
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accumulated capital is suddenly released for other kinds of opportunity (creative 
destruction). An example of the so-called creative destruction is the practice of burning 
used in the past by the Basarwa groups in the Okavango Delta: these were known to 
burn off vegetation in order to unblock river channels and enable water to reach the 
lower streams, where it was used for their own domestic use and for attracting wildlife 
downstream (Mbaiwa, 1999). This very rapid state of change (release stage) was 
followed by reorganisation, in which nutrients released from the trees as a result of the 
burning fixed in other parts of the ecosystem, after which the exploitation stage starts 
over again (Holling 1986; Holling et al. 1995 quoted in Berkes and Folke 1998). See 
Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: The Adaptive Renewal Cycle (from Holling 1986; Gunderson 1997) 
 
Exploitation and conservation phases of the adaptive renewal cycle • 
The evolution from the exploitative to the conservative phase in Holling’s ‘figure eight’ 
depicts the process conventionally thought of as ecological succession.  The part of the 
adaptive renewal cycle corresponding to the two boxes of exploitation and conservation 
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resembles a logical curve typical of population growth and the stabilisation of individual 
species. It is this part of the figure eight with which conventional resource management 
concerns itself, whereby the sigmoid or S-curve reflects the single equilibrium model 
(Holling 1986, Gunderson et al. 1995, Folke and Berkes 1998).  
 
Release and reorganisation phases of the adaptive renewal cycle  • 
The adaptive renewal cycle stresses that the sequence of gradual change, depicted by the 
S-curve (exploitation through conservation phases), is followed by a sequence of rapid 
transformation triggered by disturbance.   
 
The adaptive renewal cycle emphasises that disturbance is both endogenous and 
exogenous to ecosystem development, and that periods of gradual change and of rapid 
transformation coexist and complement one another (Folke and Berkes, 1998).  
Conventional natural resources management falls short of effectively addressing the 
release and reorganisation phases, and tends to regard climax and the carrying capacity 
as end points (ibid).  Conventional resource management measures tend to support the 
phases of gradual change, i.e. exploitation and conservation, but strive to avoid rapid 
transformation (i.e. release and reorganisation). Such management aims to remove 
disturbance and reduce variability within the ecosystem. Thus, conventional measures 
would not recognise the negative influence of Botswana’s conservation laws 
implemented since the 1960s (cf Chapter 5 and 6).  This strategy leads to more brittle 
systems and eventually to a resource crisis.  However, crises may also play a 
constructive role, triggering the opportunity for renewal and redesign in systems capable 
of learning and adapting (Holling and Gunderson, 2002).  
  
All living systems, ecological as well as social, exhibit properties of the adaptive 
renewal cycle across different scales (Gunderson et al. 1997).  In the same way that the 
ecosystem changes and recovers from shock and surprises, livelihood assets of a society 
affected by the same forces are constantly shifting.  A community could, for example, 
be well-endowed with natural assets in good times, and suffer a shortage in times of 
droughts or environmental degradation.  The need to link ecological and social systems 
in natural resource management strategies emanates from the fact that there is much 
evidence of poor management, and the conventional prescriptions of resource 
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management are not resulting in sustainability (Holling and Gunderson, 2002; Berkes 
and Folke, 1998).  
 
Conventional prescriptions of natural resource management often have a preservationist 
attitude, aimed at eliminating agents of disturbance. The preservationist approach has 
tended to exclude social dimensions, and has consequently resulted in negative impacts 
on surrounding communities arising from the loss of income and livelihood (IIED, 
1994).  Civil authorities have correspondingly invested in considerable financial 
resources on policing protected areas and keeping communities from entering those 
areas.  Furthermore, states are finding it difficult to provide adequate management at the 
local level, and, as wildlife resources are no longer ‘owned’ by any particular group, no 
one feels the responsibility for protecting them from uncontrolled exploitation (Barrow 
and Murphree, 2001; Berkes and Folke 1998; IIED, 1994).  The traditional means by 
which natural resources have been protected by communities are also being lost, 
through lack of interest on the part of state authorities and through limited use by the 
communities themselves.   
 
It has been pointed out that scientific resource management has its roots in a utilitarian 
and exploitative worldview, which presumes that humans have a right of dominion over 
nature (Berkes and Folke, 1998). In the historical process of converting the earth’s life 
support system into mere commodities, resource management science was geared for 
the efficient utilisation of resources as if they were limitless (Berkes and Folke, 1998; 
McNeely, 1997; Gunderson, 1995; World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987).  Conventional resource management has relied on the use of fixed 
rules for achieving constant yields; fixed rules for achieving the animal carrying 
capacity of a given area; and fixed maximum sustainable yields for harvesting flora and 
fauna (Constanza, et al. 1993; Arrow et al. 1995).  
 
The systems approach is replacing the view that resources can be treated as discrete 
entities in isolation from the rest of the ecological and social system (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002; Berkes and Folke, 1998).  Here it is perceived that improving the 
performance of natural resource management requires an emphasis on more qualitative 
aspects, such as institutions and property rights and cultural practices, as a complement 
to quantitative analysis (ibid). Sustainable natural resource management can be best 
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achieved in a holistic manner by looking at both quantitative and qualitative aspects 
(Jiggins and Roling, 2002; Matowanyika and Sibanda, 1998).   
 
Improving the performance of natural resource systems requires an emphasis on 
institutions and property rights; this obliges us to study the natural resource 
management practices of local communities (Berkes and Folke, 2002; Berkes, 1999; 
Berkes and Folke, 1998; Hanna, et al. 1996; McNeely, 1997; Stevens, 1997). Many 
traditional societies, such as the Basarwa, nurture sources of ecosystem renewal by 
creating small scale disturbance (e.g. through harvesting thatch grass that promotes new 
growth).  It is believed that such adaptations have been made possible through 
management practices that are founded on ecological knowledge and understanding, 
generated, accumulated and transferred through a trial and error learning process. 
(Colding, 2003; Berkes, 1999; Berkes and Folke, 1998). These resource management 
practices help conserve sufficient memory for a resumption of the adaptive renewal 
cycle and thereby generating a critical flow of natural resources and ecosystem change 
on which social and economic development depends (see Figure 1).  
 
This thesis is further informed by the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework (SRLF) 
(DFID, 1999).  The Framework defines sustainable livelihoods as “ways of combining 
and using assets that are open to people in pursuit of beneficial livelihood outcomes that 
meet their own livelihood objectives” (DFID, 1999).  The SRLF was used in an attempt 
to provide an understanding of the adaptive renewal cycle with reference to social 
systems and livelihood strategies.  The Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework 
presents the main factors that affect people’s livelihoods and the typical relationships 
between these (ibid).  It is based on the following assumptions:  
 
• First, it postulates that people operate in a context of vulnerability, within which 
they have access to certain assets or poverty reducing factors (Carney, 1998; DFID, 
1999).  The vulnerability context frames the external environmental context in 
which people exist, and identifies the shocks, seasonality and trends over which the 
community has no control (Carney, 1998; Creham, 1992; DFID, 1999). An example 
of such shocks and trends is the migration of livestock and people, encroaching into 
the lands previously occupied by the Basarwa.  Population growth also puts 
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increased pressure on land and its natural resources:  An increase in population may 
also lead to an increase in conflicting land uses.   
 
Other examples include the future impact of climate change and environmental 
degradation which will result in a reduction in wildlife populations, changes in the 
types and distribution of veld products as well as increased water scarcity (Hulme, 
1996; Ministry of Transport Works and Communication, 2001).  Trends in 
governance, including politics (policies, laws, acts and programmes) and seasonality 
in job opportunities, also frame the external environment in which the Basarwa 
exist. The Government of Botswana pushed for centralised economic growth instead 
of people-centred development immediately after independence, which has resulted 
in further impoverishment of certain poverty-stricken groups such as the Basarwa.  
Furthermore the fact that the Basarwa are voiceless in terms of politics results in 
them lacking representation in the political arena (Good, 1992; 1994; Mogwe, 1992; 
Suzman, 2001a). 
 
• Second, poverty-reducing factors gain their meaning and value through the 
prevailing social, institutional and organisational environment.  For instance, in the 
case of Basarwa, historically poverty-reducing factors gained meaning through 
clearly defined territories and rules which governed rights of access to land and 
natural resources, and the size and membership of the group holding those rights. 
• Third, the institutional, social and organisational environments also influence 
livelihood strategies in so far as livelihood options are determined by the existing 
institutional, social, and organisational structures.  These structures include national 
and international policies, the role and actions of government or the private sector, 
and cultural systems and processes (Farrington et al. 1999).  
• Fourth, a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the 
future, without undermining the natural resources base (Scoones, 1998 in Farrington 
et al. 1999).  For example, in the past the Basarwa were able to live side-by-side 
with wildlife, and their seasonal mobility ensured that resources were never entirely 
depleted.  This mobility allowed the natural assets in one area to be replenished 
while harvesting was taking place in a different area (Saugestad, 1998). Variations 
 26
in environment and rainfall correlate with the changing patterns of seasonal mobility 
and social organisation (Saugestad, 1998; Thakadu, 1997; Mbaiwa, 1999). 
 
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the Basarwa’s culture and tradition and 
concepts of land are central to their land use and natural resource management 
strategies. These, in turn, are influenced by trends in resource availability, population 
growth, and changes in national politics and government policies, economic 
development, and their historical relationship with the dominant Tswana ethnic tribes. 
While recognising that all forms of capital play a role in people’s livelihoods, I will, for 
the purpose of this study, concentrate on four livelihood assets - social capital, human, 
financial and natural capital.  The rationale for this choice is firstly, that the livelihood 
outcomes of the Basarwa are largely derived from the shared use of land and natural 
resources. Secondly, the Basarwa also depend on their human capital in the form of 
local knowledge and financial capital from the tourism industry for their livelihoods. 
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The framework can be used in planning both new development activities and in assessing 
the contribution to livelihood sustainability made by existing activities (DFID, 1999). In 
this study the framework will be used for the latter purpose.  
 
1.4 The structure and layout of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical framework of 
the study, discussing the assumptions made in both the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework and the adaptive renewal system.  The chapter examines how the framework 
and the adaptive renewal cycle can be used to complement each other in an analytical 
model used to understand the renewal of the different types of livelihood capital (human, 
social, financial, physical and natural). The chapter also outlines the research problem 
and the research questions.  
 
Chapter 2 (Study Area and History of the People) provides a descriptive overview of the 
study area and the social, geographical and ecological environments.  The socio-
economic context of the villages of Khwai and Xaxaba, the two research communities, is 
also described.  The chapter also examines the situation of the Basarwa as an ethnic 
group in Botswana, both in historical and present terms, in relation to land and natural 
resources. 
 
Chapter 3 (Methods) discusses in detail the research model and the relationships 
between the different model components, as well as the field methods employed and data 
analysis methods. 
 
Chapter 4 (Past and Present Vulnerabilities Facing the Basarwa) discusses the 
vulnerabilities the Basarwa have been and are exposed to. The findings of this study are 
complemented with reference to published research from other sources.  
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Chapter 5 (Resilience and Livelihood Strategies) examines the coping strategies of the 
Basarwa communities.  It explores the diversity of livelihood strategies the Basarwa are 
applying in and looks at how these communities are building social and ecological 
resilience. 
 
Chapter 6 evaluates the impact of policies and regulations on the livelihood strategies of 
the Basarwa. The impact of these on the access to and availability of the different forms 
of capital (social, natural, human and financial) is analysed.  In this chapter, the research 
results in the findings and key issues discussed in the previous chapters are drawn 
together, and conclusions are made. This chapter looks at the opportunities that are 
presented by the Draft CBNRM Policy and addresses implications for policy. 
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Chapter 2: Study Area and History of the People 
 
The field study was carried out in Khwai and Xaxaba, which are Basarwa settlements in 
the Ngamiland District in Botswana (see Map 1).  Ngamiland District occupies the 
northwest corner of Botswana.  Its northern and western boundaries are part of the border 
between Botswana and Namibia.  The Chobe, Central and Gantsi Districts border it in the 
east, southeast and south, respectively.  Ngamiland District lies between latitudes 18o 
30`S – 20o 00`S and longitudes 23o 15`E – 24o 30`E. Ngamiland is one of the largest 
districts in the country with an area of about 109,000 km2. It has one administrative sub-
district, the Okavango, occupies the northwest and western parts of the District.  Both 
Khwai and Xaxaba are located in the Okavango sub-district.   
 
Ngamiland is endowed with rich natural resources. Perhaps the richest is the Okavango 
Delta, which is important as a tourism resource because of the wildlife it sustains and its 
scenic beauty.  Between 1993 and 1997 the number of tourists per annum visiting the 
Delta increased at an average rate of 14.5%, from 106,800 to 184,475 respectively (Scott 
Wilson Resource Consultants, 2000).  Sixty percent (around 13,500) of employed people 
in Ngamiland work in the tourism industry. Tourism is a major and growing component 
of the Botswana economy, contributing about 5% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(Department of Tourism, 2001).  
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2.1 The Ecology of the Okavango Delta 
 
The Okavango Delta is a vast inland delta system that receives an annual flood from the 
highlands of Southern Angola.  It fluctuates in area from 15,000km2 during the flood to 
6,000-8,000km2 during the dry season. Geologically the Okavango is a young system 
(approximately 10, 000 years old), which before major geologic uplifting formed a 
drainage channel into a great lake called the Makgadikgadi (Merron, 1991).  The 
Okavango Delta consists of a mosaic of wetlands and dry lands overlying Kalahari sands 
of the basement complex and Karoo systems.  In terms of extent of flooding and 
associated vegetation, five zones are commonly defined: perennial swamp, seasonal 
swamp, seasonal grassland, intermittently flooded land and dry land (Scudder et al. 1993)  
 
The Okavango is the only large river of the world ending in an inland delta (Merron, 
1991).  The floodwaters arrive in the northern riverine floodplain in January, and take 
approximately six months to traverse the delta, reaching the drainage rivers in the south 
in June, which results in flooding in the otherwise dry winter months. By the time the 
floodplains and rivers in the southern areas are full, the water level is low again in the 
northern regions.  The regular flooding and draining of the Okavango Delta are 
determined largely by the period and amount of annual rainfall in the highlands of 
Angola (Merron, 1991).  The cycle described above is the typical but there are variations 
in this cycle.  The timing, magnitude and duration of the flood is not constant from year 
to year. In consequence, the inundated area of the delta varies widely depending on the 
seasonal variations in incoming water flow and precipitation (McCarthy, 2002).  Merron 
(1991), however, contends that the Okavango is predictable in the sense that it is driven 
by an annual flood cycle.  What is irregular is the water retention and flow rates and these 
affect fish and other fauna downstream of the flood waters.  Figures 3 and 4 give an 
indication of the variations from year to year. 
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Figure 3: Annual rainfall, Maun Station  
Source of data Department of Meteriological Servies, GoB, 2001 
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Figure 4: Okavango Delta Water Flow 
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It is estimated that the mean annual inflow is 11,000 million cubic metres, and this is 
augmented by an average of 5,000 million cubic metres of rainfall on the Delta itself 
(McCarthy, 2002).  Of this only 300 million cubic metres leaves the Delta through 
ground water flow and some 15,400 million cubic metres is lost to the atmosphere by 
evapo-transpiration, reflecting the semi-arid nature of the region where evaporation is 3-4 
times greater than precipitation. Figure 5 indicates the temperature patterns in the 
Okavango Delta, with a variation of roughly 15 degrees between night time and daytime 
temperatures. The temperature patterns around the Okavango Delta are influenced by the 
dry and arid nature of its surroundings. 
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Figure 5: Mean Monthly Temperatures (1971-2001, Jan-Dec) Source of data- 
Department of Meteorological Services 
 
The Okavango Delta is located in a rapidly developing country, and a semi-arid 
environment. Both of these circumstances are placing pressure on the utilisation of the 
Delta’s resources, especially a very fast population growth of 2.8% (Heiden, 1991)2.  Due 
                                                 
2 The population growth rate of Botswana is currently at 0.6%, having dropped from a growth rate of 2.8% between 
1975-2000 as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The percentage of adults (age 15-49) living with AIDS in 2001 was 
38.8% (United Nations Human Development Report, 2002)  
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to a combination of wetland and dry land habitats, the Okavango Delta has rich wildlife 
resources.  The waters of the Okavango Delta nurture a wide variety of riverine, fauna 
and flora in what would otherwise be considered desert (Hasler, 2000).  The biodiversity 
of the Okavango Delta is considered a valuable world heritage, as is evident from 
Botswana’s signing of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 1971 (Hasler, 2000).  It 
provides good breeding areas for a range of birds, mammals and fish.  The Okavango 
system deserves its reputation as one of the world’s premier wildlands, with magnificent 
scenery, game viewing and bird watching.  Although the species diversity is not 
exceptional, the area has nearly all large mammal species still existing in southern Africa, 
and the largest resident population of two species that are endangered elsewhere, i.e. 
sitatunga (Tragelaphus spekei) and lechwe (Kobus leche) (Heiden, 1992).  Other large 
herbivores include giraffe, zebra, roan, sable, buffalo, gemsbok, a large and expanding 
population of elephants and many other water-dependent animals such as hippopotamus.  
The Delta is a low nutrient/low productivity system, with small local patches of higher 
production and with good diversity of macro and micro invertebrates but no strong 
evidence of endemism3 (Scudder et al., 1993).  The waters of the Okavango Delta 
support economic activities like arable agriculture, livestock husbandry and wildlife 
utilisation. The Delta is thus of a high biological, hydrological and economic value to the 
Ngamiland district and the country as a whole.    
 
The hydrological peculiarity of the Okavango system, having its largest volume of water 
and the largest area extent in the midst of the dry season, results in a marked seasonal 
migration of wildlife (Scudder et al., 1993).  These animals move to the dry land 
surrounding the Delta in the wet season, taking water from rain-filled pools and pans 
(ibid).  The Khwai settlement is in one of the areas through which wildlife migrate in the 
wet season, while Xaxaba is in an area of dry season migration. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Endemism refers to the situation in which a species is restricted to a particular geographic region (Oxford Dictionary 
of Ecology) 
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2.2 The History of the People 
 
The ethnic Basarwa have been historically associated with hunting and gathering, which 
makes them different from the dominant Tswana ethnic group and the less dominant 
Kalanga, both of whom have been associated with an agro-pastoral way of life.  Although 
there are other tribal groups in the Delta, these will only be dealt with in reference to their 
contact and interaction with the Basarwa.  The language Basarwa speak is simplistically 
referred to as SeSesarwa, although there are in fact several different languages 
indigenous to the Basarwa. Much of the interest in Basarwa has arisen from their 
remarkable adaptation to one of the harshest environments in the world, the Kalahari 
Desert (Saugestad, 1998). Their ability to survive in an environment that for large parts of 
the year provides no surface water has depended on a locally appropriate combination of 
hunting and gathering techniques and a form of social organisation that allowed for the 
flexible use of large territories that were adjusted to seasonal changes (Madzwamuse, 
1998; Saugestad, 1998; Cashdan, 1993 and Lee, 1972).  The cultural differences between 
the Basarwa and the dominant Tswana agro-pastoral society have been important in 
defining the relations between the two groups, and the way each related to and used land.  
The agro-pastoral Batswana, for instance, came to dominate the hunter-gatherer Basarwa, 
thus imposing a system of land tenure that gave precedence to the agro-pastoral use of 
land.  This has been reflected in the definition of land rights in Botswana’s Constitution 
in and the Tribal Land Act of 1968 and its 1993 Amendment.  Wily (1981) states that in 
the modern Republic of Botswana, cattle-raising has been the traditional mainstay of 
local livelihood since pastoral Tswana tribes first settled in the region in the 18th and 19th 
century.  Until then the only occupants of this semi-arid land were the hunting and 
gathering San (Basarwa), who had lived for centuries without livestock, subsisting on the 
abundant wildlife and wild food resources. 
 
Some 20% of Botswana's 50,000 Basarwa live in Ngamiland.  The so-called ‘River 
Bushmen’ (referred to in Setswana as Banoka) live in and around the Delta.  They are 
said to be the earliest inhabitants of the Delta.  Although Basarwa populations are 
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becoming increasingly concentrated in a few areas, recent historic records (such as 
Stigand’s map of 1922) show that they were scattered over all parts of what is now 
Ngamiland (Cassidy et al. 2001).  
 
The River Bushmen include groups such as the Bateti, named after the Boteti River; the 
BaXhanikwe4, found north of the Delta (e.g. Xaxaba), the BaBugakhwe5 to the south and 
middle of the Delta (e.g. Khwai), and several smaller groups like the Bagumaii who lived 
scattered throughout the delta area (Tlou, 1976).  According to Tlou (1976) it appears that 
originally the Basarwa of Ngamiland were concentrated to the south of the Boteti River 
and Lake Xau region.  Over the years they moved up the river, fanned out along the many 
channels of the Delta, and settled there.  Further penetration into the swamps resulted 
from a new mobility acquired when they learned how to use dug-out canoes (Mekoro) 
from later immigrants, the Bayei and Hambukushu who came from an area in present day 
Zambia and Angola (ibid). 
 
The Basarwa’s way of life has gone through a transition.  According to Lee, (1984; 1971) 
and Hitchcock (1987), archival records indicate that the Basarwa can no longer be 
considered as pure foragers, as they have long been involved in a complex set of 
interactions with cattle owners, traders and others.  The Bayei were the first Bantu-
speakers to migrate to the Okavango (around 1750) from their home of Diyei, an area just 
west of the confluence of the Chobe and the Zambezi rivers, now within the Namibia  
Caprivi Strip (Tlou, 1976).  They met and intermingled with the BaBugakhwe, with 
whom they intermarried.  This intermixing continued over the years to the extent that the 
two groups now regard each other as classificatory cousins (ibid). To date the Bayei 
remain the most numerous ethnic group in Ngamiland.  The Hambukushu (who also 
migrated to the Delta in the nineteenth century) contributed to the life of the Delta by 
introducing technology, i.e Mekoro and fishing equipment. During the 1800s, the 
politically ascendant Batawana arrived in Ngamiland (Taylor, 2000; Bolaane, 2004).  
According to Tlou (1976), the main contributions of the Batawana to the culture of the 
                                                 
4 Sometimes spelt BaQhanikhwe. 
5 Also known as BaBugakhwe 
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Delta were in political institutions, law, language and pastoralism.  They came to rule 
over the other ethnic groups found in Ngamiland. Infestation of tsetse fly through much 
of the Delta kept most of these immigrants and their stock in the periphery of the Delta 
(Taylor, 2000; Merron 1991). 
 
This interaction with other ethnic groups has often been to the disadvantage of the 
Basarwa communities.  One disadvantage has been the failure by other ethnic groups to 
recognise hunting and gathering as a legitimate land use, which in turn has had far-
reaching consequences for the ethnic Basarwa, such as loss of land and land rights.  
 
Most government officials and policy makers have assumed that the Basarwa did not 
have a clearly defined traditional land use system (Ng’ong’ola, 1997; Ng’ong’ola and 
Moeletsi, 1995). This has resulted in Basarwa being made landless and has increased 
their poverty given that land is the basic means of production, for rural households that 
depend on agricultural production or the gathering of wild foods in order to survive 
(Arntzen et al. 1982; Mogwe, 1994; Ratcliffe, 1976; Selolwane, 1995; Wily, 1994;).   
 
Because of the problem of defining land rights, tracts of land ‘belonging’ to the Basarwa 
were incorporated into State lands, national parks and game reserves, wildlife 
management areas, and even “private” lands (such as the Tribal Grazing Land Policy 
(TGLP) ranches) (Bolaane, 2001; Ellis, 2001; Saugestad, 1998; Wily, 1994).  The 
landlessness of the Basarwa is in part the result of unintended consequences of 
government policies and programmes, such as the TGLP, the Fauna Act and the Tribal 
Land Act. Government policy can be seen as a formalisation of British colonial actions, 
during the colonial era, when Botswana was a protectorate under British rule.  Cecil 
Rhodes settled Boer and English pioneers on the Gantsi ridge in the western part of the 
country, which were intended to act as a buffer against German expansion from South 
West Africa (today Namibia) (Ng’ong’ola and Moeletsi, 1995).  During colonial rule, 
native reserves were mainly delineated for the Tswana-speaking tribes or communities.  
Crown land (land retained under the Bechuanaland Protectorate administration) was 
essentially those land areas belonging to Basarwa, Bakgalagadi and other voiceless 
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minority ethnic groups not incorporated into the recognised Tswana tribes and territories.  
Furthermore, by virtue of living on what was referred to as Crown land, the Basarwa 
were those most directly affected by the evolution and implementation of conservation 
laws.  The numerous and complicated rules and regulations of these laws were 
formulated and implemented without consultation with the Basarwa, nor with sufficient 
regard of the importance of hunting and gathering to the affected communities 
(Ngo’ngo’la and Moeletsi, 1995).  
 
The TGLP was intended to address the problem of overgrazing and land degradation 
associated with the open access to resources, the so-called “tragedy of the commons”.  
Privatisation and the fencing off of land was promoted, resulting in the loss of land by 
many rural poor, such as Batswana small stock cattle owners and the Basarwa, as it 
involved the fencing of portions of the commonage.  By the time the (TGLP) was 
introduced in 1975, the Basarwa comprised an ethnic and socio-economic minority of 6% 
in predominantly Tswana pastoral society (Wily 1981).  While about a third of the 30, 
000 Basarwa were still able to live by traditional means of subsistence hunting and 
gathering (until the recent relocation of the Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve), the majority have long seen their lifestyle give way to Tswana settlement and 
grazing patterns (ibid).  
 
Today Basarwa effectively live as landless squatters on the edge of farms, cattle posts or 
cattle ranches owned by other citizens, or in resettlement schemes started under the 
Remote Area Development Programme since the 1970’s (ibid).  Those in Ngamiland live 
on the edges of game reserves, national parks and so-called concession areas (areas 
managed by private safari companies.)  The fencing component of the new Agricultural 
Policy will make matters worse for the landless Basarwa, as more communal land will be 
fenced up for private grazing areas. 
 
Unlike the Basarwa in other parts of the country, the Basarwa in Ngamiland live in areas 
that have always been a part of their territories, although they have access to much 
smaller areas than previously.  Social services have been provided for in their traditional 
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settlements, without the need for relocation (as has been applied to Basarwa living in the 
CKGR). This has been an important reason why the Basarwa in Ngamiland are fairly 
independent and self-contained compared to those in the south western part of the 
country (Le Roux pers comm).   
2.3 Land Tenure in Ngamiland 
 
Before Independence in 1966, there were three categories of land tenure in Botswana. 
These were tribal land, which was under the effective control of each of the major tribes, 
and constituting about 47% of the land area; crown lands, under the administration of the 
Protectorate Government or recognised as not being under any tribe and constituting 
about 40% of the land area; and freehold farms, occupying the remaining 6% 
(Ngo’ngo’la and Moeletsi, 1995).  European settlers occupied the freehold farms, for 
which tribal chiefs made grants and concessions to these lands. 
 
Land tenure today includes freehold land (5%), largely farms and ranches such as those 
in the Ghanzi area and the Eastern edge of the country; State land, which covers about a 
quarter of the country and is comprised of national parks, game reserves and Wildlife 
Management Areas (19.4% - both Khwai and Xaxaba are in WMAs), forest reserves 
(1%); and all urban land (4.6%).  The majority of the land (70%) is tribal land and is 
largely allocated for communal grazing. These areas take the form of Tribal Grazing 
Land Policy farms, with a small number of commercial arable blocks (Government of 
Botswana, 2003).  
 
Ngamiland District has two major land tenure categories, tribal land and state land.  Land 
use categories within tribal and state lands are Wildlife Management Areas, game 
reserves, national parks, settlements, communal grazing lands, commercial farming lands 
and arable lands (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Summary of Land Uses in Ngamiland 
Designated Land Use Area Percentage
National Parks and Game Reserves 6340 km2 5.7% 
CBNRM in Ungazetted WMAs 10,233 km2 9.2% 
Commercial and CBNRM wildlife use in gazetted WMAs 60,617 km2 54.5% 
Commercial farming 5,116 km2 4.6% 
Communal pastoral activities (of which pastoral with possible CBNRM use) 28, 918 km2 26.0% 
Total Ngamiland 111,233 km2 100% 
[Source: Environmental Assessment of Veterinary Fences in Ngamiland: Summary 
Report (2000)] 
 
The Okavango sub-district is a rural area.  Agriculture is therefore the predominant 
activity, with subsistence arable agriculture and livestock rearing along the delta and 
rivers. Handicrafts supplemented by fishing are important for female heads of the 
households as an income generating activity. The largest economic activity in the sub-
district is tourism (Cassidy et al. 2001).        
 
2.3.1 Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)  
Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana has been accepted by the 
Botswana Government as a rural development and conservation strategy.  The aim of 
CBNRM is to improve the living conditions of people residing with natural resources, to 
the point that they see the value of conserving those resources for future generations 
(CBNRM Draft Policy, 2001).  A wide range of CBNRM activities (see table 3 below), 
such as commercial hunting, photographic tourism, ecotourism, craft production, 
basketry, the processing of veld products and game skin tanning, are managed by 
community based organisations with the assistance of Government, local NGOs and 
international donors (Rozemeijer, 2001; Boggs, 1998;). 
 
‘Formal’ Community Based Natural Resource Management (Fabricius 2004) is the major 
land use for the communities of Khwai and Xaxaba.  Formal CBNRM operates through a 
legal entity – a community based organisation (CBO) - that is established to manage, for 
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the benefit of the community as a whole, the natural resources within wildlife 
management areas (WMA) entrusted to that community (Cassidy et al. 2001).  
 
CBNRM is based on the ideals of equality, natural resource conservation and social 
development.  The policy is designed to: 
• Provide for broad stakeholder coordination at District and National level; 
• Give communities incentives to engage in sustained development and 
conservation activities; 
• Establish clear links between the reception of community benefits and the 
existence of natural resources; 
• Encourage the investment of community benefits gained from natural resources 
into activities that will not adversely affect those resources or otherwise hinder the 
viability of ecological systems; 
• Enhance community autonomy through programmes directed towards community 
self-reliance and where participation uses democratic and transparent 
mechanisms; and 
• Ensure respect for the needs of all members of society  
(CBNRM Draft Policy, 2001). 
 
To qualify for Government support for CBNRM, a community has to form a 
representative, accountable and legal entity called a Community Based Organisation, 
(also referred to as Village Trust Committees).  Village Trust Committees (VTCs) are set 
up at village level to oversee the CBNRM project activities.  The VTC must be managed 
using a participatory process sanctioned by District Authorities. Communities in 
controlled hunting areas (CHAs) are granted resource leases over wildlife and tourism on 
their land for a period of up to 15 years.  Although CBNRM allows communities to enjoy 
increased and direct management of natural resources, the Government retains the 
ultimate authority to protect species and ecological systems, and continues to regulate 
their use (CBNRM Draft Policy, 2001). 
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Cgaecgae Tlhobololo Trust:  registered in 1997 
Size of Area/ 
CBO Pop 
2640 km2 
360  
CHA NG4, use of quota of NG5 
Villages covered Xaixai 
Activities Selling concessions to the safari 
Operators, Subsistence hunting 
of part of quota, Management of 
cultural tourism operation, 
management of craft marketing 
operation, management of 
village shop  
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
-  -
2
0
0
2
 
180,000  -
2
0
0
1
 
21,5000  30
2
0
0
0
 
63,000  23
A
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n
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a
l
 
B
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e
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n
 
P
u
l
a
 
1
9
9
9
 
68,000  45
Khwai Community Trust: registered in 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
1918 km2 
350 
CHA NG18 
Villages covered Khwai 
Activities Marketing hunts, Subsistence 
hunting of part of the quota, 
Grass and crafts marketing 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
389,000  20
2
0
0
2
 
1,211,533 
22 + 3 by safari 
company per hunting 
package 
2
0
0
1
 
600,000 
22 + 3 by safari 
company per hunting 
package 
2
0
0
0
 1,200,000 
 
3 people per hunting 
package 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
i
n
 
P
u
l
a
 
1
9
9
9
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
Okavango Community Trust: Registered in March 
1995 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
929km2 
2200 
CHA NG22 (hunting in WMA) 
NG23 (photographic in WMA) 
Villages covered Beetsha Eretsha Gudigwa 
Seronga Gunitsonga 
Activities Selling concessions to the safari 
operator 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
1,500,000  76
2
0
0
2
 
1,450,000  76
2
0
0
1
 
1,400,000  130+
2
0
0
0
 
950,000  130+
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
i
n
 
P
u
l
a
 
1
9
9
9
 
600,000  29
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Table 3: Some of the Active CBOs Operating in Ngamiland. 
Source: National CBNRM Forum in Botswana, 2004; 2001 and 
2000 
Okavang
2000) 
Size of A
CBO Po
CHA 
Villages 
Activitie
Y
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
i
n
 
P
u
l
a
 
 
(Cont
 o  Jakotsha Community Trust: (registered in 
rea 
p 
589 km2 
700 
NG24 (Photographic area in WMA) 
covered Etsha 1-13, Ikoga, Jao flats 
s Photographic tourism (mokoro 
safaris); development of campsites 
ear  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
0  0
2
0
0
2
 
0  0
2
0
0
1
 
0  0
2
0
0
0
 
0  0
1
9
9
9
 
-  -
Okavango Kopano Mokoro Community Trust 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
1223 km2 
2400 
CHA NG32 (Multipurpose in WMA) 
Villages covered Ditsiping, Quxau, Daonara Boro, 
+associated settlements 
Activities Selling concession to safari 
operators; Tourism activities such 
as management of campsite, 
mokoro packages; Grass, reeds, 
ilila, fish marketing 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
-  100+
2
0
0
2
 
1,300,000  100+
2
0
0
1
 
1,200,000  100+
2
0
0
0
 
1,100,000  100+
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
i
n
 
P
u
l
a
 
1
9
9
9
 
750,000  45
Sankuyo Tswaragano Management Trust 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
860 km2 
250 
CHA NG34 (multipurpose in WMA) 
Villages covered Sankuyo 
Activities Selling concessions to safari 
operators; Thatching grass 
marketing; Seubsistence hunting 
of part of quota; Campsite 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
-  95
2
0
0
2
 
1255,000  95
2
0
0
1
 
70,000  10
2
0
0
0
 
595,460  53
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
B
e
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e
f
i
t
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i
n
 
P
u
l
a
 
1
9
9
9
 
503,850  45
  
.) CBOs Operating in Ngamiland
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 Mababe Zukutsham Community Trust: registered 1998 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
2181km2 
 200. In 1998-1999: 91 
CHA NG41 (multipurpose in WMA) 
Villages covered Mababe 
Activities Selling concessions to the Safari 
operators, Subsistence hunting of part 
of the quota 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
-  -
2
0
0
2
 
886,000  59
2
0
0
1
 
750,000  59
2
0
0
0
 
675,000  49
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e
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1
9
9
9
 
0  0
Okavango Polers Trust 
Size of Area 
CBO Pop 
 
75 members 
CHA Operating in NG12 
Villages covered Polers from diff villages, eg. 
Seronga and Gunitsonga 
Activities Tourism (viewing the Delta from 
Mokoro); Crafts marketing 
Year  Revenue
Received 
through 
Trust 
No. of Jobs Created 
2
0
0
3
 
1,000,000 100 
2
0
0
2
 
1,000,000 100 
2
0
0
1
 
750,000 100 
2
0
0
0
 
680,543 100 
A
n
n
u
a
l
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e
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a
 
1
9
9
9
 
623,534 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cont.) CBOs Operating in Ngamiland 
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MAP 2: Controlled Hunting Areas. Source: Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks 
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2.4 The Study Sites 
 
As stated earlier the fieldwork for this study was carried out in Khwai and Xaxaba. These 
two sites were selected as they are representative of Basarwa communities that 
traditionally practiced adaptive management and are exposed to rapid change (relocation 
and reduced access to land and natural resources) as a result of mainly conservation 
policies. Both settlements are on the borders of the Moremi Game Reserve and their 
current livelihood strategies remain largely based on the use of natural resources. Khwai 
and Xaxaba both have ongoing CBNRM initiatives. The two study sites therefore 
provided a good basis for studying the Basarwa’s day to day interaction with their 
ecosystem, past management systems and exploring the fundamental research questions 
that this study sought to address. More details on these study sites are provided in the 
section below. 
 
2.4.1 Khwai settlement 
Khwai settlement lies on the northern border of the protected Moremi Game Reserve 
along the permanently flowing Khwai River (in WMA NG19), 140 km from Maun.  It is 
situated in the middle of one of the primary game and tourist areas of the Delta region. 
Khwai is almost exclusively a Basarwa (BaBugakhwe) community with a hunter-gatherer 
history.  The village arose from the resettlement of various smaller family groups out of 
the Moremi Game Reserve (MGR) at the time of its designation in the early 1960s.  The 
former Headman of Khwai settlement (Alexandra, 1993), together with 20-30 people in 
1963, was forced to move to an area outside the reserve boundaries.  In the mid 1990’s the 
boundaries of the Moremi Game Reserve were extended and the people of Khwai were 
forced to relocate yet again, this time to the present site of the village (ibid).  
 
Khwai settlement has a population of 419, 95% of whom are Basarwa (Cassidy et al. 
2001). The village has 20 homesteads with average of 18 people per homestead. The 
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average income is P2,100/month per household, the bulk of which is earned during the 
tourism peak season (Every River Has Its People Project, 2001).  A typical homestead in 
Khwai may have several households living in one compound, e.g. the Chief and his family 
have built their home in his grandparents’ compound.  Some homesteads, however, have a 
single household.  A number of the residents make a living working at one of the three 
adjacent tourist lodges (Boggs, 1998). Some of the men have jobs in the hunting industry, 
particularly as trackers and skinners.  These men usually spend 6 months (from May to 
October, the hunting season) in safari camps each year, with the rest of the year spent in 
their home settlement.  
 
Crop production mainly takes the form of backyard gardens, where mostly maize and 
pumpkins are grown.  A major constraint preventing larger and more extensive gardens 
further from the village is destruction of crops by wildlife.  Certain crops (e.g. pumpkins) 
are stored in elevated and shaded structures made of poles and twigs. 
 
Khwai settlement formed a CBO and was awarded the 1, 815 km2 concession area called 
NG18 in March 1996. However, the lease was denied by the District Land Board on the 
grounds that their Trust constitution was discriminatory.  The constitution stipulated that 
any member of the community of Basarwa origin would automatically become a member 
of the trust, while non-Basarwa had to apply for membership.  This was probably a 
strategy of the Khwai community to protect themselves from domination by outsiders.  
They have, however, subsequently amended their constitution and consequently been 
given their wildlife quota, which they sold for P1.7 million (UDS 280, 000) in July 2000 
(CBNRM Status Report, 2000). In 2001 they received P600 000 (USD 100 000) from 
selling hunting packages for the hunting season (CBNRM Status Report, 2001). 
 
The only public infrastructure in this village is the Kgotla (a traditional Tswana public 
forum meeting place) and the Chief’s office.  There is neither a clinic nor a school. Most 
children attend boarding school in Gudikwa (145km from Khwai) with some attending 
school in Maun (135km from Khwai).  The nearest health care service is a clinic in 
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Mababe, which is 40km from Khwai, and there is a Government District Hospital in 
Maun. 
2.4.2 Xaxaba Settlement 
Xaxaba settlement (also known as Sedibane and Ncoega), on the other hand, has a large 
number of Basarwa of the Xhanikhwe group, some Bayei and a few people from other 
groups such as Batawana.  According to some elderly residents, Xaxaba means ‘a place of 
wildlife’ (literal translation), and in the past it was part of their hunting grounds.  This 
settlement has a population of 78 people, 11 homesteads with an average of 7 people per 
household6.  The total household income per month is P1,600 (Every river Has its People 
Project, 2001), although it is seasonal and depends largely on the vicissitudes of the 
tourism market. 
 
Xaxaba is an island, which is sometimes referred to as Sedibane.  The residents have built 
their homes right in the centre of this island to avoid the shaded river bank, which is 
preferred by dangerous wildlife.  The houses are constructed from locally available natural 
resources in the form of mud (from termite mounds), reeds, poles and grass.  Some 
households use aluminium soda and beer cans to reinforce the walls of their huts. 
 
The residents of Xaxaba claim to have originated from Tsobaoro, which is on Chiefs 
Island in the Delta.  In the mid-1960s, the first safari camps in the area attracted 
Xhanikhwe from all over the Boro/Jao region (see Map 1).  The establishment and 
subsequent expansion of the Moremi Game Reserve was a further incentive for both the 
migration of the Xhanikhwe and the establishment of more safari camps in the area.  
Subsequent to the concentration of the Xhanikhwe in the present Xaxaba settlement, the 
Wayeyi from the Jao area, who had historically travelled and hunted in the area, began 
                                                 
6 The Xaxaba community can be described as a transient community as it hosts highly mobile people who are coming in 
to seek employment in the surrounding camps and leave as soon as their contracts ‘expire’. In 1991, 212 people were 
counted in the national census (Cassidy 2001), based on various sources, and a survey carried out in 1999 estimated the 
population of Xaxaba to be approximately 400. 
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arriving in search of jobs (Bock, 1998).  Many more Hambukushu and Wayeyi  continue 
to  migrate from villages surrounding the Delta to this day, although some have returned 
to their nearby villages to work on village CBNRM projects.  Rra Kgalaleo one of my 
informants gave an account of their history and movements which corresponds with 
Bock’s (1998) record.  Rra Kgalalelo, and other informants, also advised that Xaxaba 
Island was a part of their traditional territory. 
 
The current Xaxaba settlement’s head is a Mosarwa whose grandfather was a chief in the 
same place in the 1920s.  The Xaxaba community has been especially marginalised as it 
was the only community in a Wildlife Management Area that was not initially targeted 
under the CBNRM when it started in 1993.  Eventually Government tried to remedy this 
by amalgamating Xaxaba with communities of Ditshiping, Quxau, Daonara and Boro for 
managing NG 32.  This is not working, as the area is too far from Xaxaba for the 
community to actively participate in the CBNRM activities.  More importantly, the 
Government withdrew Special Game Licences in Xaxaba with no immediate form of 
compensation. Special Game Licences were introduced by the Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks to legitimise subsistence hunting by the poorest members of the 
population, making it possible for them to hunt wildlife legally.  These were intended to 
guarantee rights of those people who belonged to communities that foraged for a living, or 
who were Remote Area Dwellers who depended on hunting and gathering for subsistence 
and income.  The withdrawal of these licences has had a profound effect on the food 
security of several households in Xaxaba, as they no longer have direct access to 
subsistence hunting (Cassidy et al. 2001).  Like Khwai, crop production is a major 
constraint in Xaxaba because of crop damage by wildlife.  The settlement has grown, 
however, as a result of job opportunities in the tourist camps nearby.  Xaxaba does not 
have a shortage of males as it is very close to three safari camps (the main source of male 
employment), hence attracting men to stay in the settlement rather than causing them to 
migrate.  Like the Khwai community, the Xaxaba community has a mixed economy which 
includes hunting and gathering, rain-fed agriculture, wage labour, and fishing and income 
from CBNRM initiatives (Cassidy, 1999; Every River Project Data, 2001). 
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 Like Khwai settlement, the Xaxaba settlement has no school or clinic.  The children of 
Xaxaba go to school in Maun (70km away), where they stay with relatives, or in rented 
rooms with no adult care.  The sick are taken to Maun where the nearest health care 
facilities are, or are attended to by a Government mobile clinic, which is unreliable due to 
the difficulty of accessing this island by road.  The residents of Xaxaba use regular flights 
to and from the nearby tourism camps to get to Maun where a return trip costs P60.00 
(US12.50). 
 
This unique ecological, political and socio-economic history and context has had profound 
implications for the vulnerability, adaptability and livelihood options of the Basarwa. 
These issues will be explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the methods employed to address the research questions.  The 
sustainable rural livelihoods framework and adaptive renewal cycle provided the 
theoretical background upon which the data is interpreted and analysed.  
 
The initial fieldwork for the study was undertaken in May 2000.  Two weeks were spent 
in Khwai and another two weeks in Xaxaba.  The second leg of fieldwork took place in 
July 2001, when a further 25 days were spent in Xaxaba only.  Some difficulties were 
encountered in data collection in Khwai.  Although there is potential for more research to 
be done on the Basarwa, much has already been done, and as a consequence of this, the 
residents of Khwai were not easy to work with.  For several days it was difficult to 
undertake any interviews.  The residents argued that the research topic had previously 
been studied by other researchers without the Khwai people having gained any benefits 
from that research.  Perhaps if the research approach had been action oriented, and the 
Khwai community could see the immediate benefits arising from it, there would have 
been better cooperation.  The chief’s father had said: 
 
“Many white people come here to ask us about our traditional ways of gathering, 
tracking and managing resources, and write about these. Sometimes the very same 
people are paid to come back and teach us how to conserve the natural resources 
using our very own knowledge. You will be given a certificate for writing about us, 
what will we get?” 
 
In an effort to win the trust and cooperation of the villagers, time was spent sitting under 
the shade with some of the villagers, such as the Chief, his parents, Mma Kelereng and 
some of the younger people like Domisasa, during which time general and informal 
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discussions were held. Once we had the trust of the community leadership, it became 
much easier to interview the rest of the community members.  
 
On the third day after our arrival in Khwai, some residents left the village to go to a 
nearby hunting concession where they had been invited to collect some elephant meat. 
They were gone for three days, returning back with the meat for some of their family 
members.  My field assistant and I took the opportunity to interview some elders who 
remained behind collecting their life history so as to trace their movements from their 
traditional settlement to the current Khwai and establish the changes which may have been 
brought about by this move. When the others returned we carried out various forms of 
data collection, discussed in more detail in the paragraphs below. 
 
In contrast to our reception at Khwai, we were well received by the community of 
Xaxaba, probably because this village has been the subject of little research. We flew to 
OddBalls Camp, which is close to the island, on a charter airplane, and were handed over 
to an elderly man referred to as RraSedo, who ferried us over to Xaxaba. Terrified of the 
Delta waters, I asked our poler if we were safe from dangerous wildlife. Although I was 
expecting an assuring response, he said; 
“.…there is no way one can get away from death; if it is time for you to die you will die 
regardless of where you go.” 
 
My interpretation of RraSedo’s statement was that, in the wilderness of the Delta, there 
are no life guarantees and one may be faced with death any time, as both the waters and 
the surrounding islands are home to a variety of dangerous wildlife such as crocodiles, 
hippo, elephants and lion. This is a facet of life faced by members of both communities on 
a daily basis. 
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3.2 Data Collection Methods 
 
The data collection methods used in this study included focus group discussions, key 
informant interviews, observation, and the use of secondary data.  Secondary data 
included analysing survey data from the “Every River Has Its People” project’s socio-
ecological survey (2001), maps, reports, policy documents, electronic journals, websites 
and other sources of information on the study subject.  A combination of methods was 
used in order to complement and cross check data.  Furthermore the holistic, 
interdisciplinary nature of studying livelihoods requires bridging conventional survey 
tools with qualitative methodologies (Campbell and Sayer, 2003; Ellis, 2000; DFID, 1999; 
Scoones, 1998). The primary data was, however, largely based on qualitative discussions 
with residents of the two communities and key informants in and outside the two villages.  
These discussions took the form of in-depth semi-structured interviews, particularly with 
community residents, and more structured interviews, especially with key informants.  
The latter was used mainly to cross check information acquired through in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions.  Each of these methods is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
As noted above, the Basarwa of Khwai settlement had been studied previously.  They 
expressed their concern about researchers coming in to collect information from them and 
never coming back to share their findings or helping them in any way.  It was, therefore, 
especially important to build trust before going ahead with data collection, as well as to be 
careful not to raise any hopes or expectations which would not be fulfilled by this study. It 
was therefore decided to avoid carrying out a survey, since one had been done for the 
“Every River Has Its People” socio-ecological project between October 2000 and 
February 2001. 
 
There was also a need to clearly communicate the purpose of this study to the two 
communities, and to spend time at both study sites familiarising myself with the 
communities and community activity, in order to build trust and gain co-operation.  
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 As stated by Chambers (1992), when carrying out this type of research one needs to “learn 
rapidly and progressively, with conscious exploration, flexible use of methods, 
opportunism, improvisation, iteration, cross checking, not following a blue print 
programme but being adaptable in a learning process”. 
 
The above statement can be understood to make reference to participatory rural appraisal 
and rapid rural appraisal methods, which are often suitable for action research. This study 
was not based on action research, however; the methodologies employed were borrowed 
from the PRA framework. A combination of both extractive and participatory methods 
were used through key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions and participant observation, all of which are methods used in PRA 
(Nemarundwe and Richards, 2002; Ellis, 2000; DFID, 1999; Singh and Rennie, 1996; 
Chambers, 1992). 
3.2.1 Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions are semi-structured discussions with a group of people who share 
a common feature (e.g. women of reproductive age, users of a particular service); this 
method of data collection is largely qualitative (Borrini - Feyerabend, 1997).Together with 
an assistant from Gudigua (a nearby village), who acted as an interpreter and cultural 
informer. I gathered together people in groups of 6-12 to discuss several issues of concern 
to this study.  Focus group discussions were held in Khwai with the basketry committee, 
village elders and the Village Trust Committee. In Xaxaba they were held with two sets of 
village elders and the Village Trust Committee. 
 
The focus group discussions enabled me to explore the nature of land use and natural 
resource management practices amongst the Basarwa groups in the study area. The focus 
group discussion method created the opportunities for generating new ideas for 
hypotheses and the interpretation of results. The information gathered also provided the 
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study with rich quotes; probing issues in greater depth; and sharing information between 
the researcher and respondents in informal and relaxed settings.  
 
This latter point was important.  Whereas I chose participants for focus group discussions   
by means of sampling procedure, I often met them where they were already gathered to 
relax and stay away from the sun to conduct the group discussion.  It was possible for me 
in this way to collect a group of elders without actively calling them to a meeting, as 
people often sat and interacted with their age mates and members of the same sex.  In 
some cases though, for example the women’s basketry committee and village leaders (the 
chief and his advisors) in Khwai, I arranged for a special meeting with the groups. 
  
Often discussions were interrupted by the need for translation, as I neither speak nor 
understand the local language. This was more of a problem in Khwai, as respondents 
preferred to use Sesarwa instead of Setswana. 
 
3.2.2 Key informant interviews 
Semi-structured interviews (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997) were held in a relaxed and 
informal way (Neuman, 1997) with experts in the field of land use and natural resource 
management. Unlike questionnaires, with standardised questions and close ended answers, 
semi-structured interviews use only general questions (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997).  This 
leaves the interviewer free to ask probing and follow up questions such as “Who?” 
“Where?” “When?” and “How?” based on the respondents' answers and conversation flow 
(ibid). 
Semi-structured interviews were held with a range of key informants, including: 
• Experts in Basarwa research;  
• Government officials.  This included the Game Wardens, the Department of 
Wildlife Management Parks (Community Service Division), and officials who 
have previously worked in the Okavango Sub-District for a period of more than 
five years, officers of Department of Wildlife and National Parks (based in Maun) 
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were also interviewed; Non-Governmental Organisations, including Kuru 
Development Programme in Shakawe, Conservation International, and Kalahari 
Conservation Society;  
• Representatives of Community Based Organisations (Khwai Community Trust, 
Xaxaba Settlement Trust Committee), including community members holding key 
positions at the two study sites;  
• Community leaders and the elderly, especially with reference to traditional 
practices; and 
• Representatives of the private sector, including the management of Delta Camp 
and OddBalls Camp operating near Xaxaba settlement.   
 
A total of 17 people were interviewed using this method. Notes were taken, using a tape 
recorder and hand-written notes to keep records of these discussions. 
 
Key questions asked included: 
1. Is land use conflict a problem in this area? If yes, what is the nature of this 
conflict? 
2. What in your opinion do you see as important for the livelihoods of the community 
in this settlement?  
a. resource rights (land and natural resources) 
b. education 
c. cash income 
d. other 
3. Please elaborate on your answer.  For instance, when in the year is cash income 
most important? 
4. What are the income opportunities for the community in this area? 
5. Do Government policies and regulations influence the livelihood strategies of the 
Basarwa communities in this area? Please elaborate (e.g. which policies). 
6. Do you think CBNRM is likely to benefit this community? Please elaborate. 
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The full interview guide for the key informant interviews is given in Annex1.  
3.2.3 Informal interviews 
This method of data collection was also used throughout my fieldwork, often with 
ordinary members of the community (e.g. the Mokoro craftsmen, fishermen, women, 
tourist guides etc.). 
 
The questions designed for the focus group discussions, as well as general questions on 
community matters, were used for these interviews.  The village leaders (Chiefs, Village 
Trust Committee chairpersons and Village Development Committee members) mainly 
gave a political perspective of the issues raised during the discussion relating to the 
livelihood strategies, while at the same time giving me legitimacy to conduct further  
interviews with other members of the community (Caplovitz, 1983). 
 
Informal interviews were held with members of the study villages as well as with other 
researchers involved in research on Basarwa and natural resource management.  These 
researchers included Lin Cassidy, Maitseo Bolaane, Michael Taylor and Rosinnah Masilo, 
some of whom do their work through the Basarwa Research Programme at the University 
of Botswana. Lin Cassidy and Maitseo Bolaane were interviewed through emails and over 
the telephone, as they were studying abroad. Interviews with both Rosinnah Masilo and 
Michael Taylor took place in Gaborone.  
 
Data obtained through these methods mainly took the form of notes, tape-recorded 
interviews and discussions, photographs and observations. The data was then summarised 
and reduced to a manageable size. Data reduction and transformation was a continuous 
process, after the fieldwork was completed, until the final report was written.   
 
3.2.4 Documentary and other secondary data assessment 
The documentary assessment phase of research is often referred to as secondary data 
assessment.  It is the re-analysis of previously collected survey data or other information 
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(Neuman, 1997).  I assessed available and accessible documented information on the 
research topic and the two study sites, including progress, and monitoring and evaluation 
reports from the Department of Wildlife and National Parks Community Extension and 
Outreach Division; USAID’s Natural Resource Management Programme; and KCS’ 
Every River Has Its People Project survey data and documents.  The Every River Has Its 
People survey data allowed me to undertake a quantitative analysis for this study. At a 
community level, the Community Trust files were examined and the NG32 2001 Annual 
General Meeting attended. 
 
Various policies and legislation documents (e.g. CBNRM Draft Policy 2001, Rural 
Development Policy and Strategy, Department of Wildlife and National Parks Act, 
Ecotourism Strategy, etc.) were studied in order to establish how national policies and 
local institutions can be adapted to promote the resilience of the livelihood strategies of 
the two communities. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Qualitative data analysis 
This study set out to identify the links between the two communities and their local 
environment. In order to do this effectively I established an interdisciplinary framework 
that combined the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework and the Adaptive Renewal 
Cycle methodologies. These allowed me to frame questions whose answers should 
provide information regarding those links. The first step in analysing this data was to 
disaggregate and categorise the data on livelihoods into the four different types of 
livelihood capital suggested by Campbell et al. (2003). For instance, where respondents 
spoke of adaptive strategies, the next step in analysis was to establish where the strategies 
would fall in terms of the livelihood assets (e.g. data on taboos and informal rules was 
categorised as relating to social and cultural capital). The second step was to look at the 
constraints surrounding local practices, review policy documents, and analyse the policy 
framework to ascertain whether these practices were being supported or not, thereby 
 61
strengthening or weakening their resilience. The diagram below, adopted from Rennie and 
Singh (1996), comes close to summarising the links between these two frameworks, and is 
useful to illustrate how the two frameworks were brought together in order to group and 
analyse the data. 
 
 
 
 
 62
  
 
 
Every River has Its  
People survey  
data, focus group  Local discussions, key 
adaptive informant 
interviews, strategies observation
1
2 
3Sustainable 
Livelihoods 
systems
Social and 
Economic Conventional 
Policy Knowledge 4conditions 
Data from policy and  
strategy documents 
interpretation of data to 
inform analysis of 
livelihood systems 
based on the SRLF and 
Adaptive Renewal 
Cycle
Figure 6: Towards adaptive livelihood strategies 
 
The above figure represents the three main constraints leading to sustainable livelihood 
systems in arid and semi-arid lands (centre circle). Sustainable livelihoods draw most 
(arrow 1) from the adaptive strategies that people and nature have evolved together (first 
circle), but they will also require an appropriate environment of social and policy 
conditions (second circle, arrow 2). They will also draw on contemporary knowledge 
systems (third circle). The dotted arrows (3, 4) show the influence of adaptive strategies 
on contemporary knowledge and hence on policy (4). Source Rennie and Singh (1995). 
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The figure above indicates what happens for livelihood strategies that are sustainable, and 
is useful in terms of breaking down the analysis in order to learn where weaknesses for 
building sustainability lie. For instance, it was found in this study that the prevailing 
economic and policy conditions hamper the local communities’ adaptive strategies, and 
that the current conventional knowledge informing these policies does not take the local 
knowledge and culture of these communities into consideration. 
 
Analyses of qualitative data were further informed by Carney’s (1998) suggestion of using 
a schematic approach, which involves plotting the asset status on a pentagon, with each 
corner representing one of the five major categories of assets (see figure below). 
 
Natural 
Capital
Human 
Capital
Financial 
Capital
Physical 
capital
Social 
Capital
 
Figure 7: Plotting Asset Status on a Pentagon 
 
The example displays a household/community that is high in social and natural capital, 
low in financial and physical capital and moderately endowed in human capital. This 
depicts the picture of the asset status of Basarwa communities prior to 1968, the period 
characterising the practice of traditional livelihood strategies (see Chapter 5). For 
example representing relative asset endowment comparisons between 
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households/communities graphically in this way, assets are shown in the same order 
round the perimeter of the pentagon; the resulting area of the pentagon inside the figure 
gives an approximate picture of the relative asset endowment of social units being 
compared. In the case of this study, the internal pentagon will change in response to 
change in the two communities’ history and livelihood strategies. 
Source: Carney (1998) 
 
The axis is not calibrated in quantitative terms, but represents rank orderings when broad 
comparisons have been made across different groups (Carney, 1998). Though Ellis (2000) 
suggests a participatory approach be used with this form of analysis, in this study the 
analysis was carried out after the fieldwork stage, based on information derived from the 
fieldwork and from secondary data analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Quantitative data analysis 
Numeric survey data from the Every River Has Its People project was transferred into a 
spreadsheet for purposes of calculating averages for various socio-economic parameters 
(e.g. average income, income by source etc.). The data also provided basic demographic 
information on the two study sites. 
 
Statistical data from reviewed sources was referred to as part of the analysis and 
interpretation of the research results. The data was categorised for this purpose into three 
main areas, which make up the results chapters: vulnerabilities, resilience and coping 
strategies, and evaluation of current interventions. 
 
Reflections on the methodology: 
The methodologies employed mimicked the approaches used in participatory research. 
These were guided by the SRLF and the adaptive renewal cycle, which are frameworks 
that bridge disciplines and therefore call for the bridging of research methods used in the 
social and natural sciences. Ideally when carrying out research of this kind, a multi-
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disciplinary team is required. As I have a strong background in social sciences (mainly 
sociology), integration of the findings from the perspective of ecosystem ecologists 
proved to be very challenging. 
 
Furthermore, participatory research often results in a joint learning process for both the 
subject group and the researchers; however, due to the fact that this was not an action 
research project or a study linked to any specific ongoing projects in the two villages, the 
joint learning aspects were not exploited to the full potential. 
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Chapter 4: Past and Present Vulnerabilities Faced by the 
Basarwa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the past and present vulnerabilities that the Basarwa have been and 
are being exposed to.  In order to understand the livelihood strategies of the Basarwa, one 
has to understand the current vulnerabilities they face, and compare present vulnerabilities 
to those that have shaped their social and institutional fabric.  The central thesis in this 
chapter is:  
 
The traditional social and institutional characteristics of the Basarwa of Khwai and 
Xaxaba settlements have developed in response to the highly dynamic Okavango Delta 
ecosystem.  
 
Contemporary Basarwa are faced with new socio-economic vulnerabilities in addition to 
ecological uncertainties, for which they have few traditional coping strategies. The key 
questions addressed in this chapter are: 
 
1. What are the historical sources of vulnerability that may have shaped the evolution 
of Basarwa social and institutional systems? 
2. What additional sources of vulnerability have been introduced by external political 
and economic developments over the past century? 
3. Are the Basarwa studied here prepared for these new challenges? 
 
At local level in their day-to-day interaction with their natural environment, the Basarwa 
are vulnerable to climatic and environmental variability, as well as to global and local 
economics, politics and power.  They face the same vulnerabilities at a national level 
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because of their position as an ethnic minority within the social stratification of Botswana.  
These vulnerabilities in turn affect their livelihoods and the wider availability of financial, 
social and natural assets. Assets are both destroyed and created resulting in response to 
trends, shocks and seasonality.  What makes the Basarwa more vulnerable than other rural 
poor communities in Botswana is their loss of land, as outlined in the introduction to this 
thesis. 
 
Vulnerability used in the context of studies such as this typically refers to the exposure of 
groups of people or individuals to stress arising from environmental change (Adjer, 2000).  
In the context of my study, however, vulnerability will also encompass stress arising from 
political developments, power relationships, and related to politics, power, global  
economic trends, all of which disrupt livelihoods, resulting in the loss of security for the 
Basarwa.  The factors that make up a society’s vulnerability context are important, as they 
have a direct impact on the status of people’s assets and the options that enable them to 
cope with stress or surprises in their social-ecological systems.  Hence, the variability and 
diversity of activities that people engage in are crucial components of vulnerability.  
Environmental and social unpredictability forces people to adopt risk, thus encouraging 
adaptive strategies that minimise risk rather than necessarily maximising returns 
(Devereux, 1999).  
 
Often people have little or no control over factors that make up their vulnerability context 
(Ellis, 2000; DFID, 1999).  According to Devereux (1999), vulnerability is determined 
partly by risk factors that are generic to groups of individuals or households that are linked 
either geographically or by some shared risk characteristic, and partly by risk factors that 
are specific to each individual or household.  Although an entire community might face 
equal exposure to a threat, such as drought or a food price rise, resilience to that stress is 
differently distributed across households depending on their relative wealth and access to 
alternative income sources, including support from extended family and social networks. 
Or rather, as emphasised by Sen’s work on Poverty and Famine (1981) the ability to 
command control over commodities or ‘entitlements’.  
 68
Surprise is one of the components of the vulnerability context of the Basarwa in 
Ngamiland. Ecological surprise is one of the greatest sources of unpredictability in the 
Okavango Delta, and this can have a devastating effect on the social and ecological 
systems of the Basarwa.  Surprise is defined by Gunderson (1999) as a qualitative 
disagreement between observations and expectations when an ecosystem behaves in an 
unexpected manner.  Gunderson argues that surprise at local level can be created by 
broader scale processes for which there is little or no previous knowledge.  The 
vulnerability of social and ecological systems to surprise and crises is increased by any 
decline in the flexibility and buffering capacity of those systems.  Although Gunderson’s 
(1999) description refers to ecological surprise, the same can be said for social surprise.  
For example, the increase in the elephant population and the resultant destruction of 
habitat in the Okavango Delta impacts upon the livelihoods of the communities living in 
the Delta. These communities as a result become more vulnerable, as they compete for the 
same resources with the elephants (e.g.Mokolwane palm foods, and homes and crops, 
eaten and destroyed by foraging elephants). 
4.2 Observations and Analysis 
 
Research data shows that the Basarwa in the Okavango Delta are vulnerable to shocks, 
surprises and externalities, including: 
• Climatic and ecological variability. The Delta is prone to periodic floods, which in 
some cases flood the homes and crop fields of the residents of Xaxaba and Khwai. 
Furthermore, the presence of permanent waters attract a wide variety and large 
numbers of wildlife, which cause crop damage and are sometimes responsible for 
personal death and injury; 
• Power and politics. The Basarwa are peripheral to the political environment of 
Botswana, and thus do not have a strong influence on the decision-making process 
and policy formulation. As a result, they passively receive policies and regulations, 
many of which have criminalised their traditional land use and natural resource 
management practices;  
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• Global and local economic trends. The Basarwa of this study rely on the tourism 
industry for much of their financial capital; they are affected by trends such as 
fluctuations in the tourism market arising from political instability in Zimbabwe. 
The vulnerabilities in tourism are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.2.1Climatic and ecological variability 
 
Observations 
Firstly, both the Xaxaba and Khwai settlements are vulnerable to floods because of their 
location on the floodplains of the Okavango Delta.  In May 1999, during fieldwork, a 
household in Khwai had to temporarily live in the community craft centre (which was not 
yet operational at the time) because their homestead was flooded.  There were three other 
homesteads in the south-western part of the village near a seasonal pool which had also 
been hit by the floods.  
The Xaxaba community also experienced flooding of their homes.  In 1999, the settlement 
was flooded for the first time in over 10 years.  All households within 3-4 metres of the 
river banks had no harvest that year as their crops had been destroyed and their homes 
completely covered by water.  Army helicopters were flown in to evacuate the affected 
community members to Maun, but the families returned to their homes as soon as the 
water had receded.  Furthermore, due to heavy rains and flooding of the Delta in 1999, 
2000 and early 2001, the delivery of Government food relief and pensions to the Xaxaba 
community was unpredictable during those years, leaving the most vulnerable community 
members without food and money for months. 
Secondly, by virtue of being the only source of permanent water in the country, the Delta 
attracts wildlife in large numbers.  The communities of Khwai and Xaxaba therefore live 
with the threat of danger from larger wildlife, such as elephants, buffalo, hippo, crocodiles 
and lion.  In both settlements, one hears stories of people who have either been killed or 
badly wounded by wildlife.  For example, Mothusi, who is a guide with OddBalls Camp, 
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is badly scarred on his stomach from an encounter he had with a buffalo on his way back 
from work.  His colleagues had managed to escape, leaving him to take refuge on a nearby 
anthill, where he stayed until the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and 
Gametrackers (one of the lodges in the area) staff came to rescue him and rush him to 
hospital.  Another incident involved a man who had lost some of his fingers on one hand 
fighting off a crocodile.  In order to cope with or avoid these dangers, children are not 
encouraged to bathe or swim in the middle channels of the river, as there are often hippo 
and crocodile there. The residents of Khwai are also encouraged to collect tap water from 
the DWNP camp to avoid accidents with crocodiles and hippo when drawing water from 
the river. The Moremi Park officers in Khwai showed me the skin of a lion that had been 
terrorising villagers, killing their donkeys, and roaming in the village at night. Eventually 
one of the villagers, who had accompanied the DWNP staff to hunt down and kill the 
notorious lion, was seriously injured. 
MmaB in Xaxaba, in whose back-yard I had set my camp in 2000, had been surprised by 
my decision to camp under a large tree, citing hippo and elephants as potential dangers. 
Next to my camp was a house that had been destroyed by an elephant, which had broken a 
tree with heavy branches, which then fell on the house.  The villagers thought I must have 
a very strong God who protects me from the dangers they were vulnerable to.  
According to the villagers, elephants, buffalo, zebra and other animals converge on their 
settlements during the dry season, when most seasonal pools have dried up, in search of 
water.  This we witnessed during the last of my fieldwork in July 2001, when we had to 
flee our camp next to the river one evening, having seen a large herd of elephants in the 
village.  
 
Although there are many livelihood assets in the veld and in the water of the Delta, access 
to these resources is restricted by fear of wildlife, especially buffalo and elephant on land, 
and crocodile and hippo in the water (cf. section 4.2.2).  Kebatenne, one of our 
informants, pointed out a number of islands with good firewood and fruit, but also stated 
that the villagers do not stay out long on these islands because of Tsetse flies and buffalo.  
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Although there are numerous stories of people’s encounters with dangerous animals in 
these two settlements, I have included only a few as examples of how the residents of 
Xaxaba and Khwai are vulnerable to wildlife.  The threat from wildlife, and the need for 
people to always be cautious and alert, is further evident in the folk stories told to children 
by their elders. An example of one of these stories is given in Box 1.  
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 Box 1: The story about Nsthwarela Ngwana  
An old man left his home to visit his neighbours one evening.  A Phiri (hyena) came into his shelter and sat
there. His wife walked in, it was dark and she couldn’t see clearly. At seeing this figure she assumed it was
her husband, to whom she said “could you hold the baby for me while I make her bed” and she gave the baby
to her ‘husband’. The Phiri sneaked out of the shelter and ran off with the little baby. After the woman
finished making the baby’s bed, she said “let me have the baby, her bed is ready” and there was no response.
At that moment her husband walked in and again she repeated “may I have the baby now” and her husband
responded, “what do you mean, you had the baby”. At that moment they realised the baby was gone, never to
be found again. 
 
That is how the island got to be known as Ntshwarela-ngwana.  Ntshwarela ngwana directly translated from
Tswana means ‘hold the baby for me’. 
 
Lesson: Wild carnivores are treacherous and unpredictable. The children were being taught to be careful, and
always guard themselves against danger and the unknown. They were taught to understand that darkness and
night are dangerous and uncertain times because one cannot see things clearly, especially in an area like the
islands of the Okavango Delta in which they lived, because there is a lot of dangerous wildlife. 
 
Story told by Rra Kgalalelo, one of the oldest members of the village in Xaxaba and also one of my key
informants.  
 
entral to the hardships faced by the residents of Khwai and Xaxaba is the problem posed 
y a large population of elephants in the area.  According to the respondents in both 
hwai and Xaxaba, the vulnerabilities arising from this problem are caused by 
ompetition for resources between them and the elephants, Mma Monjwa stated: 
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”Our children were brought up on gau (the crown heart of hyphaene petersiana stem) and 
fish. These were our main foods, we never went hungry. In the water we ate Tshitla (typha 
capensis) and moxhou (schoenoplectus corymbosus). All these were found in the wild.  
Tsobaoro [refer to Chapter 2] where we originate from is very rich in these resources.  In 
Xaxaba7 these resources are scarce; the presence of elephants makes the situation even 
worse”. 
 
This statement illustrates that resource scarcity can be attributed to the presence of 
elephants. Further, the danger posed by the presence of these elephants restricts access to 
natural resources. 
 
The residents of Xaxaba said that they used to collect tswii (nymphaea nouchali8) from the 
river when it dried up, but elephants have destroyed everything, even the mokolwane 
palms (hyphaene petersiana).  The Mokolwane has multiple uses: the sap is tapped for 
wine, the crown head of the stem is eaten as a vegetable, and the young leaves are 
collected and used for making baskets (see Photograph 1). They stated that people are 
blamed by both Government and conservationists for destruction of the environment, but 
that the real culprits are the elephants.  
 
                                                 
7 Xaxaba is also known as Sedibane and Nxhoaga. 
8 The roots of which are cooked or roasted and eaten by the Delta communities 
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 Photograph 1: Boiling Mokolwane leaves used for making baskets 
 
People believe that there were never so many elephants in the islands until the erection of 
cordon fences and the establishment of the Game Parks (cordon fences have been erected 
by the Government to restrict the movement of herbivores – especially Cape buffalo – in 
order to reduce the incidence of hoof - and - mouth disease in the domesticated cattle 
population). Stressing the misplaced conceptions of conservation by those in power (the 
Government, particularly the Department of Wildlife and National Parks), Mma Monjwa 
stated that: 
 “…people are accused of damaging the veld by starting fires, but such fires are not 
destructive”.  
 
The irony of the whole issue, according to Mma Monjwa, is that the destructive elephants 
are protected while useful fire practices are banned. The respondents argued that fires 
create fresh fodder for wild animals and also allow people to see animals from far away, 
thus aiding safety as well as hunting activities.  
 
The villagers of Xaxaba used to cultivate large fields before they had any problems with 
elephants. In fact, the day before one interview, Mma Monjwa’s grandson had, pointed 
out to us a nearby island where his grandparents used to have arable fields. They 
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cultivated pumpkins, maize, beans and sorghum. They now have only back gardens at 
their homes instead of large fields, mostly because of wildlife encroachment and the 
shortage of land. The gardens in Khwai range between 1 hectare and 3 hectares. The table 
below provides a summary of the 2000 harvest in the two settlements.  
 
Table 4: Crop Yields for 2000  
Xaxaba Khwai 
Only 1 household had cultivated fields but had 
no harvest due to destruction by wildlife 
4 households harvested < 5 bags of 
maize  
 2 households had no harvest due to 
destruction of crops by wildlife 
 2 households harvested between 5-10 
bags of maize  
(Source of data: Kalahari Conservation Society 2001, Every River Has Its People Project) 
 
Most households reported that they believed most of the natural resources are declining 
(cf. Chapter 5).  Examples of resources in decline include Tswii, water, river reeds and 
mokolwane. The decline of these resources was attributed to drying river channels and a 
decrease in rainfall, as the rainfall chart for the last 30 years indicates (see Chapter 5).  
According to the results of the Every River Has Its people survey, the Xaxaba residents 
attributed the decline in natural resources to too many elephants and a decrease in rainfall, 
while the Khwai residents believed the main causes to be a lack of rainfall and blockage 
of river channels by papyrus growth.  
 
The vulnerability these two communities face differs slightly at this level: Xaxaba is 
surrounded by perennial swamps which wildlife moves into during the dry season, while 
Khwai is downstream of the Okavango’s main channels, and is surrounded by seasonal 
swamps which no longer receive water because of blockage by thick vegetation growth. 
Further, palm leaves are getting rare in Khwai due to over-use by people and the large 
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number of elephants, and Khwai basket makers must travel as far as Maun (130 km) to 
collect palm leaves, thus incurring transport costs. 
Analysis 
The irregular flooding that characterises the Okavango Delta affects the availability of fish 
to downstream fishermen. In addition, communities such as Xaxaba and Khwai never 
really know how much water to expect nor whether to prepare for floods, because the 
Delta system is largely dependent on the amounts of rainfall received in the Angolan 
highlands. With no monitoring and early warning systems in place, the communities 
remain vulnerable to floods. 
 
Because of good rains during 2003 and 2004, the Delta has received large in-flows, 
making Xaxaba inaccessible by road. The community stated that they go for months on 
end without receiving Government welfare assistance. 
 
A review of the literature reveals that people living in the Okavango Delta are also 
vulnerable to endemic disease.  Heiden (1991) states that, since the early 19th century, 
habitation of the Delta has been determined by two main factors, the presence of disease 
vectors (especially malaria mosquitoes and tsetse fly) and hydrological fluctuations.  
Heinz (1969), when writing of his encounter with the Qhanikhwe (also spelt Xhanikhwe), 
BaBugakhwe, Xokhwe and Tzexa, describes the vulnerabilities faced by the Basarwa at 
the time as they interact with their environment. He observed that the Qhanikhwe appear 
to have been disseminated by sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasia, an often fatal disease 
caused by the trypanosome parasite that is spread through the bite of a tsetse fly) and were 
dying in large numbers.  
 
The elephant problem, which was highlighted by the two communities, can be said to be 
at least partly human induced. The CITES ban on elephant trade in 1989 resulted in an 
increase in elephant populations (Berges, 2001).  This, together with the erection of 
cordon fences worsened the situation by confining most of the elephants to the Okavango 
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Delta.  The ban on ivory trade has been said to hurt human needs and conservation efforts 
in Southern Africa, as the resulting large elephant populations cause habitat destruction 
and encroach on human settlements (ibid).  The two communities of Xaxaba and Khwai 
repeatedly complained about the high population of elephants in the area, arguing that this 
has led to competition for resources and low crop production (the next chapter highlights 
the extent of the human/wildlife conflict).  In the 1970s, elephants were said to be scarce 
throughout the Okavango, although fairly large herds were seen in the dry season, 
particularly around Khwai, Moremi and Maxwee (Patterson, 1976).  It was estimated then 
that the elephant population did not exceed 2,000 at any one time although indications 
were that the area could support larger numbers (ibid).  By 1994, however, elephant 
populations in northern Botswana (mostly concentrated in the Delta) were estimated at 
79,033 with an annual rate of increase of 9.4% (ULG Consultants, 1994).  The table below 
indicates the trend of elephant population growth in northern Botswana and in the Delta. 
 
Table 5 : Elephant Population Trends  
Year Elephant Population 
1989 54,596 
1990 58,011 
1991 62,518 
1992 52,815 
1994 79,153 
1995 75,196 
1996 99,425 
1997 - 
1998 - 
1999 115,690 
Source: Department of Wildlife and National Parks (1999)  
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Table 6: Okavango Delta Elephant Population 
Source: Department of Wildlife and National Parks 
Year 1994 dry 1994 wet 1996 Nov 1999 dry 1999 wet 2001 dry 2002 dry 
Elephant 
Population 
18703 
5144 26795 30971 12847 18175 28550 
 
The communities studied and the Government of Botswana alike are not satisfied with 
regulations relating to the culling of elephants, which is governed by international law.  
As Berger (2001) states, the management of Africa’s half a million elephants by national 
governments affects millions of people who share the same predicament as Xaxaba and 
Khwai. The international community (and especially the United States, with its power to 
support, control or discourage the international trade in ivory) greatly affects the range of 
management options open to African governments and local communities (ibid). 
 
As noted above, one of the problems arising from elephants is habitat destruction.  The 
Botswana proposal tabled at the 2000 CITES (Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species Conference) of Parties in Kenya (Berger, 2001) stated concerns over 
habitat degradation from its large elephant population, and noted that the Botswana 
Parliament had a management plan adopted in 1991 that advocated culling in order to 
keep elephant populations at the 1990 population of 546,000. However, this proposal was 
not adopted. The population now stands at more than 106, 000 and is increasing at 5% per 
year, up from just 34,000 in 1983.  The proposal noted that Botswana’s elephant 
population, while roaming over a vast network of protected areas covering 80, 000km², 
was partly confined to this gigantic range by the cordon fences. However, at the western 
outskirts of the Okavango Delta, where fences are generally impractical, the elephant 
population was expanding with a concomitant increase in crop damage (Berger, 2001).  
Crop depredation means these communities can no longer grow enough crops to feed 
themselves, and in turn forces them to depend on often unstable cash income from the 
tourism industry and Government social welfare programmes. Relying on such external 
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strategies, which are highly unstable, weakens the social resilience of these Basarwa 
communities.  
 
From the evidence provided above one can safely conclude that the large elephant 
population threatens the ecological resilience of the Okavango Delta.  This situation, in 
combination with the other vulnerabilities discussed above, weakens the social resilience 
of communities such as Xaxaba and Khwai, whose livelihoods rely on the natural 
resources found in the Delta.  
 
As stated by Adjer (2000), ecological and social resilience may be linked through the 
inter-dependence of a community’s economic activities and their ecosystems. For 
example, the residents of Khwai and Xaxaba argue that, because of the large elephant 
population, Mokolwane is becoming scarce and must be collected far away from their 
villages.  In some cases they incur transport costs to obtain this resource.  This has 
negative impacts on basket making, which has been identified as a major source of 
livelihood (Taylor, 2001, Boggs, 1998 and Bock, 1998) for most Delta communities, 
including Khwai and Xaxaba - of the households surveyed, 73% in Xaxaba and 50%  in 
Khwai reported that basketry contributes to their livelihood income (see Table 7 in 
Chapter 5).  
 
It is important, however, to note that the elephants also play a positive role in the long-
term resilience of the palm plant as Mokolwane seeds are dispersed in and fertilised by the 
elephant faeces in combination with fire, which acts as a stimulus for germination (Roodt, 
1998) and aids Mokolwane propagation.  Thus, it is not simply the presence of elephants 
that makes people vulnerable, but rather their sheer numbers and the fact that veterinary 
fences have restricted their migratory routes. 
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4.2.2 Power and Politics 
Observations 
Several power relationships and political issues affect the two communities of this study. 
These include: 
 
Hunting restrictions – the restrictions on hunting introduced by the Wildlife Conservation 
and National Parks Act (Act No.28 of 1992) create further hardships for the communities 
of Xaxaba and Khwai.  The older residents said that during the colonial era hunting was 
allowed throughout the year as long as permission was sought from the colonial 
government.  In the opinion of several people interviewed, life was a lot better then than it 
is now.  Today they have to rely on hunting safaris for trophy meat, on DWNP for meat 
from problem animals, and illegal hunting for subsistence.  The effects of this are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The community of Xaxaba said that things have changed since the Boro River and their 
former gathering and hunting areas were incorporated into the Moremi Game Reserve.  
They are not allowed to gather anything inside the game reserve, which has reduced the 
area they can use for gathering grass, reeds and firewood, and for fishing. The statement 
below captures their frustration with these restrictions. 
 “It seems animals are more important than the human beings, you can judge from 
the sort of sentences people get for poaching”.9  
 
Restrictions on movements resulting from land tenure issues - surrounded by lodges and 
the Moremi Game Reserve, the residents of both Xaxaba and Khwai are no longer able to 
engage in their traditional seasonal movements as a means to cope with resource scarcity.  
They feel that they are ‘fenced in’ and helpless (see Chapter 1 and 2). 
 
                                                 
9 It is common to hear of stories of people who were beaten up by the Botswana Defence Force or Police for alleged poaching. 
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Competitions from non-Basarwa - in addition to restricted access to resources, the 
Basarwa are faced with competition for available resources from non-Basarwa groups.  
The 1993 amendment of the Tribal Land Act of 1968 gave all citizens of Botswana the 
right to acquire land and settle in any part of the country, regardless of their tribal 
affiliation.  This change, according to the communities of Xaxaba and Khwai, has 
complicated matters in terms of natural resource management. Tsoe, an elderly resident of 
Khwai in her 60s, stated:  
“...we were just on our own; the BaBugakhwe and our band was composed of 
family units; that way the use of natural resources was easily managed”. 
 
In the past, cooperation at community level was high, but now it is felt that things are 
different.  For instance, having collected thatching grass and agreeing to sell it at a certain 
price, some people may change the price without consulting the rest of the community.  
Decisions are no longer made collectively at community level but rather increasingly at an 
individual level.  
 
The residents of Khwai also claimed that most employees in the lodges surrounding their 
village were from outside Khwai.  The facts appear to support this: a study carried out by 
Taylor in 1998 revealed that Khwai residents held only 9 of the 74 non-management posts 
in the three lodges in vicinity.  The companies running lodges in the area are alleged to be 
opposed to employing locals.  Employees from outside also compete with the community 
of Khwai for customers for their crafts.  They sell their baskets through the curio shops at 
the lodges to the tourists, hence bringing basket sales in Khwai down.  The lodge 
employees inform guests of estimated basket prices, which makes it difficult for the local 
basket makers to sell their goods at their own fixed prices Although bargaining is 
commonly practised by tourists, communities in Botswana have not been exposed to this 
kind of trading and they tend to find it unacceptable.  
 
In a focus group discussion with the DWNP officials in Khwai, the Park Officers argued 
that it would be difficult for the Khwai community to successfully run their own CBNRM 
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projects because there is a lot of conflict at community level, mostly in connection with 
the question of who has the right to be a member of the community.  There is some 
evidence from within the community to support this assessment.  The constitution for the 
village trust had a clause (which was later removed) excluding non-Basarwa from 
becoming committee members, yet some of these residents had lived in Khwai for more 
than 20 years. Many of these people are still excluded from any decision-making process 
at community level, as they continue to be seen as temporal residents.  
 
Threats to continuity and the transfer of traditional knowledge - another source of 
vulnerability related to power and politics is that of the intergenerational transfer of 
traditional knowledge and skills.  Continuity of local knowledge is under threat.  
Community elders argued that they could no longer use the same methods of transferring 
knowledge to their children, because their children spend a lot of time away from home at 
their different schools.  Because of the small population in both Khwai and Xaxaba, 
neither of these settlements10 has a school, and the children are obliged to attend school in 
Maun and Gudigwa.  These students stay with relatives, lodge, or stay at boarding school. 
They effectively spend close to nine months away from their homes, and only three 
months a year with their parents in the village.  
 
According to Le Roux (1999, pers com.), formal education has eroded traditional 
education in that it promotes scientific explanations for everything.  Children accept the 
education they get from their parents, but once in school they come back home and 
challenge this knowledge, arguing that it does not make sense and it is not written 
knowledge.  This then leaves the parents feeling angry and bewildered, saying that 
education takes away their children and alienates their cultural identity.  They, in turn, 
stop participating in the education of their children and often feel accused when the 
teachers call them in and tell them of the problems they are having with the children at 
school (ibid). 
                                                 
10 According to the Settlement Policy, settlements with less than 500  people do not qualify for  the provision of schools and clinics 
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 Another factor highlighted by Le Roux (1999) is that the loss of their ethnic language 
among the younger generations of Basarwa is a threat to their traditional knowledge base.  
The argument she puts forward is that the traditional names of plants are replaced by 
Setswana names, which results in a further loss of knowledge because the original 
Basarwa names explained the properties and characteristics of the plants in question. That 
accumulated knowledge is lost as it is replaced by a label which is meaningless, coming as 
it does from a foreign language which is not fully understood by the Basarwa. 
 
Government policies also impact upon livelihood strategies. The community members 
said that their hunting grounds had been designated into parks and game reserves, where 
the hunting and gathering of veld products is restricted.  This, they feel, has had an 
enormous impact on livelihood strategies such as hunting.  The residents of Xaxaba stated 
that they no longer have access to Tsobaoro, which is rich in wildlife and veld resources, 
as Tsobaoro now falls within the Moremi Game Reserve.  The situation has been 
worsened by Government’s cancellation of the Special Game Licence11.  Their access to 
these natural resources has been reduced without giving them any alternative means of 
making a living.  The outcome, they argue, is dependence on government for handouts 
(food, clothes), pensions for the elderly, and employment through the Government’s 
Drought Relief Programme. 
 
The residents of Khwai and Xaxaba are of the view that the erection of cordon fences, has 
affected their livelihood strategies, especially in terms of the availability of wildlife 
resources such as zebra and impala.  The respondents in Khwai and Xaxaba argue that 
                                                 
11 The Special Game Licence was introduced in 1979 as part of the Unified Hunting Regulations. It was aimed at: 
a) Legitimising hunting activity by the poorest members of the population, those who depended heavily on meat 
for a living; 
b) Assuring a measure of food security for rural poor people; 
c) Allowing people to increase incomes from wildlife utilisation; and 
d) Promoting better wildlife management by obtaining more information on the trends and scope of this form of 
utilisation. 
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migratory routes of some species have been affected, hence these can no longer be found 
in previous hunting grounds.  On the other hand, large numbers of other species have been 
enclosed in small areas of land, resulting in an overpopulation of certain species. An 
example they give is the elephant, which they argue contributes to environmental 
degradation.  They urged that as a result of fences, people and wildlife have been cramped 
into small areas where they compete for the same resources: for instance, both people and 
elephants feed on the fruit of the fan palm trees (hyphaene petersiana).   
 
Residents in both villages of Khwai and Xaxaba blame government policy for the conflict 
between people and wildlife.  To compensate for limited access to natural resources, the 
residents of Khwai and Xaxaba have taken to growing maize and pumpkins in small 
gardens in their yards. Yet, as discussed previously, the elephant encroachment has 
resulted in lower yield harvests. 
 
The residents of Xaxaba said that there had been an influx of people from surrounding 
villages, such as Seronga, Shorobe, Maun and other areas, into their village to seek 
employment in the nearby safari lodges. However, the introduction of CBNRM projects 
has encouraged these people to move back to their own villages where they can be 
employed in safari camps, which are in joint venture projects with their respective 
communities.  
 
The respondents in Xaxaba also maintain that, as a result of Government policies, they are 
not in a position to engage in their traditional natural resource management practices, 
especially that of seasonal mobility, because they have been “fenced in”.  They stated that, 
“we are surrounded by safari lodges and the game park hence there is nowhere to move”.  
They further argued that government regulations restrict their access to certain resources.  
One example they gave is that of fish: they said that they were not allowed to fish because 
the Boro River is within a national park. Their frustrations are reflected in the statement: 
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“The river has always been a source of our livelihood, now we only rely on 
government hand outs, which has made our situation worse. This we see as 
government strategy to frustrate us and drive us out of our lands”. (Focus Group 
discussion, Xaxaba, 1999) 
Analysis 
The section above touches mainly on vulnerabilities related to issues of land rights and 
access to natural resources.  As highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, the Basarwa are largely 
landless (or rather have been restricted, and in some cases, no land rights). Because 
Basarwa societies are founded upon a land-based socio-economy and culture, their society 
will disintegrate without land (Wily, 1994).  
 
The Basarwa in other parts of the country, especially in the south–west, were resettled into 
Remote Area Dweller settlements, which meant that they no longer had the freedom to 
move seasonally in their former territories. This reduced their access to natural resources.  
The marginal, fragile and infertile land of the Kalahari where these communities are 
located left them with no option but to rely on handouts from NGOs and Government (e.g. 
Drought Relief Programmes) (Hitchcock et al., 1989).  In Ngamiland, the Basarwa’s land 
was incorporated into protected areas in the form National Parks.  This situation is similar 
to that of those in the south-western part of the country and resulted in reduced access to 
land and natural resources.  The implications of being in such a position are that a 
dependency syndrome develops, and consequently the community does not actively 
manage their resources through the use of their traditional knowledge and social 
institutions. Their resilience and adaptability is therefore stifled.  
 
Government policy, on the one hand, saw resettlement as a way of developing the 
Basarwa, removing them from their “backward” lifestyle and concentrating them so that 
they could benefit from the social amenities the rest of Batswana were already enjoying 
(e.g. schools, clinics and roads).  However, the Basarwa in Ngamiland have not been 
affected by resettlement to the same extent as those in the south-western part of the 
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country. While they have been dispossessed of their lands, opportunities still exist for 
them to pursue beneficial livelihood strategies, as will become apparent in the next 
chapter.  
 
One of the factors determining effective resource use is the power and control people have 
over their relationship to these resources (Twyman, 2000).  As the preceding sections have 
shown, power and control over natural resources has been removed from the Basarwa.  
They are continuously dispossessed of their lands and access to resources by conservation 
laws and regulations in Ngamiland, and a combination of conservation and livestock 
policies in other parts of the country. This situation is similar to what other traditional 
communities, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in general are experiencing across 
the world (see Chapter 6). 
 
Some studies have shown that the existence of Basarwa settlements in tourism areas puts 
them in a position of competition and conflict with the tourism industry, as they compete 
for the same natural resources in the same area.  In such competition the Basarwa are 
often on the losing end, as they have less political power compared to the tourism industry 
(Taylor, 2002; Mbaiwa 2004).  A survey of safari lodges in the Delta revealed that, out of 
15 lodges or camps, the brochures of 14 make no mention whatsoever of local peoples or 
culture.  Instead the majority illustrate the luxurious interiors of the chalets, and the type 
of wildlife related activities tourists can engage in (Damm et al. 1997).  
 
The tendency of safari operators to employ non-community members is another example 
of the Basarwa no longer having power and control over the use of natural resources in 
their territories.  Power has shifted to other players, in particular Government and the 
private sector. This lack of power reduces the Basarwa’s capacity to shield themselves 
against disturbance and hence reduces their social resilience.  
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The implications of threats to traditional/local ecological knowledge 
Cultural continuity ensures the development and strengthening of cultural and social 
capital, hence building resilience into social systems (Berkes and Folke, 2002; Berkes, et 
al. 2000; Gadgil et al. 2000; Berkes, 1999; Bock, 1998).  Cultural continuity also ensures 
that communities continue to be equipped with the right skills for the livelihood strategies 
appropriate to their local environment.  Even though traditional knowledge and skills are 
not used as much as they were in the past, the communities of Khwai and Xaxaba are 
concerned about the threats to their knowledge. 
 
Youth are more likely to migrate to cities and seek employment there rather than stay in 
their communities to pursue a traditional lifestyle.  When they do migrate to cities, they 
are likely to send home remittances and hence contribute to diversity in the livelihood 
strategies of their communities. Some, however, opt to stay in their villages, where they 
often fail to contribute meaningfully to community livelihood, as they do not have the 
necessary skills to do so.  To be a successful hunter, for instance, requires a high degree of 
skill in tracking animals, crafting hunting tools, stalking the animals and shooting 
accurately.  These skills take many years to develop, and in most foraging societies men 
do not become successful hunters until their mid twenties (Bock, 1998).  Some may use 
the knowledge they gained through formal education to participate in the community by 
sitting in various committees (e.g. VTC and Village Development Committees).  The 
chief of Khwai, for instance, was elected chief because he had been to school and is 
literate. Although a young chief, his grandfather Amos uses his wisdom to guide him with 
the assistance of other village elders.  
4.2.3 Global and Local Economic Trends  
Observations 
From the 1980s onwards the marketing efforts of international tour operators have made 
the Okavango Delta a tourist destination of world renown (Heiden, 1991).  The tourism 
industry provides a major source of livelihood for the communities of Khwai and Xaxaba.  
These communities are vulnerable and directly exposed to the market forces affecting this 
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industry, as well as to trends in the political environment.  In 2001, for example, the 
tourism industry in southern Africa experienced a marked fall in guest numbers because of 
concerns about the farm invasions in Zimbabwe.  Rural communities, especially those like 
Khwai and Xaxaba that provide labour to the tourism sector, are feeling the effects of this.  
In Xaxaba, some of the freelance mokoro polers and tour guides lost their jobs at 
OddBalls and Delta Camps.  The number of tourists coming into Botswana in 2001 
dropped substantially and in order to cut costs, the management of OddBalls and Delta 
Camps had to reduce staff numbers from 40 to 15 (four of whom were on short contract 
for the duration of the peak season).  Several villagers used to work as freelancers for Odd 
Balls, Gun’s and Delta Camps.  They said that this arrangement allowed them to carry on 
with their other activities, e.g. making Mekoro (plural for mokoro), fishing, building and 
renewing their houses.  The management of OddBalls and Delta Camps have, however, 
decided to hire full-time guides and polers paid on a fixed monthly wage in order to 
reduce company running costs.  
 
The camp owners have defended these actions by noting that the political situation in 
Zimbabwe has led to a drop in the number of tourists visiting Botswana, which has so 
reduced their profit that they can no longer sustain the freelance working relationship they 
had with the villagers of Xaxaba.  
 
Of the remaining 15 employees at Odd Balls and Delta Camps, only seven are from 
Xaxaba, the rest being from Maun, Seronga and other surrounding villages.  The 
employees from Xaxaba are mostly young trainee guides and laundry staff.  The manager 
of the two camps highlighted the fact that he was finding it difficult to work with local 
staff.  In his words he described them as “too demanding and too difficult to work with”.  
From the many discussions I had with previous employees and other community 
members, they see the land of Xaxaba as theirs and hence regard being offered 
employment by the safari companies operating in the area as a right rather than privilege  
(refer to Chapter 2).  Their perception works against them in that they are losing jobs to 
people coming in from the surrounding villages, such as Maun and Seronga. 
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 Rra Kgalalelo summarises the situation in Xaxaba by stating: 
 “Life is lot more difficult now. If you go into any of these homes you will not find a single 
household which is well off. No one can claim to be coping and comfortable.  This is 
experienced through all the different age groups, the young and the elderly. Re a Sheta, 
we are struggling. Most of us are not educated; we have only recently started sending our 
children to school. But there is a high rate of school dropout due to teenage pregnancy 
amongst the girls. It is also quite difficult because, as it is, there is no clinic and it is not 
easy going to Maun unless you can afford to pay P60.00 [USD12.50] for the air ticket”.  
 
When discussing livelihood strategies in Xaxaba, the following words were repeatedly 
echoed by our respondents: “re a sheta” and “xha”. The former means ‘we are 
struggling’ and the latter means ‘there is absolutely nothing’. These two phrases were 
used by respondents to summarise the vulnerabilities they are faced with.  
Analysis 
The 1960s marked the beginnings of the tourism industry in the Okavango Delta although 
marketing efforts were stepped up from the 1980s onwards (Heiden, 1991). Initially the 
largest employers were hunting and photographic safari operators, with their demands for 
local labourers as trackers, skinners, gun bearers, waiters, grounds men, laundry women, 
and a variety of other jobs that were paid and classed as unskilled labour (Taylor, 2000).  
While Government positions and skilled work such as guides and teachers tend to provide 
permanent employment, unskilled employment in the private sector tends to be highly 
variable.   
 
Having been exposed to the industry for years, many community members have become 
conditioned to think that tourists would not be interested in the social and cultural life of 
the people of the Delta, and hence they hardly ever mention their own social setting. 
Mbaiwa (2004), as will be discussed in Chapter 6, notes this to be a direct result of 
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enclave tourism, with tourism activities and facilities that are far removed from the local 
setting. 
 
Competition for access to resources with other user groups having better means of 
exploiting them increases the community’s vulnerability.  Commercial off-takes of plant 
resources are generally uncontrolled and the sustainability of harvest rates unknown. The 
community of Khwai, however, does make an effort to restrict access to outsiders wishing 
to collect thatch grass in their community area.  
 
The Basarwa in Ngamiland have been intimately engaged in a cash economy since the 
middle of the nineteenth century (Taylor, 2000).  Taylor, however, states that for many the 
most predictable form of income is government welfare.  This was the case for Khwai but 
not so for the Xaxaba community.  The implications of this situation are that by relying on 
external institutions for a livelihood, the Basarwa communities have very little control and 
hence their social resilience is weakened. Hitchcock (1997) summarises this situation by 
stating that indigenous people and other minority groups often have cultural histories and 
traditions, and subsistence economies different from those embodied in national 
institutions. Economic development can bring rapid, unanticipated and detrimental change 
in each of these areas.  
 
These changes will be discussed in the chapters that follow, although we begin to 
appreciate that not all change has been detrimental to the two communities. The question 
at this point is: how does vulnerability affect people’s resilience? This question will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
4.3  Conclusion 
 
A common thread regarding the vulnerability context of the Basarwa that runs through the 
issues discussed above is their lack of political power to improve their livelihood options.  
Compared with the Basarwa communities in the southern part of the country, the 
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communities of Xaxaba and Khwai have higher cash income opportunities, thanks to the 
flourishing tourism industry within the vicinity of their villages.  Although the 
communities in the Delta experience land use conflict as a result of being in wildlife 
management areas, they are comparatively better off than other communities in a similar 
position.  Further, they have the potential to benefit from the Community Based Natural 
Resource Management programme.  
 
Their major vulnerabilities arise from conservation policies and legislation. However, an 
abundance of large wildlife - a consequence of these policies - raises large amounts of 
revenue through community auctions to hunting safari companies.  
 
As emphasised in the introduction to this chapter, change does not always affect local 
people negatively.  Assets can be both destroyed and created as a result of trends, shocks 
and seasonality of the vulnerability context.  Although Basarwa communities now have 
restricted access to natural capital, they seem to have increased access to financial capital 
(see illustration below).  It can be argued, however, that financial capital is more 
unpredictable than natural capital.  The question to be asked is: how sustainable is this 
financial capital in improving the livelihoods of the Basarwa communities, considering 
that they rely heavily on the safari companies and government driven CBNRM for this 
asset? As stated by Ellis (2000), the most vulnerable households/communities are those 
that are highly prone to adverse external events and lacking in the assets or social support 
systems that could carry them through periods of adversity. Natural capital and social 
capital are what marked internal coping capabilities of the Basarwa. The diagram below 
indicates an erosion of these assets and a growth in financial capital, which is more prone 
to external threats and thus increases the vulnerability of the Basarwa. 
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Figure 8: Asset pentagon indicating the asset status of the Basarwa as a result of the 
various vulnerabilities they are faced with.  
Source: Adapted from Carney (1998) 
 
Notes: The darker inner line indicates the asset status of traditional Basarwa communities 
whereas the fainter line indicates their asset status as a result of the current 
vulnerabilities they are faced with. 
 
As a result of the events discussed in this chapter, the Basarwa have gradually become 
more vulnerable and marginalised, and were finding it increasingly difficult to cope in a 
political and economic environment for which their traditional adaptations were 
ineffective. Their social system had undergone a ‘flip’, from being mobile, flexible and in 
control of their own destiny, to being sedentary and controlled by external (mainly 
government and private sector) forces.  The next chapter explores more details to explain 
the above. 
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Chapter 5: Resilience and Livelihood Strategies: Coping with 
Uncertainty 
 
“The way we conserved our resources in the past was like this, allow me to give an 
example.  If in a field you have pumpkins you will not harvest and eat all in one day, you 
will keep some for tomorrow because you still have to eat the next day.  That is how we 
handle our natural resources because we are entirely dependent on them and we are not 
educated, hence we do not have other opportunities.  We harvest our resources, making 
sure that some are left for the next time we might need them.  This is what encouraged our 
people to use the resources wisely, knowing that they will need them again in the near 
future” (Keamogetse Kwere, Khwai, 2000). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses past and present livelihood strategies pursued by the Basarwa in 
Khwai and Xaxaba settlements in order to cope with floods, drought, danger from 
wildlife, seasonality of employment opportunities, unpredictability and other factors of 
vulnerability discussed in the preceding chapter. The chapter attempts to address the 
following questions: 
a) What type of resilience-maintaining livelihood strategies have the Basarwa 
evolved, in response to ecological uncertainties; 
b) What livelihood strategies do they use to cope with the new sources of 
vulnerability introduced by contemporary and political economic developments in 
Botswana and globally; and 
c) How do these coping strategies affect their livelihood assets and the resilience of 
the social-ecological system that they are part of? 
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As noted above, resilience refers to the capacity of a system to buffer and survive 
disturbance (Folke and Berkes, 1998).  It conserves information, knowledge and 
experience and can be referred to as the memory of a system (social and ecological).  
Conserving this memory is a prerequisite for recovery from shock, stress or surprise, and 
also maintains opportunities for innovation and renewal in social and ecological systems 
(Gunderson et al. 1997 in Folke and Berkes 1998).  Memory, in the context of this study, 
is maintained in the indigenous knowledge of natural resource management systems, and 
in local ecological knowledge, possessed by the Basarwa in Khwai and Xaxaba.  In some 
cases, societies build economic and social resilience in the short term, at the expense of an 
increasingly degraded natural resource base (Folke et al. 1998).  This is neither a wise nor 
a sustainable strategy in the long term, since economic and social development ultimately 
depends on functional diversity and resilience of the ecosystem (Folke et al. 1998).  Thus, 
it is important for society to balance economic, social and ecological resilience, as these 
are closely linked with the success of interconnected systems. 
 
‘Livelihood strategies’ is an overarching term that refers to the range and combination of 
activities and choices that people make in order to achieve their livelihood goals (DFID, 
1999).  Put differently, livelihood strategies are a dynamic process in which people 
combine diverse activities to meet their various needs at different times, and as coping 
mechanisms to respond to surprises.  Some societies develop livelihood strategies in order 
to cope with uncertainty and vulnerability, in the process building and maintaining 
resilience.  Often, vulnerable communities cope through risk-spreading diversification into 
several non-correlated sources of income.  They also invest in building social capital, 
which provides safety nets in times of stress.  Devereux (1999) argues that, where the 
providers of social support face the same livelihood risks as the recipients, social capital 
might not provide adequate risk insurance for the vulnerable group, as shortages are likely 
to result in the reduction of sharing. 
 
Coping strategies are, according to Folke et al. (1998), different from adaptive strategies. 
Coping strategies tend to be short term responses in abnormal periods of stress, whereas 
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adaptive strategies are responses that evolve over time.  In spite of coping strategies being 
short term, the continued availability of a range of coping strategies may be necessary for 
livelihood strategies to remain adaptive in the long term (ibid).  Devereux (1999) 
nevertheless challenges the use of the term ‘coping’, arguing that it seems rather 
pejorative for the complexity and diversity of behavioural adjustments that people make in 
times of hardship, and at the same time it overstates the resilience of the poor.  The 
question the author raises is if, for instance, people who are already malnourished reduce 
their food consumption to one meal per day, then in what way are they coping?  
 
This chapter concentrates on those coping strategies that enable the Basarwa of this study 
to adapt to their changing political, social and natural environments not just to survive but 
rather build resilience.  These, in the long term, become adaptive strategies through their 
continued practice.  An example is the recent increased involvement by the Basarwa in 
Ngamiland, in the cash economy which has become a contemporary resilience-enhancing 
strategy.  In analysing the social-ecological linkages in local community-based institutions 
of Mexico and in the context of that country’s forest ecosystems, Alcorn and Toledo 
(1998) illustrate how adaptiveness and resilience have been built into institutions so that 
they are capable of responding to and managing processes, functions, dynamics and 
changes in a way that contributes to ecosystem resilience.  These are institutions in the 
sense of rules in use, taboos, totems, culture, and the social norms and values in a 
community.  Examples include the use of folklore and knowledge carriers to help 
maintain ecologically sound management practices, such as “milpa” which is an 
institution and a process whereby ecological knowledge, derived from the experiences of 
farmers who have adapted to the local environment over generations, is passed on to 
children and supported by mythologies and yearly festivals (Alcorn and Toledo, 1998).  
 
Several adaptive management practices and associated social mechanisms serve to prevent 
the development of large-scale crises.  They allow disturbance to enter at a lower level in 
the panarchy of nested adaptive cycles (Gunderson et al. 1997) where it opens up patches 
of opportunity for renewal and reorganisation of the ecosystem (Folke, nd) and supports 
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the building of resilience.  It is believed that such practices are founded on ecological 
knowledge and understanding, which is generated, accumulated and transferred through 
management practices that are acquired through trial and error learning processes. An 
example is monitoring the state of the resource, which is a very common practice among 
resource users: For instance, Sahel herders monitor grazing pressure and the state of the 
pasture to make decisions about rotating or relocating herds (Niamir-Fuller, 1998).  The 
Sahel nomads simulate disturbance by following the migratory cycles of their livestock 
from one area to another.  By so doing, mobility not only allows the households to 
minimise their production risk but also subjects the ecosystem to short but intense pulses 
of grazing.  The pulses of grazing by herbivores contribute to the capacity of the semi-arid 
regions of grasslands to function under a wide range of climatic conditions (Niamir-Fuller, 
1998). Pastoralists diversified by having an appropriate mix of animal species in the herd 
to utilise different vegetation types and patches. The Maasai of Kenya, for instance, widen 
the radius around wells as the wet season advances, to leave enough forage around the 
wells for the dry season (ibid). In other words, pulses of grazing strengthen the resilience 
of the grasslands after disturbance and surprises by reserving pasture for dry periods, thus 
allowing the overgrazed areas to recover. Other examples include total protection of 
certain species from use by humans, temporal restrictions of harvest, nurturing sources of 
renewal, and integrated management of multiple species systems (see below for examples 
relating to the Basarwa).  The example of the Sahel nomads given above is highly 
dependent on local ecological knowledge for its success.  The herders monitor and track 
resources daily, employing appropriate indicators to determine daily movements.  
 
Social systems that lack ecological knowledge and understanding are thus less likely to 
implement appropriate management practices, and may lose resilience and adaptability to 
such an extent that they can only slowly (if at all) recover from periods of stress and 
surprises.  If redundancy, variability and memory is lost or reduced, resilience will also be 
lost or reduced, and the social–ecological system may not transcend the disturbance.  A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and 
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maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, without undermining the natural resource 
base (Scoones, 1998).  Resilience is therefore central to sustainable livelihoods. 
 
The determinant of people’s choice of livelihood strategies is their access to different 
levels and combinations of assets referred to as capital (Scoones, 1998).  Livelihood 
strategies are, however, in a continuous process of flux.  People adapt to evolving threats 
and opportunities by changing livelihood objectives, and also as their own capabilities 
alter during their lifetimes (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000).  This analytical model is founded on 
a belief that people require a range of assets in order to achieve positive livelihood 
outcomes; no single category of assets on its own is sufficient to yield all the many and 
varied livelihood outcomes that people seek.  They therefore have to seek ways of 
nurturing and combining in innovative ways those assets they do have in order to ensure 
their survival.  People with diverse assets tend to have a greater range of options and an 
ability to switch between multiple strategies to secure their livelihoods, a situation not 
enjoyed by many rural poor, including the Basarwa of this study.  Due to a lack of access 
to natural assets in the form of land and natural resources, the Basarwa have had to adopt 
new livelihood strategies, making use of the fewer resources available to them now, 
compared to in the past.  The different types of livelihood resources/capital are defined 
below: 
• Human capital represents the different types of skills, knowledge, ability to labour 
and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood 
strategies and achieve their livelihood goals.  In the context of this study, such 
skills include building mekoro, making baskets, collecting reeds, hunting, 
knowledge about the local ecosystem, and building huts.  Although the 
accumulation of human capital can be an end in itself, the same cannot be said 
about the other types of capital, as human capital is required to make use of any of 
the four other types of assets.  
 
• Social capital refers to the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of 
their livelihood objectives.  Examples of these social resources are norms, values, 
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networks, access to wider institutions of society, and trust.  Social capital can be 
effective in improving the management of shared resources (natural capital) and 
the maintenance of shared infrastructure (physical capital) (DFID, 1999).  Social 
networks facilitate innovation, the development of knowledge and sharing of that 
knowledge.  There is, therefore, a close relationship between social and human 
capital.  Social capital, like other types of capital, can also be valued as a good in 
itself.  It can make a particularly important contribution to people’s sense of well-
being (through identity, honour and belonging).  Social capital is, however, 
different from other forms of capital, in that it is ‘intermediate’ and not itself a 
commodity, service or resource, but rather a network or channel through which 
commodities, services and resources might flow (Devereux, 1999).  A form of 
social capital amongst the Basarwa is kinship ties, through which tenurial rights to 
land and natural resources is obtained by individuals (Cashdan, 1993).  
Furthermore, the reciprocity/sharing networks of traditional Basarwa communities 
were based on exploiting social capital (Hitchcock, 1989; Kent, 1993). 
 
• Natural capital refers to natural resource stocks, from which resource flows and 
services useful for livelihoods are derived.  According to Berkes and Folke (1998), 
natural capital consists of non-renewable resources extracted from ecosystems, 
renewable resources produced by the processes and functions of ecosystems, and 
environmental services.  For the purpose of this study, natural capital is used to 
refer to land and the natural resources upon which the Basarwa derive their 
livelihoods, such as wildlife, reeds, grass and other veld products discussed in the 
previous chapters.  
 
• Physical capital is the basic infrastructure (transport, shelter, water, energy, and 
communications) and production equipment that enable people to pursue their 
livelihoods (Carney, 1998).  Of importance to communities in the Delta is water, 
mekoro, firewood, and mud and reed houses as these are central to livelihoods in 
the area. 
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5.2 Observations 
 
The Basarwa have adapted to the new political status quo and the vulnerabilities discussed 
in the previous chapter by engaging in a diversity of livelihood strategies, some of which 
are fairly new.  The changes the Basarwa are faced with offer new opportunities as well as 
new constrains, and these are discussed in the sections that follow. For example, as 
seasonal mobility is no longer an option because of the restrictions associated with the 
land tenure system in Botswana (see Chapter 4), backyard gardens are used to provide for 
household subsistence needs.  The Basarwa in Ngamiland adopted the skill of farming 
from agro-pastoral groups they interacted with, such as the Hambukushu, Bayei and the 
Tawana.  Rain-fed agriculture, although done at a small scale, is an example of coping 
mechanisms developed to respond to surprises. More of these coping mechanisms are 
discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
5.2.1 Climatic and Environmental Variability 
Historical livelihood strategies used by the Basarwa to cope with climatic and ecological 
variability are well documented.  This study thus concentrated on capturing contemporary 
strategies.  A review of the literature revealed that key adaptations that enabled the 
Basarwa to cope with climatic and environmental variability (i.e. drought and periodic 
shortages of resources) included: 
• Mobility; 
• Flexibility in the use of resources; 
• Flexibility in group size; 
• Flexibility in leadership structures; 
• Detailed knowledge of the local ecological system and appropriate skills to 
capitalise on this knowledge; and  
• Sharing networks (Hitchcock et al. 1989; Kent, 1993). 
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5.2.1.1 Territoriality and Seasonal mobility 
The literature on the seasonal mobility of Basarwa that was reviewed for this study 
indicated that variations in environment and rainfall combine in changing patterns of 
seasonal mobility and social organisation (Saugestad, 1998).  Barnard (1992) discovered 
that after studying four different groups of the Basarwa found in the Kalahari, the !Kung, 
G/wi, Naro and the !Xo used different coping strategies in response to changes in climatic 
conditions and the availability of resources on their local environment.  However, before 
we draw generalisations about the nature of the adaptive strategies, we need to look at the 
diversity of seasonal mobility employed by each of the groups.  The mobility pattern on 
these Basarwa groups depended largely on where the group was found, and on the 
abundance of natural resources available in that location.  The Basarwa found in wetter 
conditions had different patterns from those found in drier areas.  These differences are 
explained in detail below. 
 
The !Kung, according to Barnard (1992), lived in an area with comparatively better 
rainfall, and with a presence of permanent water sources.  They foraged in more fluidly 
composed groups, involving two or more bands that came together in the dry season to 
exploit permanent wells.  In the wet season, when water and food was abundant, the 
!Kung dispersed into smaller (family) groups.  The territories of the !Kung overlapped 
each other, with areas rich in natural resources being used by more than one band.  The 
bands would disperse deep within their territories in the summer.  The G/wi, however did 
the opposite; they lived in an area with less rainfall and resource abundance. Hence they 
congregated in the wet season and dispersed in the dry season, as they did not have any 
permanent water sources to exploit in the dry season.  Flexibility in group size was 
employed as a strategy to adjust to seasonal changes and the consequent availability of 
food and water. 
 
The Naro, on the other hand, lived in an area well favoured with water and natural 
resources, making them less territorial, compared to the !Kung, G/wi and !Xo.  Because of 
abundance in food resources and water, the Naro did not need to disperse at any time.  The 
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group congregated in both dry and wet seasons.  In contrast, the !Xo were more territorial 
as they lived in an area where natural resources were the most sparse and least predictable 
of these four groups.  With the !Xo territoriality operated not only at band level but also at 
the band nexus12 (ibid).  The !Xo dispersed in both the wet and dry season, and the 
scarcity of resources made it necessary for the bands to be of a relatively small size. 
 
Another element of importance to the traditional adaptive strategies of the Basarwa was 
the size of territories within which seasonal movement occurred.  The Basarwa who lived 
in resource-abundant areas moved within relatively smaller territories compared to those 
who lived in resource-poor areas.  In other words, seasonal mobility was more extensive 
for the !Xo compared to the three other groups.  Although there is a dearth of research on 
the settlement patterns of the Basarwa in the Okavango Delta, one can safely assume that 
seasonal mobility was not as extensive as it was for the !Xo and other desert Basarwa 
because of the abundance of resources and availability of permanent water sources. In fact 
Bolaane (2004) states that the BaXhanikhwe and Babugakhwe did not follow defined 
annual cycles similar to that of Basarwa in the Kalalahari. Their movements show a 
tension between the value of being close to stretches of permanent water and the desire to 
avoid areas infested by tsetse fly. The movements of the BaXhanikwe and Babugakhwe 
were nevertheless still within their territories. 
 
An additional strategy of adapting to climatic and environmental variability was 
embedded in territoriality.  In the case of Basarwa, tenurial rights were obtained through 
birth, marriage and residence.  Cashdan (1983), for instance, noted that among the 
BaXhanikhwe, kinship controlled access to land, whether for resource exploitation or 
residence. Cashdan found that people sought permission to use land where they had close 
relatives, and consequently permission was rarely if ever denied.  Furthermore, sanctions 
for trespassing existed and were used when needed.  The rules operating in these 
institutions differed from clan to clan, in response to micro-environmental factors that 
influenced the way in which people used natural resources.  Cashdan (1983) further 
                                                 
12 Band nexus is a group of bands related to each other by friendship and kinship ties as well as by ritual bonds. 
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argued that the Naro lived in an area that was well favoured with food and water 
resources, hence they were less territorial.  There was considerable movement across 
territory boundaries and between social groups, such that bands would typically have 
access rights to more than one territory.  In an interview with Rra Kgalalelo and other 
village elders in the Xaxaba community, we learnt that outsiders would have to seek 
permission from a band in order to gain access to resources within the Xhanikhwe 
territory.  Permission was not sought from the band leader alone but also from the 
ancestors.  This point is elaborated in more detail under the section discussing local 
institutions governing land use and natural resource management. 
 
5.2.1.2 Current Strategies 
The Xaxaba settlement sits right in the centre of Xaxaba (Sedibana) island, away from the 
riverbanks and the riverine woodlands, which are made up predominantly of Acacia 
erioloba.  There are good reasons as to why this community has chosen bare open spaces 
for building their homes instead of on the riverbanks where there is shade: the floodplains 
and water levels in the Delta are unpredictable, and by building their homes in the middle 
of the island, the residents of this settlement avoid both the river floodplains and also 
make way for wildlife, which comes to the island to drink water and feed.  The thick 
vegetation along the riverbanks is an especially popular feeding ground for buffalo and 
elephants.  To avoid the danger of elephants knocking tree branches onto the roofs of their 
huts, the residents of Xaxaba build their homes away from the area. 
 
In order to keep away from the scorching sun during the day, the residents of Xaxaba 
spend their time sitting or working under the thick shade of the riverine forest.  At sunset 
they move back to their homesteads where they stay indoors, because that is the time 
when wildlife (especially predators and hippos, which graze from early evening) is 
moving about. Residents who must go out use torches to provide light.  The mud huts, 
which are constructed from soil from anthills, wooden poles, and sometimes soda and beer 
cans used for reinforcement, keep the houses cool in summer. Some of the houses are 
made of reeds, and these are also cool in summer.  As Figure 5 indicates, the temperatures 
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are high for most of the year with the daily maximum temperature ranging between 25oC 
and 42oC for the past 30 years.  The residents of Xaxaba still use controlled burning to 
clear the thick scrub growth around the settlement in order to improve visibility of 
dangerous wildlife. Although clearing vegetation was used to attract wildlife for easier 
hunting in the past, it is now only used for enabling the residents to spot dangerous 
wildlife from a distance and thus to avoid it.  
 
Like the rest of Botswana, the Okavango Delta is prone to periodic drought (see Chapter 
2).  According to the residents of Xaxaba and Khwai, there is still an abundance of food in 
the veld during drought periods.  Elaborating on this point, they cite examples such as 
Ghao (which is drought resistant), fish and tswii found in pools and ponds along the dry 
river channels, python, bogopane (monitor lizard), mokolwane, honey and tortoise.  Fish is 
smoked and dried for storing, and it can be kept for up to four weeks.  During times of 
drought people would also use stocks from previous harvests of maize, which is preserved 
by pre-boiling and drying.  According to Rra Kgalalelo, in desperate times, the fever berry 
(motsibi) is mixed with soil from anthills for consumption. “Sip wells” dug on the ground 
along river channels provide drinking water for the communities in times of droughts.  
 
5.2.2 Power and Politics 
The previous chapter discussed vulnerability as a result of the powerlessness of the 
Basarwa communities, and the resultant lack of influence in the decision-making 
structures guiding policy development and implementation.  This section discusses coping 
mechanisms of the Basarwa used both in the past and present, drawing mainly on the role 
of institutions in governing the access to and control of natural resources.  
 
5.2.2.1 Local Institutions governing land use and natural resource management  
 
Traditional institutions 
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Traditional local institutions governing land use and natural resource management existed 
in both formal and informal forms.  In addition to the adaptive strategies discussed above, 
the Basarwa, like many indigenous societies, had traditional ethics, norms and rules that 
governed the use of land and natural resources (Spinage).  For example, among the G/wi, 
animals are kx’oxudzi (to be eaten things), but they are N!adima’s creatures (that is, God’s 
creatures), and as “His property they must be respected, not abused”.  They may be killed 
in self-defence or for food or to avoid an attack that is believed to be imminent.  The G/wi 
disapprove of what is seen as greedy hunting, fearing that it will displease N!adima and 
they will suffer unpleasant consequences in some way (ibid).  Examples of traditional 
local institutions in Khwai and Xaxaba settlements are discussed below. 
   
According to the respondents in Xaxaba, governance of the use of natural resources was 
beyond the powers of ordinary individuals in the community, and was vested in those with 
supernatural powers, such as rainmakers.  The respondents in Xaxaba spoke of taboos, 
which were embedded in natural resource management systems and livelihood strategies 
in general.  They spoke of what they termed Setema, referring to people who had the 
powers of lions.  They said if someone spilled water as they were returning from the river 
where they collected it, lions would surround the village that very evening.  Those with 
the powers of the lions would then have to apologise on behalf of the wasteful person(s), 
and only then would these lions go back to where they had come from.  The fear of calling 
lions to the village deterred clan members from wasting water.  The lions could also be 
attracted to the village by someone returning to the village with thatch grass at sunset.  To 
avoid this, the grass collectors were required to leave the grass outside the village and 
bring it in the morning or any other time during the course of the day.  These beliefs 
deterred people from being wasteful and encouraged good natural resource management 
practices.  Rules governing hunting included requiring outsiders to seek permission from 
band members to hunt in their traditional territories.  The band members would then take 
this request to their ancestors before they could permit their visitors to hunt.  Rra 
Kgalalelo, who is one of the oldest members of the Xaxaba community, described the 
process as follows: 
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“Bayei would bring with them maize, sorghum and other gifts to come and seek 
permission to hunt or collect medicinal plants in a territory which belonged to the 
BaXhanikwe.  The first person to receive these visitors will then give the Bayei a 
place to rest for the night.  The following day in the morning they would be taken 
to the bandleader where their request is made official.  They would state, ‘we have 
come to seek permission to hunt and we bring with us gifts in the form of food’.  
The food would be prepared and shared with the rest of the band.  The next day, 
strong Xhanikhwe [another term for BaXhanikhwe] men are selected to 
accompany the visitors on their hunting expedition. It was necessary for the 
visitors to be escorted because they did not know their way around the said 
territory, i.e. where to find different types of animals”. 
 
By accompanying the visiting hunters, the Xhanikhwe made sure that their rules were not 
broken.  They ensured that there was no hunting of expectant female wildlife or of 
productive male animals.  They also made sure that the visiting hunters did not go beyond 
the boundaries of the Xhanikhwe territory.  This way they retained the power to decide 
where and how much hunting was to take place.  This is reflected in another statement, 
made again by Rra Kgalalelo: 
 
“The visitors and the Xhanikhwe men appointed to accompany them would take 
guns with them and go to a sacred tree known as Kgaka where a fire is made and 
the ancestral spirits are contacted to safeguard the men on the hunt.  After this the 
Basarwa would take the Bayei to an island where the hunting is going to be; they 
did not hunt female animals, only old male animals were hunted.  The animals 
would then be skinned and meat dried at the hunting site; the kill would all be 
given to the visitors.  The land was protected (said with emphasis), people who 
hunted without being given permission were, if found, required to give an 
explanation and state who had given them permission to hunt”.  
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Other rules governing the use of natural resources involved observing ceremonies marking 
the arrivals of the “first” wild fruits. The elderly women in Xaxaba stated that the very 
first fruits, berries and honey of the season (usually in late October and early November 
for most fruit species) were collected and burnt so that the smoke could go up to the 
ancestors, as a tribute to them.  Thereafter, the collected fruits would be given to old 
women and to successively younger age groups.  By the time the youngest group has had 
its share there would be an abundance of fruits in the wild, and the members of the 
community would then be free to go out and collect the fruits at will.  This, they said, 
ensured that fruits were collected on a large scale only when there was enough in the veld 
to avoid over-harvesting. 
 
Factors eroding traditional institutions 
Traditional institutions have been replaced by modern rules and regulations, and people’s 
mobility has increased over the past decades.  Further, some of the resources that were 
accessible only to band members are now open access resources.  Examples of this given 
by the respondents in this study are the palm (Hyphaene petersian) leaves which are used 
by Basarwa in both Xaxaba and Khwai for crafts, reeds, water lily (Nymphaea nouchali/, 
referred to as Tswii by respondents) and thatch grass.  The community of Xaxaba stated 
that people come in from as far as Maun to harvest water lily roots for commercial 
purposes, whereas they themselves use it for subsistence.  As pointed out in Chapter 5, the 
residents of Khwai argue that in the past, when their clan comprised of BaBugakhwe 
alone, cooperation at community level was very high and as a result the use of natural 
resources was easily managed and controlled.  They also argued that, at community level, 
they are in a position to regulate the collection of thatch grass, but they are not in any 
position to control other people who come from outside their area to collect the grass.  
This is because their rules are not supported by the present legal system. 
 
Modern institutions substituting traditional institutions 
Although there have been some changes in the traditional institutions of the Basarwa 
governing land use, new institutions for monitoring and regulating natural resource use 
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(such as Community Trusts, commonly referred to as Village Trust Committees) for 
CBNRM initiatives have been adopted.  The residents of Khwai have formed a committee 
that monitors the collection of thatching grass and established rules relating to when or 
where the grass will be cut (cf. Chapter 2).  One such rule allows cutting thatching grass 
during the period of June to September, when it is mature enough and drops seeds that 
will germinate during the rainy season.  If someone is caught cutting grass outside that 
period, they are sanctioned before a public meeting and given a warning.  If they are 
caught doing so again, the punishment will be stiffer.  Generally those who do not obey 
the rules are treated as outcasts and hence do not benefit from the support systems of 
being part of a larger community.  They are kept out of any decision-making at 
community level. 
 
The communities are aware of the potential benefits of being directly involved in natural 
resource management through CBNRM projects. The Village Trust Committees (VTCs) 
have, therefore, become the most important formal institutions at local level.  VTCs draw 
the largest crowds to the Kgotla (Tswana traditional community forum which has become 
commonly used by other tribal groups in Botswana) for meetings.   
 
Problems with modern institutions 
The community also takes a keen interest in the activities of the Village Trust Committee, 
which are seen as directly generating income and employment for the community as well 
as improving the community’s status in terms of access to natural resources.  This interest 
has resulted in a conflict between the villagers and chief Thogotona of the Xaxaba 
settlement, who now spends most of his time in Maun attending to his personal business. 
Thogotona in his own words said: 
  
“I am spending a lot of time in Maun attending to my own business interests.  What is the 
point of being here and serving the community when they seem to have forgotten 
everything that I did for them for the past seventeen years.  All they are interested in now 
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is the VTCs because it generates money and brings money into the community. Nothing 
else seems to be of equal importance”. 
 
The Village Trust Committee, which is a modern institution set up for managing and 
monitoring natural resource management, makes an important contribution to 
development projects.  
 
However, some of the committee members in Khwai argued that they are not actively 
involved in the Trust’s activities because they have not developed much confidence in 
CBNRM, hence they prefer to watch from a distance.  They also argued that there are 
factions within the community, which makes leadership difficult.  For instance, the village 
did not have a chief for a long time because of disagreements between groups within the 
community.  The residents of Xaxaba also have a Village Trust Committee, though this 
committee argues that it is difficult for them to be directly involved in management of the 
Wildlife Management Area allocated to them because of the distance between their 
settlement and the WMA.  
 
Although the Basarwa communities of Khwai and Xaxaba have adopted new institutions 
for natural resource management, conflict at community level is seen as a stumbling block 
for the success of these institutions.  A focus group discussion with the DWNP staff 
members stationed in Khwai revealed that it would be difficult today for the Khwai 
community to collectively manage the natural resources in their WMA because there is a 
disagreement at the community level in terms of who has the right to be a community 
member.  This, they said, explained why the constitution for the Trust in Khwai originally 
had a clause excluding non-Basarwa residents from being committee members, despite the 
fact that some of them had been Khwai residents for more than 20 years (cf Chapter 2). 
 
In order to compensate for limited access to natural resources, the residents of Khwai and 
Xaxaba have taken to growing maize and pumpkins in small gardens in their yards, and in 
other livelihood strategies discussed in the previous chapter. Although discussed 
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previously, the elephant problem has resulted in low harvests; both communities are 
however making large sums of money through CBNRM, and gaining employment in the 
tourism industry with their joint venture partners (cf Chapter 2, section 2.3).  
 
In July 2000, the Khwai community amended their constitution by removing the clause 
excluding non-Basarwa from serving in the committee.  Following this move, they were 
allocated their first wildlife quota by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, from 
which they raised P1.7 million in a one-day auction sale.  The money was used to set up a 
hunting safari camp, which is run and managed by the community, hence creating 
employment in Khwai.  
 
The community of Xaxaba, on the other hand, has a CBO which has been operational 
since April 1997.  The village earned P15,000 in 2000 from the CBNRM initiative in 
NG32 (refer to map 2).  This money was used to build and stock a community tuck shop, 
which is being managed by the VTC chair and treasurer.  The profits made from this tuck 
shop are deposited in a bank account, with some of it used for purchasing new groceries 
stock.  The tuck shop has, however, had problems in that P1,000 had been reported 
missing. Although its goals are to be run as a community business for the benefit of all, it 
is not popular with the local community because it does not sell goods that are locally in 
demand such as paraffin, batteries, flour etc.  Part of the problem seems to be that the shop 
is run and managed by people with no business background or experience.  
 
Some of the community’s profits have also been used to buy a vehicle and a boat.  The 
Xaxaba community treasurer, popularly known as “Rips”, is of the view that by investing 
in tangible goods the community’s confidence in CBNRM has been boosted.  On the other 
hand, though, a group of elderly women I interviewed questioned the rationale behind 
buying a vehicle and a boat when some members of the community such as senior citizens 
and orphans are struggling to meet their basic needs for food and clothing.  
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5.2.3 Global and Local Economic Trends 
To cope with vulnerabilities arising from global and local economics, the residents of 
Khwai and Xaxaba engage in cash labour to supplement other livelihood options.  Tables 
7 and 8 below indicate that most households (66% for Xaxaba and 43% for Khwai) 
combine informal and formal employment.  Most of the livelihood options (fish, grass, 
reeds and wild fruits) listed in the table below generates direct income for the households 
in Khwai and Xaxaba.  The Basarwa in Ngamiland depend largely on the tourism industry 
for their livelihoods.  The dry season when there is not much in the veld coincides with 
the peak season in the tourism industry.  Thus, the Basarwa in both Xaxaba and Khwai 
rely on employment in the safari industry and remittances from family members who are 
employed.  Part-time tourist guides can make up to P700 in a good month.  Mostly men 
are employed in this industry as polers13, guides and trackers. A survey of 15 households 
in Xaxaba revealed that 46% of the households rely on remittances from members of the 
family, whilst a survey of 14 households in Khwai indicated that 36% of the households 
rely on remittances. 
                                                 
13 Poler refers to someone who is engaged to drive a Mokoro (dug-out canoe). A long pole (called Nkashi) is used to 
paddle the Mokoro. 
 
Table 7: Source of Livelihood for Xaxaba and Khwai 
 
Number of households Source of Livelihood 
Xaxaba 
(sample size 
15hh) 
Percentage of 
households 
Khwai (sample 
size 14) 
Percentage of 
households 
Fishing 15 100% 9 64 
Baskets 11 73% 7 50 
Arable Farming 0 0 8 57 
Mokoro Safaris 4 26% 0 0 
Hunting 2 13% 0 0 
Formal employment 5 33% 3 21% 
Remittance 7 46% 5 36% 
Reeds 15 100% 7 50 
Sale of grass 8 53% 9 64% 
Drought relief and food 
ration 
0 0 3 21% 
Traditional building 
material 
9 60% 4 29% 
CBNRM 4 27% 0 0 
Wild fruits & vegetables 13 86% 4 29% 
Table 8: Source of Income (14 households in Khwai and 15 in Xaxaba) 
Percentage of Households Source of income 
Xaxaba Khwai 
Formal only 27% 7% 
Informal only 7% 43% 
Both formal and informal 66% 43%  
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Table 9: Household Monthly Gross Income (sample size same as above) 
Number of Households Monthly Gross Income in Pula 
 Xaxaba Khwai 
<500 20% 36% 
500-1050 27% 21% 
1050 - 2050 20% 21% 
2050 - 3050 13% 7% 
3050-3550 7% 0% 
>3550 13% 7% 
No income 0 8% 
 
The women, however, tend to remain in the village, engaging in foraging, making 
crafts, and brewing traditional beer for sale, for example, in order to contribute to the 
household needs.  The baskets they make are sold to tourists for between P150 and 
P250 depending on the size.  Women also collect thatch grass and reeds, which they 
sell to the safari lodges in their areas and to buyers from Maun and other villagers 
who may be renewing their homesteads.  As the tables above indicate, both thatching 
grass and reeds were important sources of livelihood for more than 50% of the 
households in both Khwai and Xaxaba.  The dry season is a time when homesteads 
are renewed to provide shelter from the rains of the wet season. The builders in the 
community charge P400 to build a wooden frame for a hut.  Normally people make 
their own frames and do not have to pay somebody else to do it, but those who are 
fully employed do not have the time to renew and build, and often engage a local 
builder to do so. 
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 Photograph 2: Mma Monjwa weaving a basket 
 
The Mokoro, which is a major means of livelihood for the men in Xaxaba and an 
important source of livelihood to 26% of the households, is made from morula 
(Sclerocarya birrea), moporota (Kigelia Africana) and motshaba (Ficus sycomorus) 
tree trunks, all of which are available locally (see photograph 3). Only non-fruit 
bearing trees are used for the purpose of mekoro. By sparing fruit- and seed-bearing 
trees there is a continuous provision of wood for canoes and fruits from the trees14. In 
the case of palm leaves used for making baskets by the communities in Ngamiland, 
the leaves are cut in a manner that doesn’t affect the ability of the plant to grow new 
leaves.  Palm leaves collection is, however, done throughout the year. 
 
                                                 
14 The Morula bears edible fruits and seeds, whereas the fruits of Moporota, which is also known as the sausage 
tree, are used as an aphrodisiac.  
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 Photograph 3: Guides from Xaxaba on their Mekoro 
Table 10: Profiles of some Community Members with Diversified Livelihood 
Strategies 
 Name  Sex Age Livelihood Other members of family 
Thogotona (Xaxaba 
Chief )  
Male Roughly 
65 
Collects reeds, thatching 
grass and tswii, which he 
sells to safari companies 
and customers in Maun.  
Collects meat from hunting 
Safaris, which he dries into 
biltong and sells in Maun.  
Cultivates maize, pumpkins 
and beans in the rainy 
season. 
Wife runs a small tuck shop 
in Maun and looks after 
school-going children and 
grandchildren. 
Kwamovu Sehenyi 
(also known as 
RraKay)  
Male 50+ Fisherman sells fish for P10 
or P5 depending on size. 
Makes fishing nets and sells 
to other fishermen. 
Freelances as a tour guide 
and can make up to P700 in 
a good month. 
Serves as VTC Chairman 
where he earns a sitting 
Wife lives in Maun and 
takes care of their school 
going children 
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 Name  Sex Age Livelihood Other members of family 
allowance for meetings. 
Keakantse 
Mahumotwane   
Female 45+ Works at OddBalls Camp 
as housekeeper and in the 
laundry.  
Makes baskets and other 
crafts which she sells 
through OddBalls and in 
Maun.  
Collects Tswii, thatching 
and reeds, which she sells 
to the camps, in Xaxaba 
and to customers in Maun. 
Member of VTC and earns 
a sitting allowance per 
meeting attended. 
Cultivates maize, pumpkins 
and beans in the rainy 
season. 
Husband makes fishing 
nets, mekoro, carves 
wooden crafts 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: Woman arranging thatching grass in Khwai 
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Natural resources are still central to the resilience and adaptability of Basarwa of 
Xaxaba and Khwai and therefore the transfer of knowledge on their management from 
the elderly members of the community to the younger generation is important.  The 
skills of hunting, tracking, making baskets, and other livelihood strategies are kept 
alive through such transfer of knowledge.  The women interviewed in both Khwai and 
Xaxaba stated that their female children accompany them on their gathering trips, 
where they observe their parents collecting wild fruits, cutting grass or collecting 
reeds.  On these trips, children are shown which plants are edible and which ones are 
poisonous.  They are also shown how to collect plants in a way that allows the fruits 
to grow back again.  They are told what the plants are called and their different uses, 
in the process building up human capital, as through this process children are taught 
essential skills for gathering and processing wild foods.  
 
5.2.4 Interdependence between the Basarwa and Bayei in Xaxaba 
In Xaxaba, evidence of building social capital was found in the interdependent 
relationship between the main ethnic groups, namely Basarwa and Bayei living in the 
settlement.  This relationship is outlined below. 
 
The residents in Xaxaba spoke of a special relationship between the Basarwa and the 
Bayei, who have always lived together and depended on each other’s different skills 
for their coping strategies.  This interdependence can be seen in the mixed cultures 
that can be seen in the Xaxaba settlement.  This interdependence is illustrated by the 
stories in Box.2.   
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 Box 2:  The stories of the Mosarwa and Moyei siblings 
 
a) “The Mosarwa and Moyei are siblings, the former being the older child. This is how the relationship has always
worked, the older child will go out into the bush to explore and when he comes back he will bring with him
Sorghum, which he picked in the wild and cooked it, then called his sibling to come and see what he has found.
His younger brother will then say to him this is called sorghum and it is prepared in such and such a way. The
older one will go out again and this time might see what looks like a herd of buffalo and go back for his brother
who will then say to him this is not buffalo but cattle and this is how to domesticate them and use them”. (Village
elders, Xaxaba 2000) 
 
b) A Mosarwa stumbled across a Mokoro near a river. He took a stick and starting beating the Mokoro instructing
it to move. His Moyei sibling saw him and walked over to him and said; this is a Mokoro, it is used for crossing
river channels, you must use Nkashi (a pole) to paddle it. And he showed the Mosarwa how this is done. This is
how the Mosarwa got to learn to use a Mokoro (Rra Kgalalelo, Xaxaba 2000).  
 
hese stories were often repeated when the historical relationship between the 
asarwa and Bayei was discussed.  It was emphasised that:   
“Yes we are of the same origins.  By this we mean the Mosarwa is older and the 
oyei is younger15. In terms of culture we have learned so much from each other, the 
ayei know and understand our culture and we have also grown to know and 
nderstand theirs e.g. weaving baskets”.   
                                                
5 This statement could be interpreted to mean the Mosarwa is older because they were the first inhabitants of the 
elta, followed by the Bayei, as argued by Tlou (1976;1985). 
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 Photograph 5: Rra Monjwa making a fishing net (an example of Bayei skill 
transferred to the Basarwa of the Okavango Delta) 
5.3 Analysis 
 
The Basarwa’s traditional livelihood strategies were sophisticated, and closely linked 
to a belief system complete with internally controlled institutions.  These have been 
replaced by livelihood strategies which are largely driven by external factors, such as 
Government driven strategies and economic trends, which are all weakening the 
resilience of the Basarwa communities.  The very core of the Basarwa’s livelihood 
strategies have been reduced to symbolic importance, and in cases where traditional 
skills are still contributing to the livelihoods of these communities, the contribution is 
as not as significant as it used to be. There is a shift in the importance of livelihood 
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assets towards financial and human capital as opposed to social and natural capital, 
which were central to the livelihoods of the Basarwa in the past. If one takes the 
concept of adaptation by necessity, put forward by Ellis (2000), we begin to 
appreciate that the Basarwa have developed these strategies out of necessity rather 
than as a matter of choice. 
5.3.1 Climatic and Environmental Variability  
Mobility and flexibility in the use of resources; flexibility in group size; detailed 
knowledge of the local ecological system; the right skills; and reciprocity/sharing 
networks were in the past key aspects of Basarwa adaptation, enabling them to adapt 
to drought and periodic shortages of resources (Hitchcock et al. 1989, Guenther, 
1981).  As Saugestad (1998) argues, the resilience of any type of adaptation depends 
on the flexibility and adaptability of its practitioners.  The Basarwa communities have 
been shown to be highly flexible and adaptable to the unpredictable and highly 
variable nature of their local ecological systems.  Below is a further analysis of the 
resilience-maintaining livelihood strategies the Basarwa have evolved in order to 
respond to climatic and environmental variability. 
 
Seasonal mobility is an example of management practices based on ecological 
knowledge and governed closely by social mechanisms.  As stated earlier in this 
chapter, although the Basarwa engaged in seasonal mobility, they moved only within 
their territories, within which there were rules governing access to land resources.  
Territorial boundaries were not physically demarcated but were recognised by natural 
landmarks such as pans or groves of trees.  Hunting and gathering across territorial 
borders was usually avoided (see Barnard, 1979; 1986; 1992a; and 1995, Cashdan, 
1983; and Madzwamuse, 1998).  There was, however, less movement when collecting 
natural resources in Ngamiland than in Gantsi and Kgalagadi Districts, primarily 
because resources are richer in Ngamiland (Bolaane, 2004).  
 
In addition to the traditional coping mechanisms discussed in the previous section, a 
traditional response to drought amongst the Basarwa was to increase the number of 
people in the labour force.  Children, for example, were pressed into service as 
foragers. They would help collect veld products and help process plants for 
consumption purposes.  Another coping strategy in periods of drought, according to 
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Hitchcock et al. (1989), was to increase the amount of time spent on foraging, as the 
depletion of food resources in the vicinity of the settlement required people to travel 
long distances or switch to alternative foods.  This flexibility is not unique to the 
Basarwa: the western arctic Inuit community of Sachs Harbour, another indigenous 
people, have absorbed climate-related changes through the flexibility of the seasonal 
cycle and the Inuvialuit way of life, by modifying the time of harvesting, modifying 
the location of harvest activity, adjusting the species harvested, and minimising risk 
and uncertainty (Berkes and Jolly, 2001).   
 
Berkes and Jolly (2001) argue that the Inuvialuit of Sachs Harbour draw on 
accumulated knowledge and experience to come up with these coping strategies. 
Similarly, Hitchcock et al. (1989) argue that one of the reasons for the adaptive 
success of Kalahari hunter gatherers was their knowledge of the local environment 
and their efficient means of exploiting it.  This knowledge, however, was not always 
at the disposal of all Basarwa groups in the Kalahari, and for those without the 
necessary knowledge of the local environment a dependency strategy was chosen.  
This involved ‘squatting’ on ranches as a means of getting through droughts (ibid).  
 
Local knowledge and the intergenerational transfer of this knowledge is important in 
facilitating adaptation to the climatic shocks that affect the Okavango Delta, as well as 
for building the resilience of the coping strategies adopted.  To cope with drought, the 
Basarwa communities of Xaxaba and Khwai draw on their human capital - hunting 
skills, the knowledge of alternative foods, and other survival skills.  This is seen as a 
fairly common strategy for communities directly relying on natural resources for their 
livelihood, where, in seasonal shortages and famines, people broaden their definition 
of food (Shipton 1990).  Elders remember emergency food repertoires and pass them 
along as oral history.  Famine sufferers often break food taboos, suggesting that, 
among other things food taboos may function to conserve resources for emergencies 
(ibid).  Traditional knowledge, which acts as the memory of the system, enables such 
communities to anticipate and predict periods of shortage and abundance, and respond 
before a crisis occurs. 
 
Some management patterns are similar to the functional role of biodiversity as 
insurance in ecosystems. There is a great deal of biodiversity in ecosystems that 
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seems redundant during ecological succession yet which may become of critical 
importance in release and reorganisation phases (Gunderson et al. 1995). The 
importance of such species maybe detected only when they are needed, following a 
disruption (Holling et al. 2002).  An example of a social analogue to such redundancy 
is groups of species used by people as emergency foods, alternative foods, and hunger 
and thirst suppressants.  These enable communities to cope and recover from crisis.  
Species redundancy in biodiversity, which helps buffer disturbance and maintain the 
opportunity for innovation and novelty in ecosystems, may also function to buffer 
disturbance and maintain opportunity in social systems (Gunderson, et al. 1995). 
According to Berkes and Jolly (2001), some people in the Sachs Harbour stated how 
it was easier in a sense to cope with environmental change now than in the past, since 
the community does not rely exclusively on harvested wild foods (ibid).  The same 
can be said for the communities in the Delta, whose livelihood strategies are not 
entirely land-based.  In times of drought, households can continue to draw on wage 
labour and remittances from working family members in order to cope.  This will 
likely be the case for as long as the tourism industry in the Delta continues to thrive.  
Thus improvement in access to a ‘new’ type of capital can also strengthen the 
resilience of a community.  
It is notable, however, that coping strategies are no longer as complex as they used to 
be.  Today, sedentary Basarwa communities rely more on diversification and a 
combination of livelihood strategies rather than mobility and flexibility in group size.  
This diversity, in addition to maintaining a level of flexibility in pursuing different 
livelihood options, continues to build resilience in social and ecological systems.  
Most of the livelihood options are still directly dependent on natural resources, 
indicating a continued link between the social and ecological systems of the Basarwa 
in Khwai and Xaxaba. Table 6 lists sources of livelihood and indicates the percentage 
of households depending on the resource.   
 
The table on monthly gross income suggests that the Basarwa engage in a wage 
labour and the cash economy by selling grass, reeds and other products. However, the 
fluctuating household income levels reflect seasonality and the irregular nature of the 
sources of income for the residents of Xaxaba and Khwai.  In some months a 
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household may not sell grass, and other months the number of tourists is low, both of 
which factors would lead to lower income. 
5.3.2 Power and Politics 
The political environment has increasingly become the main determinant for 
adaptation to which remote communities must adjust (Saugestad, 1998).  An agro-
pastoral land tenure system, hunting regulations, and programmes geared towards 
sedentising the Basarwa, replace an appropriate combination of hunting and gathering 
technologies.  They make redundant the Basarwa’s form of social organisation that 
allowed for the flexible use of large territories, adjusted to seasonal changes, which 
permitted the Basarwa to cope with uncertainty.  These techniques have been replaced 
by new Government interventions that threaten the resilience of the Basarwa 
communities.  
 
Traditional cultural behaviour assisted ecological resilience by preventing the 
overexploitation of wildlife and veld resources and helping such resources to recover.  
The Xhanikhwe, for instance, did not kill productive wildlife but only hunted ageing 
wildlife.  In summer only male animals were hunted, as the females would be 
pregnant, and in winter, which is the mating season, male animals were spared as they 
now had an important role to play in reproduction.  These strategies ensured renewal 
in wildlife species.  This selective hunting during the different seasons enhanced the 
resilience of the ecosystem in the sense that disturbance (hunting) took place in such a 
way that ecosystem memory was conserved thus making reorganisation and 
innovation possible.  
 
Gadgil (1985) gives a similar example where religious prohibitions on fishing in India 
during the mating season protect the breeding stock.  Sacred ponds were protected, 
providing a sanctuary for the breeding fish.  Gadgil (1985) further reports that all 
resources, including fish, were the property of the gods and not of social caste, and 
permission had to be sought from the gods before resources were harvested.  
Traditional practices in India maintained fish populations at sustainable levels.  We 
see a similarity in the case of the Xhanikhwe, in that permission to hunt in their 
territory was sought not only from the band but also from the gods. 
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Furthermore, social taboos which may not have been aimed directly at conservation, 
often resulted in the conservation of certain species or relieved the pressure on certain 
resources.  The case of the first fruits of the season being eaten by the elderly, and 
then going down the age groups, is one such example whereby the Xhanikhwe 
relieved pressure on wild fruits at a time when this resource was limited.  The opening 
of the season for collecting wild fruits and berries coincided with an abundance of the 
resources in the wild.  Examples elsewhere exist where taboos have been used by 
indigenous societies as social mechanisms in the management of natural resources.  
Among traditional societies in Oceania, it was customary to impose taboos on the use 
of subsistence crops to prevent their being harvested at inappropriate times (Chapman, 
1985, Child and Child 1993 quoted in Colding and Folke 1997).  These taboos were 
not always permanent in time and space, but could be removed when food resources 
were plentiful (ibid).  
 
In some cases, food-related taboos comprise a total prohibition of species at all times.  
In Botswana this is often found in the form of totems.  According to Colding and 
Folke (1997), such taboos protect animals and plants completely both in time and 
space, by prohibiting their killing and use by all members of a human community.  
They further argue that, at least in theory, this total prohibition may be of direct value 
in protecting threatened and vulnerable species.  My study did not identify many cases 
of this type of taboo amongst the BaBugakhwe and the Xhanikhwe, in Khwai and 
Xaxaba respectively.  There was one case of a woman in Xaxaba who was badly 
scarred on her face; and she said that she had had a skin reaction after eating from a 
pot that her husband had used to cook elephant meat, which is her totem.  Others 
(such as Mma Monjwa and Rra Monjwa) contradicted this as they ate meat of their 
totem.   
 
Totemic law also played a role in managing the use of wildlife resources.  Totemic 
law has both characteristics of informal and formal constraints, as it is based on both 
rules and norms of behaviour.  For example, the Tswana were traditionally divided 
into many groups, distinguished from one another by their totems, which, in the 
majority of cases, were animals. For instance, the totem of the Kwena and Ngwaketse 
royal families is the crocodile; of the Ngwato and Tawana the duiker; of the Kgatla 
the vervet monkey; and of the Lete the buffalo.  One of the most common obligations 
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concerning a totem animal was that it should not be killed or even touched.  In this 
way a range of species were protected. This concurs with Folke, Berkes and Colding 
(1998), who argue that a characteristic institution in many traditional communities is 
to manage resources not by managing numbers but by managing the resource and 
ecosystem through social conduct.  They also argue that various kinds of taboos have 
been recognised to be ecologically functional and to have the potential of building 
resilience in ecological and social systems.  An example of this kind of mechanism is 
the food taboos amongst the Caicurus16, which seem to be associated with different 
ecological factors.  Tabooed fish for the Caicurus tend to be carnivorous, toxic, or to 
have medicinal properties (Begossi, 1998).  Colding and Folke (1997) argue that 
species-specific taboos also tend to protect threatened species, as such species may 
hide, forage and reproduce in the vicinity of the local groups that abstain from their 
utilisation. They may also, through traditional ecological knowledge, be recognised as 
keystones, playing a major role in the structure, dynamics and stability of an 
ecosystem (ibid).  Elephants and hippo, for example, are keystone species in the Delta 
because they maintain the river channels and open up the vegetation. 
 
The religious aspect of natural resource management by the Basarwa is very 
important, as illustrated by the residents of Khwai and Xaxaba.  They argued that, 
apart from the practical way of imparting knowledge through hunting and gathering, 
educating the younger generation about natural resource management involved 
teaching about the gods who govern the utilisation of all natural resources in the area.  
Often the fear of supernatural beings was used as a deterrent against the abuse of 
natural resources. Bad luck would befall anyone who was seen to be misusing natural 
resources.  
 
In contrast to the Basarwa, in the Tswana culture the institution of Chieftaincy 
(Dikgosi) controlled access to natural resources.  Chiefs were considered to be the 
owners of wildlife, holding it in trust for the tribe.  As a fundamental principle 
governing access to wildlife, the Tswana considered all fur-bearing animals to belong 
to the chiefs, irrespective of who hunted them, and their rituals emphasised that they 
                                                 
16 Caicurus are descendents of Indians and Portuguese, located on the northern coast of Sao Paulo State and the 
southern coast of Rio de Janeiro State on the Atlantic coast. 
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were tribal property (Campbell 1978, in Spinage 1991).  The concept of tribute also 
seems to imply that game was the property of the chief; he is considered the owner 
and is entitled to share in the proceeds of every hunting expedition. The Chief 
received all animals killed in a collective hunt that he had organised (letsholo).  
Sometimes he divided the meat among those taking part, but usually suitable portions 
were dried and taken back to the community to be shared communally.  The Chief 
kept the skins or sold them. Individual hunters were obliged to give the Chief the 
brisket (sehuba) of large game, the skins of lions and leopards, one tusk of any 
elephant killed (that of the side on which it fell), some feathers of an ostrich killed and 
the body of a bustard (Spinage, 1991). Unlike kinship, which restricted and controlled 
rights and access to wildlife in Basarwa society, tribute law among the Batswana 
limited the individual’s right to hunt animals.  
 
According to Schapera, tribute law was disappearing by the 1930s, which led to 
people having more freedom connected with hunting than they had previously 
possessed under customary law. However, this freedom began to be restricted at the 
request of the colonial administration by the protection that the Chiefs extended to 
large game.  The Kgalagadi, Basarwa, Bayei and other minor tribes living in under the 
authority of major tribes were obliged to hand over to the major tribe all hunting 
spoils, such as ivory, ostrich feathers and skins.  According to Schapera (1943) in 
Spinage (1991), the only people seriously affected by such changes were the 
Kgalagadi and the Basarwa, and they apparently did a great deal of poaching.  They 
ignored the Chief’s restrictions and did not hand over the skins which the Tswana 
claimed as theirs.  Hunting had become less important in the Tswana economy but 
remained important to the economy of the Basarwa.   
 
The Tswana also used protected area systems to manage the use of wildlife resources. 
Traditional protected areas were in the form of hunting reserves belonging to the 
chiefs.  Such a reserve was Chiefs Island in the Okavango Delta, known formerly as 
“Mathuiba’s Island” after the Tawana Chief who set it up sometime after 1906.  This 
island is the very same island which the Basarwa of Xaxaba claim was a part of their 
traditional territory. Khama, chief of the Ngwato, had a “reserve” for ostriches in 
1875 in the region of Makwa, somewhere south of Sua Pan.  Generally speaking, 
however, there was little need for protected areas before the era of exploitation, which 
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began in the middle of the 19th century, and the Chiefs hunted with their people in 
common hunting grounds. Khama’s ostrich reserve was set up as an area to allow 
ostriches to breed undisturbed, because of the great decline in numbers which had 
taken place and the resulting scarcity of feathers for trade (Spinage, 1991). 
 
As institutions form part of the structure and processes of sustainable rural 
livelihoods, they can help cushion the impact of external shocks.  The erosion of 
traditional institutions has hence increased the vulnerability of the Basarwa and 
weakened their buffering capacity to survive disturbance, in turn weakening the 
resilience of both social and ecological systems. 
 
In the new relationship the Basarwa have with the environment, hunting and gathering 
are limited to symbolic importance.  Hunting and gathering is no longer vital to the 
livelihood strategies of the Basarwa, but does remain central to the construction of 
people’s identities (Twyman, 2000).  The nature of hunting and gathering has 
undergone transformation.  Firstly, the purpose of gathering has changed, from 
providing food to the household to generating cash through commercial purposes, 
such as selling thatching grass, basketry and other crafts. Secondly, as Taylor (2000) 
observes, hunting regulations have not stopped subsistence hunting completely but 
rather transformed it into hidden, wasteful and individualistic practice. By virtue of 
hunting being a hidden activity, it has resulted in restricted sharing networks of meat 
beyond households (Taylor, 2000) and therefore threatens the social capital central to 
the traditional livelihood strategies of the Basarwa.  The fact that hunting is socially 
hidden may explain why hunting and gathering does not appear in Tables 7 and 8, 
which list the livelihood options given by the Xaxaba and Khwai communities.  The 
occasional presence of meat in the community is an indication that illegal hunting was 
being carried out. 
 
By criminalising one of the central markers of Basarwa identity, hunting regulations 
are symbolically marginalising Basarwa from mainstream society (Taylor, 2000).  
This, in turn, affects the Basarwa’s sense of well-being, in a similar way to the effects 
of loss of their traditional territories/lands. This is the case more especially if one 
takes Christudolou’s (1990) view that land is a locus for group and even national 
identity. Land is not only a source of production but also a ground for cultural identity 
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- a society occupying a certain area of land attaches significance in being identified 
with it (ibid). Social capital and to some extent human capital draws its strength and 
resilience from such factors. 
 
The loss of traditional lands that form a part of Basarwa identity can be regarded as a 
threat to the resilience of their social capital, as part of their identity and sense of 
well-being are stripped away.  The two groups in Xaxaba and Khwai spoke of their 
traditional territories with and sense of longing and loss.  They constantly spoke of 
leading a better life in those areas, such as Tsobaoro in case of Xaxaba residents.  
These were referred to as matota abo ntate, which is Setswana for “our ancestors’ 
ruins”.  This point is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Moser (1998) argues that drawing on social networks acts as effective mechanism for 
dealing with minor shocks and risks, but is not effective with severe shocks or major 
risks such as droughts.  In times of severe shocks, social capital is threatened, 
especially in poor rural communities, such as the Basarwa, where sharing is important 
to the survival of communities and for building resilience (Devereux, 1999; Kent, 
1993; Shipton, 1990; and Hitchcock et al. 1989).  Furthermore, social capital is a 
means to an end, where the end is access to more immediate forms of capital such as 
human capital (e.g. assistance in crafting a Mokoro or building shelter) and natural 
capital (rights to use land and other natural resources).  In Khwai, social capital is 
being threatened by the existence of non-Basarwa groups. This has resulted in 
conflicts at community level, making it difficult for community decisions to be made.  
In contrast to the situation in Khwai, the existence of Bayei and Basarwa side by side 
in Xaxaba indicates a notion of complementarity between the different ethnic groups.   
 
The relationship between the Basarwa and Bayei discussed in section 5.3.3 
strengthens the social capital of the Xaxaba community. The connection between the 
two ethnic groups makes it possible for the two to bring together their skills and 
knowledge in order to come up with resilient strategies to deal with the ecological and 
social stress.  Although the Basarwa constitute 66% of the population in Xaxaba 
(Cassidy et al. 2001), there has been a complete process of acculturation between the 
two groups. Equipped with different skills, the Bayei and Basarwa learn from each 
other. Their collective human capital is enhanced, making it easier for the community 
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to utilise other forms of capital (natural and physical) in order to pursue desired 
livelihood outcomes. Both groups know how to make Mekoro, weave baskets, grow 
food and hunt, and they are equally in a position to benefit from the thriving tourism 
industry in their area, with all households having at least one person employed in the 
surrounding camps. Both communities of Khwai and Xaxaba draw on their social 
capital, whereby they rely on working family members for financial capital through 
remittances. 
 
In contrast to the traditional local institutions, which were governed by the respective 
Basarwa communities, the new institutions are externally driven.  The procedures for 
setting up Village Trust Committees are stipulated by the Government. Requirements 
include developing a written constitution and making use of the Kgotla system as a 
forum for public consultation and participation, both of which are new and foreign 
concepts being imposed on the Basarwa communities.  These draw very little from the 
local institutions discussed in section 5.2.2.  Some traditional practices are, however, 
being drawn upon, although not to their full potential. One example is the Khwai 
community restricting the harvesting of thatching grass during the off-season, so as 
not to interfere with the process of renewal and growth.  The practice is monitored 
through a resource committee using local knowledge and traditional institutions. The 
temporal restriction on harvesting is, according to Folke et al. (1998), common to 
many modern and traditional management systems.  An example from elsewhere is 
the Canadian Amerindian hunters, where hunting areas are rested so that the animals 
can replenish themselves. As noted previously, the Basarwa also had similar hunting 
and harvesting restrictions to ensure that the wildlife was able to replenish itself.   
 
Basarwa, like many indigenous societies, had indigenous methods of coping with 
uncertainty presented by the highly variable and unpredictable environment they lived 
in and relied on for their livelihood.  These strategies have, however, undergone 
changes as a result of dispossession, acculturation through interaction with other 
ethnic groups, and in response to the policies of the Government.  The result has been 
a breakdown in old methods, the reshaping of coping strategies and an emergence of 
new strategies to reduce vulnerability and build social and ecological resilience.  
It should be emphasised, however, that land remains a major determinant of the 
natural, physical and financial capital available to the Basarwa.  The amount of land 
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the Basarwa presently have access to is of a lower capital value to their livelihoods 
compared to their larger traditional territories.  The values of the other forms of 
capital are also reduced. The loss of land further reduces the social capital of the 
Basarwa, as they lose their sense of belonging and are relegated to an underclass, 
which in turn affects their human capital.  
 
As stated in the introduction, social capital can be effective in the management of 
common resources.  For example, the fear of being treated like an outcast, cut off 
from the benefits of being part of the community, acts as a deterrent against 
mismanagement of natural resources.  Social capital has enabled the Basarwa of 
Khwai to maintain and use their traditional grass cutting rules and practices.  In this 
sense social capital builds resilience in social-ecological systems.  
 
Twyman (2000) argues that for Basarwa communities in the south-western part of the 
country, the natural resource base has changed, and whilst the use of natural resources 
has in many cases dwindled, livelihoods based on these resources remain important in 
terms of cultural identity and symbolic significance.  Natural resources remain as real 
and perceived safety nets in times of stress, as is demonstrated by members of the 
Xaxaba community who, after being retrenched from OddBalls and Delta Camps 
turned to making Mekoro (among other activities) and selling these to younger guides 
who did not have the time nor the necessary skills to make this very important item, 
which is central to livelihood strategies in the Delta.  For the Basarwa of Ngamiland, 
however, gathering remains central to both their livelihood strategies and to the 
construction of their identities.  Hence, building on natural capital is of importance for 
these communities, as it has the greatest potential for developing the financial capital 
into a new and increasingly important form of capital for the Basarwa communities in 
the Okavango Delta. 
 
Sending children to school for a formal education is seen as an attempt by Basarwa 
communities to build their human capital, in the hope that it will improve access to 
other forms of capital, such financial capital (through access to better paying jobs) and 
natural capital (as an improved understanding of the policies and institutional systems 
provides the Basarwa with an opportunity to fight for their land rights).  This, in turn, 
builds political capital, which the SRLF has been criticised for not addressing.  It is 
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this human capital that the Basarwa are drawing on to adopt new institutions such as 
Chieftaincy, Village Trust Committees and Village Development Committees, which 
are part of the newly established and formal institutional framework of the Basarwa 
communities.  However, one notes that the failure of these institutions to formally 
draw upon and build on traditional local institutions weakens the resilience of the new 
livelihood strategies, as they are governed by rules that are alien and foreign to the 
concerned communities. These institutions and their impact on the resilience of the 
Basarwa are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.3 Global and Local Economic Trends 
 
As outlined in section 5.2.3, the Basarwa communities in Ngamiland rely on a variety 
of livelihood strategies for their needs, with remittances from family members 
employed in the tourism industry playing a large part in their livelihoods.  The role of 
diversity in the livelihood strategies of the Basarwa remains crucial for their survival.  
 
Maintaining diversity in livelihood strategies remains important for social resilience 
of the Basarwa.  Adjer (2000) correctly argues that diversity and flexibility enhance 
resilience of both social and ecological systems. Examples drawn from field data for 
my study illustrate how the two Basarwa communities have adapted to the new status 
quo.  They exploit the opportunities presented by the tourism industry, such as 
employment, selling crafts and thatching grass, as well as new opportunities presented 
by CBNRM. 
 
Although Chapter 4 indicates that the Basarwa communities in Ngamiland are 
vulnerable to wildlife danger, the presence of wildlife also provides a livelihood 
opportunity which builds and strengthens financial capital for the Khwai and Xaxaba 
communities.  Through the Government-driven CBNRM approach, these 
communities have accrued financial benefits not enjoyed by communities elsewhere 
in the country. As Berkes (2001) argues, not all ecological surprises are negative from 
a local point of view.  According to the CBNRM Status Report (2000), CBNRM 
activities in Ngamiland District earn the highest income in the country.  Ngamiland is 
home to the bulk of the country’s wildlife resources, which are worth huge sums of 
money to hunting safaris.  In 2000, Ngwaa Khobee Xeya Trust (a community based 
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organisation in Kgalagadi District) had a total income of only P300, 000, compared to 
P1.7 million received by the Khwai community and P1.1 million received by Kopano 
Mokoro (which Xaxaba is a part of).  In fact, Kopano Mokoro earned three times the 
total income of Ngwaa Khobee Xeya through land rental and wildlife quota fees 
alone.  At household level, financial capital in Xaxaba, Khwai and the rest of 
Ngamiland is strengthened by the employment opportunities provided by CBNRM.  
 
Regardless of the seemingly important role played by financial capital in the 
livelihood strategies of the Basarwa communities of Khwai and Xaxaba, these 
communities continue to give a high rating to natural capital. An example illustrating 
this is the Khwai communities’ resistance to attempts by Government to relocate them 
to an area where social amenities, in the form of schools and clinics, will be provided.  
Their argument is that their development priorities are not clinics and hospitals, but 
rather land rights and natural resource rights.  The residents of Khwai perceive these 
rights as their source of identity and as their ticket to economic development, which 
would then enable them to have funds to buy a community vehicle which could be 
used for driving the sick to the nearby village of Mababe.  They also argue that their 
vehicle could be used for transporting school-going children to a boarding school in 
Gudigwa and back for school holidays.  With eco-tourism increasingly gaining 
popularity in the global tourism market, the Khwai community are likely to have 
made an astute decision. 
 
For communities that rely directly on natural resources for their livelihoods, 
uncertainty and surprise is inevitable.  It hence remains important that a 
diversification of livelihood strategies and flexibility is maintained.  The Xaxaba 
residents’ resistance to give up their “freelance” status should be seen as an attempt 
by the community members to ensure that room for diversity and flexibility is 
maintained.  As one of the residents put it: 
 
“The freelancing arrangement we had with Gun’s Camp, OddBalls and Delta 
Camp allowed us to carry on with our livelihood activities (matshelo a rona), 
like making Mekoro, fishing, gathering building materials or renewing our 
homes”. 
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Conclusion 
 
Generally the residents of both Khwai and Xaxaba engage in a diversity of livelihood 
activities, and this diversity is a risk-minimising strategy related to uncertainty and 
surprise.  Those who had lost jobs at OddBalls and Delta Camps moved on to other 
means of making a living.  Diversification is well known as a risk-spreading strategy 
related to uncertainty and surprise (Adger, 2000 and Berkes, 2001), and one that 
remains central to the resilience of the livelihood strategies of the Basarwa 
communities. But how are current interventions affecting resilience and livelihood 
assets of the Basarwa? This question is addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Evaluation of Current Interventions 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In light of what we have seen in this thesis about adaptive strategies among some 
Basarwa and the challenges they are facing, it is appropriate to ask how well this 
understanding is reflected in the general policy measures of the Government of 
Botswana. In this chapter, the focus changes to Government as the main actor, as 
opposed to individuals and communities and their relationship to the environment as it 
has been in the previous chapters. This chapter also attempts to show that access to 
natural resources for the Basarwa in Khwai and Xaxaba is limited not by resource 
scarcity and depletion but also by policy and legislative constraints. This leaves the 
Basarwa more vulnerable to surprise and disturbance than before, thus weakening the 
resilience of social and ecological systems. The concept of adaptive management is 
used to evaluate the 2001 CBNRM Draft Policy as it provides the context for current 
interventions, and the principles used in its formulation have guided the 
implementation of CBNRM in Botswana over the last 10 years. 
 
This chapter further seeks to address the last two research questions: 
• How has the resilience of past and present livelihood strategies been 
influenced by changes in policies and institutions? and 
• How can the current CBNRM policy and institutions be adapted to promote 
the resilience of the Basarwa’s livelihood assets? 
 
As noted earlier, the term “institution” in this thesis is used to refer to both social and 
political institutions. Social institutions are what cement the social life of a group and 
tend to give livelihood assets their meaning and value (Giddens, 1996). They provide 
the basic living arrangements (rules) that human beings use to guide their interactions 
with one another, by means of which continuity is achieved across generations. 
Institutions are embedded in and develop out of the culture (norms and beliefs) of 
communities or larger societies. Policies and institutions are an important aspect in 
terms of assessing livelihood strategies, as they effectively determine access to 
various types of capital, livelihood strategies and decision-making bodies, and sources 
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of influence (such as pressure groups/interests groups and other forms of civil 
society).  
In the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework (DFID, 1999), which is used as a 
conceptual framework in this thesis, policies, legislation and institutions are regarded 
as transforming structures and processes. These effectively determine access to 
various types of capital, livelihood strategies, and to decision-making bodies and 
sources of influence. They are therefore pivotal in terms of providing an enabling 
environment for improving livelihoods. Institutions are made up of formal constraints 
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions and 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. They also 
determine the type of benefits communities gain from any given livelihood strategy. 
For example, institutions may govern usufructory rights of individuals to land, and on 
the basis of those rights, individuals may benefit or be excluded from hunting and 
gathering in a particular territory, as discussed in the previous chapter. Institutions can 
also help cushion the impact of external shocks through the provision of social safety 
nets (DFID, 1999), which in turn strengthens the buffering capacity of social and 
ecological systems to survive disturbance, and improves their resilience. Through 
institutions, individuals gain access to various forms of capital and during times of 
stress they may have access to social capital (through sharing networks) by virtue of 
belonging to a group. One example is sharing among traditional communities, which 
are often thought to mitigate the unevenness of hunting returns in forager 
communities (Kent, 1993). Another example in traditional communities is 
intercommunity trade facilitated through established social networks, which the 
Inuvialuit people use as an important means of addressing regional differences in 
resource availability (Berkes and Jolly, 2001). 
Organisations, in addition to institutions, also help local people cope. Where people 
do not have access to organisations of the state, they often lack knowledge of their 
rights and have only a limited understanding of the way in which government 
functions. This makes it hard for them to exert pressure for change in the processes 
(policies, legislation, etc.) that affect their livelihoods, or to exploit opportunities 
presented by various government policies and strategies. I have, therefore, 
investigated how these transforming structures have influenced the livelihood 
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strategies, such as hunting and foraging, seasonal mobility and adaptability 
necessitated by changes in the ecological environment, and variations in natural 
assets, of the Basarwa in Ngamiland.   
Adaptive management is an integrated method for natural resource management 
(Holling 1986; Lee, 1993; Gunderson et al., 1995). It is adaptive because it 
acknowledges that environmental conditions will always change, thus requiring 
management institutions to respond to feedback by adjusting and evolving. Adaptive 
management, like some traditional systems, takes a dynamic view of ecosystems, 
emphasises processes (including resource use) that are part of ecological cycles of 
renewal, and stresses the importance of resilience. Adaptive management, like many 
traditional knowledge systems, assumes that nature cannot be controlled and yield 
predicted; uncertainty and unpredictability are characteristics of all ecosystems, 
including managed ones (Gunderson 1999). In both cases feedback learning is the 
way in which societies deal with uncertainty in the management and use of natural 
resources. Often this is not learning at the level of the individual, but social learning at 
the level of society, or institutional learning at the level of the institution. Adaptive 
management emphasises learning by doing in a way similar to that in which skills and 
knowledge are transferred amongst the Basarwa. Adaptive management therefore 
views policy as hypotheses, that is, most policies are really questions masquerading as 
answers. Because policies are questions, then management actions become treatments 
in an experimental sense (ibid) and need to be adapted accordingly.  
 
The question then is does the Botswana CBNRM Policy as a current intervention 
provide a mechanism to allow for learning and adaptation? Furthermore, is the policy 
environment conducive to learning, i.e. is enough space accorded to local 
communities to participate in policy formulation and implementation? Niamir-Fuller 
(2004) argues that most dry lands exhibit dynamic equilibrium, and therefore need 
adaptive management to allow optimum use of variable unpredictable resources. 
However, in order for this to happen a fair amount of flexibility is required. 
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6.1.1 Policies as Institutions 
 
Policies are official statements reflecting the development tasks that Government 
undertakes to do (Cassidy, 2000). They state the aims and objectives that Government 
hopes to achieve in certain areas of development. Once policies are accepted, they 
form the framework for related laws. These laws must be in agreement with the 
objectives of the policy. In essence, policies shape development in a country (ibid). 
Although policies are not legally binding over ordinary citizens, they can determine 
what Government allows people to do (ibid). The policy that this thesis evaluates is 
the CBNRM Policy; other policies that govern the use of land and natural resources 
have been touched on briefly in the introduction for purposes of providing 
background. 
6.1.2 Land and Natural Resource Policies in Botswana 
 
The section below gives an overview of policies and legislation governing land use 
and natural resource management in Botswana. It is against this background that the 
discussions in this chapter should be understood. 
 
6.1.2.1Past and Present Policies and Institutions Governing Land Use and Natural 
Resource Management 
 
Between 1968 (the year marking the beginning of a post Independence land reform 
process in Botswana) and 1992, a number of policies and Acts were promulgated that 
virtually negated the Basarwa’s adaptive livelihood strategies. The 1968 Tribal Land 
Act had catastrophic consequences for the Basarwa’s resilience. This Act defines land 
rights and use in agro-pastoral terms at the expense of hunter-gatherers (Ng’ong’ola, 
1997).  
 
The system of land tenure under colonial administration that emerged after the 
proclamation of Crown Lands and demarcation of the tribal reserves survived with 
minimal modifications until the attainment of Independence in 1966 (Ng’ong’ola and 
Moeletsi, 1995). In 1968 the Tribal Land Act (1968) was proposed to transform that 
land tenure system. The purpose of the transformation was to accommodate modern 
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concepts of land use and to democratise land administration. The first step towards 
this exercise was the formation of Land Boards to take over the land administration 
functions from the tribal authorities (chiefs). Nine land boards were established in 
areas roughly coinciding with former native reserves. The reserves belonged to the 
only eight tribes (Bangwato, Bakgatla, Barolong, Batawana, Batlokwa, Bamalete, 
Bangwaketse and Bakwena) that were recognised by the colonial Government as 
having title to land. These were all Tswana speaking groups, and so called “minority” 
tribes such as the Basarwa, Bakalaka, Bayei and others were not allocated land. In 
other words the minority tribes, who had been denied title to land by the colonial 
administration, remained formally landless after independence. 
 
In 1976, three more land boards were established for the Chobe, Ghanzi and 
Kgalagadi tribal areas, whose status was converted from state land to tribal land. This 
move improved the security of tenure of the Basarwa, Bakgalagadi and other minority 
ethnic groups. However, their problems were not completely addressed, as the land 
board system was inadequate, having been designed against the backdrop of the 
dominant Tswana system of land tenure based on an agro-pastoral land use. Land 
boards were designed to replace Tswana Chiefs, headmen and overseers. This did not 
significantly improve the tenurial security of the Basarwa and other ethnic minorities, 
who had weak social and political structures compared to those of the Tswana, and 
were therefore further disempowered by the imposition of land boards (Ng’ong’ola, 
1997).  
 
In 1993, the Land Act was amended in order to extend rights to all citizens 
irrespective of ethnic affiliation. However, this move still did not cater for the 
Basarwa communities, as no amendment was made to accommodate their different 
tenurial practices and experiences. Land rights remained defined in agro-pastoral 
terms (Ng’ong’ola and Moeletsi, 1995; Ng’ong’ola, 1997) at the expense of hunting 
and gathering societies. Some of the Basarwa, e.g. the River Bushmen (BaBugakhwe 
and Xhanikhwe), were to a small extent engaged in farming and livestock-rearing 
land uses as a result of being in contact with the Bayei and Hambukushu (see 
Cashdan, 1983, Barnard, 1979; 1986, 1992 and 1995).  
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The Tribal Grazing Land Policy and 1991 Agricultural Policy 
Despite the general shift towards local accountability in land use and management 
matters presented by the establishment of land boards, critics have argued that, since 
1975, there has been a slow but clear reversal of policy that has led to an increasing 
centralisation of land administration (Neme, 1995). The de-linking of communities 
from the land they occupy and own collectively, and the increasing privatisation of 
tenure arrangements, had a negative effect on people’s livelihoods, because 
communities were cut off from access to land and natural resources which were now 
on private land. This included San communities and many of the rural poor. The 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1974, and the fencing component of the 1991 New 
Agricultural Policy, provides evidence for this shift in policy and the increasing 
privatisation of the commonage. 
 
The Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) set out guidelines for the implementation of 
a land tenure reform designed to halt the degradation of land by overgrazing, which 
had become particularly severe in the populated parts of eastern Botswana. The policy 
proposed to do this primarily by enclosure. Individuals with many cattle, or groups of 
smaller stockmen, would be assigned exclusive rights over defined areas of grazing 
which they would be encouraged to enclose. A major component of the 1991 
Agricultural Policy was the proposed fencing of cattle posts on communal grazing 
lands and converting them to ranches, ostensibly to improve cattle management and 
production practices. The policy asserts that the TGLP succeeded in demonstrating 
that fenced ranches are more productive than communal area cattle posts, hence the 
emphasis on fencing (GoB, 2002). Nevertheless, the TGLP and the 1991 Agricultural 
Policy aggravated the problem of overgrazing and land inequality in communal areas 
by allowing ranch owners to continue to use communal areas, thus failing to relieve 
pressure on communal grazing areas (GoB, 2002; Neme, 1995). 
 
Bureaucrats responsible for formulating these two policies believed that communal 
management encouraged overstocking because individuals have no motivation to 
limit the number of livestock grazing on the range (Neme, 1995), an assumption 
based on Hardin’s (1968) theory of the tragedy of the commons. Like Hardin, they 
argued that the best way to reduce overgrazing was to create private property rights, 
which would give cattle owners the incentive to preserve the range by reducing their 
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herds. While having the potential to reduce overgrazing in the enclosed, privatised 
areas, the TGLP in its implementation tended to aggravate the problem of overgrazing 
in the remaining communal pasture by maintaining dual grazing rights for private land 
owners.  Private land owners are the only ones who enjoy this right because farmers 
without private land can only graze their cattle on communal pasture. At the same 
time, privatisation worsens the problem of overgrazing by reducing the size of the 
communal areas (White, 1999; Neme, 1995; and Segosebe, 1995). The development 
of water resources (deep boreholes) in the western Kalahari and the eradication of the 
tsetse fly around the Okavango Delta worked with these two policies in prompting the 
further opening of the new areas to cattle and human settlement (Neme, 1995).17 
Many of the TGLP ranches were established in the Ghanzi and Kgalagadi Districts, 
where it was assumed abundant and under-utilised land existed. However, this 
assumption was soon proved wrong, as many with traditional use rights (e.g. Basarwa 
in the southern part of the country, and poor farmers) were displaced.  
 
Linked to the TGLP and livestock related policies in general is the erection of cordon 
fences, which have had a negative impact on wildlife numbers by blocking seasonal 
migration routes. Decline in wildlife numbers and distribution has further reduced 
access to resources for communities with wildlife and natural resource based 
livelihood strategies, such as the Basarwa. The erection of cordon fences undertaken 
to control the spread of foot-and-mouth disease, has further reduced the Basarwa’s 
access to land and resources. These fences are supposed to prevent the transmission of 
foot-and-mouth disease by separating the nation’s cattle from its wildlife, particularly 
buffalo, which are known carriers of the disease (Neme, 1995). This protection from 
foot-and-mouth is very important as an outbreak would jeopardise Botswana’s beef 
exports, a source of foreign exchange. The Northern Buffalo and the Southern Buffalo 
Fences are of special concern to this study as they fence off portions of the Okavango 
Delta. According to Neme (1995), the Department of Animal Health and Production 
in the Ministry of Agriculture felt that these fences were necessary because the area 
                                                 
17 In Tswana society cattle are a form of wealth and prestige. The more cattle someone owns, the wealthier and 
more important that person is. Cattle are also an important component in certain rituals such as funerals and 
wedding feasts and as part of bogadi (bride’s wealth). These cultural factors make people reluctant to sell cattle or 
limit their herd size, even if doing so would increase the overall productivity of their herd. 
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had been opened up to cattle grazing by its successful efforts to control tsetse flies. 
Tsetse fly infestation had previously deterred cattle from grazing near the Delta.  
 
The Delta system not only influences wildlife movement by introducing water 
barriers, it also raises the total wild animal biomass that can be carried in western 
Ngamiland. The western and eastern regions of Ngamiland hold wildlife communities 
adapted to their respective conditions, with a third assemblage of water-dependent 
migrant species moving from semi-arid to moister conditions on a seasonal and 
annual basis (Scott Wilson Resource Consultants and The Environment & 
Development Group, 2000). This mobility is a key feature promoting the diversity and 
biomass of Ngamiland wildlife communities against a backdrop of habitat diversity 
(ibid). As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the effects of this concentration of wildlife on 
the Basarwa have been both negative and positive: while on the one hand wildlife is 
encroaching into human settlements and destroying crops and posing a threat to 
human life, these Basarwa communities in Ngamiland stand to benefit financially 
through CBNRM more than their counterparts in other parts of the country. 
 
In addition to the livestock policies and the impact of ranches on people’s security of 
land tenure discussed above, the loss of land for Basarwa in Ngamiland is largely due 
to conservation and the establishment of national parks. Chapter 2 highlighted the 
relocation of the Khwai community as a result of the establishment of the Moremi 
Game Reserve and the resultant restricted access to natural capital for both the Khwai 
and Xaxaba communities. New conservation laws (e.g. the Wildlife Conservation and 
National Parks Act of 1992) reduced their access to traditional territories. 
Communities were not (and still are not) allowed to gather wild resources within 
Moremi Game Reserve. The Basarwa of Xaxaba and Khwai found themselves trapped 
into increasingly smaller areas of land that could not accommodate their traditional 
livelihood strategies. Their strategies for coping with climatic and ecological 
variability were dependent on the extensive use of land and natural resources, which 
required access and control over large areas of land. Furthermore, hunting regulations 
(Controlled Hunting Area regulations, Fauna Conservation Act, Unified Hunting 
Regulations of 1977), as previously discussed, criminalised one of the central markers 
of Basarwa identity, affecting their sense of pride and identity (Taylor, 2000; 
Twyman, 2000).  
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Resettlement and sedentisation: 
 
In a bid to solve the problem of displaced Basarwa (especially those along the Ghanzi 
ridge) the Government of Botswana introduced the Remote Area Development 
programme. This programme is discussed in more detail in the section below. 
 
The Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) 
 
Having been displaced from their traditional lands as a result of the policies and 
strategies discussed above, some Basarwa were relocated to so-called ‘service areas’ 
under the RADP resettlement scheme where they were provided with access to land, 
water, clinics and schools. In some cases, RADP settlement schemes were developed 
to make way for wildlife in the newly designated game parks and wildlife reserves 
(Mazonde, 1994). During the 1980s, the resettlement strategy of RADP was gradually 
re-interpreted to permanently settle and civilise Basarwa (Wily, 1994). 
 
The sedentary lifestyle inherent in this policy shift was unfamiliar to and incompatible 
with the Basarwa’s traditional social organisation, causing them to rapidly lose social 
capital. Alcoholism became rife, teenage pregnancies increased, and conflicts within 
and between clans escalated. One of the major problems faced by these ‘betterment’ 
schemes was forging coherence among various social groups. One such example is of 
an incident in the village of Diphuduhudu, where one Basarwa clan refused to accept 
a Mosarwa who came from a different clan as a headman of the settlement (Mazonde, 
1994). Such lack of social cohesion meant that social development, which under 
current circumstances depends on the successful clustering of residents around village 
institutions, could not take place (ibid). The residents of Khwai alluded to the fact that 
the management of natural resources had become difficult because the present 
communities are made up of people from different areas with different norms, values 
and practices. This cripples the resilience of social institutions, as people who do not 
share common norms, values and kinship ties are grouped under one settlement and 
expected to function as a community. As Alcorn and Toledo (1998) argue, the 
successful implementation of community-wide decisions depends on widely shared 
values that serve to strengthen social capital. Mazonde (1994) further notes that most 
remote area dwellers who settle in these betterment schemes experience deterioration 
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in their standard of living. When settlements grow too big, available game and veld 
products within reasonable reach rapidly diminish, which limits the number of people 
who can engage in sustainable livelihood strategies (Saugestad, 1998). 
 
The Herbage Preservation (Prevention of Fires) Act of 1978 prevented traditional 
Basarwa practices that used fire to open up blocked river channels, control wildlife 
movement patterns, improve feeding habitat for wildlife and clear areas for better 
visibility.  
 
The policies discussed above marginalised the Basarwa and dispossessed them of 
their lands, and alienated the communities from the management of natural resources. 
Below is a summary of other policies and how they affect the Basarwa. 
 
Table 11: Summary of Policies Affecting Natural Resource Management in the 
area 
Policy  Summary 
Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act (Act 
No.28) 1992 
Includes amendments and updated legislation 
further to the National Parks Act of 1976 and the 
Fauna Conservation Act of 1987. All subsidiary 
legislation made under and in accordance with the 
provisions of the Fauna Conservation Act and the 
National Parks Act, but which are not included in 
the WCNPA remains in force and effect. Numerous 
amendments to the WCNPA are currently being 
finalised for gazettement. 
Unified Hunting Regulations (1979) An attempt to simplify hunting licensing systems 
and to make it more equitable on a national basis 
resulted in the promulgation of the Unified Hunting 
Regulations, giving all citizens theoretically equal 
access to wildlife resources on hunting quotas 
throughout the country. Many poorer residents of 
rural villages who are dependent on hunting for part 
of their subsistence income have suffered reduced 
access to wildlife resources where they live as a 
result of changes in licence availability brought 
about by the Unified Hunting Regulations.  
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Policy  Summary 
Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986) The Wildlife Conservation Policy stated the 
Government’s policy of promoting the economic 
use of wildlife resources on a sustainable basis to 
the benefit of all Batswana, particularly to those 
citizens most heavily reliant on wildlife for their 
subsistence needs. The concept of community 
participation is recognised through this policy. 
Wildlife Management Areas were more clearly 
defined under the WCP as areas in which the 
primary form of land use would be wildlife 
utilisation. 
Tourism Policy (1990) The main objective of this policy is to obtain from 
tourism resources of the country (primary wildlife 
and wilderness areas), the greatest possible net 
social and economic benefits for Batswana on a 
sustainable basis. 
Tourism Act (1992) Following proposals of the Tourism Policy, the 
Tourism Act was gazetted in 1992. The Act and the 
policy promote low volume high cost tourism, 
which is viewed as appropriate for the most 
attractive tourist destinations in the country but 
could actually hinder the development of the 
community based ecotourism being proposed for 
some WMAs. A new Tourism Master Plan, which is 
currently in draft form, retains high cost – low 
volume approach for the core wildlife areas but 
suggests a more mixed cost – higher volume for 
other areas, e.g. those surrounding the delta which is 
less sensitive to damage from pressure of tourism. 
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Policy  Summary 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy (1975) The issue of potential loss of access to resources by 
the poor and owners of few or no cattle through the 
implementation of TGLP was briefly addressed in 
the white paper, and in planning for 
implementation, but rights of access were not 
legally protected, and large numbers of people 
(particularly RADS) were dispossessed of 
resources, including wildlife in the process. Fencing 
of an extensive TGLP farm block in the south 
eastern Ngamiland (Hainaveldt) further impeded 
wildlife movements, affecting migratory 
populations most heavily during the late 1970s.  
National Policy on Agricultural Development 
(1991) 
A major component of this policy is the proposed 
fencing of cattle posts on communal grazing lands, 
ostensibly to improve cattle management and 
production. The policy asserts that the TGLP 
succeeded in demonstrating that fenced ranches are 
more productive than communal area cattle posts. 
Wildlife will however be further impeded over large 
areas as fences are erected, and access to resources 
by subsistence hunters and collectors of veld 
products in these areas will be reduced or 
eliminated. 
 
6.2 Community Based Natural Resource Management 
6.2.1 An overview of CBNRM 
 
Although CBNRM is a widely recognised acronym in Southern Africa, the definition 
takes different forms depending on the setting. Adams and Hulme (2001) have 
defined CBNRM as a variance of community conservation, which they define as: 
“those principles and practices that argue that conservation goals should be 
pursued by strategies that emphasize the role of local residents in decision 
making about natural resources”. 
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Collaborative resource management, as one of several approaches, is increasingly 
seen as offering substantial promise as a way of dealing with natural resource 
conflicts in a participatory and equitable manner (Castro and Nielsen, 2001). In 
Botswana the Government has introduced community conservation through the 
introduction of the Community Based Natural Resource Management Policy, which 
however, remains unadopted in draft form only. 
 
The previous chapters highlighted traditional practices of Basarwa communities that 
led to resource conservation; these, together with several other local and indigenous 
practices, can be said to be proof that these communities have always practised 
community based natural resource management. This section, however, focuses on 
evaluating formalised CBNRM, which is commercially oriented, makes explicit 
reference to conservation of natural resources, and is characterised by external 
interventions in the form of funding and technical support (Fabricius, 2004). 
Internationally, many of the CBNRM initiatives were started because the authorities 
and donors perceived them as a quick fix to solve natural resource related problems, 
such as illegal use or perceived degradation; as a way of protecting threatened natural 
resources outside protected areas; or because governments wanted to diversity their 
economies (ibid). In other cases, governments attempt to devolve natural resource 
management because of an inability to finance the necessary institutional control 
(Fabricius, 2004). 
 
As opposed to earlier conservation strategies that were grounded on the intrinsic value 
of nature, and sought to keep nature and humans separate, community conservation is 
basically utilitarian and anthropogenic (Jones and Murphree, 2004). Community 
conservation shifts the focus of conservation efforts to people, groups and settlements 
(Stevens, 1997). This definition of community conservation, which implies active 
participation of local communities, is however challenged by Sullivan (2002), who 
argues that in practice this so-called ‘new conservation’ can also be viewed as a 
continuation of past conservation policies. This is firstly due to the fact that CBNRM 
projects and policy are largely driven and implemented by external agents. Secondly 
it is a result of the ways in which local differences and aspirations are glossed over 
while communities are regarded as homogenous entities. In this case, although 
through CBNRM communities are no longer physically displaced for purposes of 
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conservation, they can be said to be displaced for as long as the global and national 
dialogue arena shy away from addressing the multi-layered discourses of and rights to 
land and resources (ibid). 
 
According to Adams and Hulme (2001), the fact that community conservation is not 
new points towards the need and the opportunity to build on existing practices and 
knowledge where these exist.  The opportunity to build on existing practices exists 
mainly because CBNRM has an apparent focus on livelihoods and the diversity of 
strategies, opportunities and resources that make up a livelihood as argued by 
Fabricius (2004). In theory, CBNRM is viewed as keeping as many options as 
possible open for local people, thus maintaining flexibility and avoiding an undue 
emphasis on any one type of resource or livelihood strategy (ibid).  
 
CBNRM, however, faces several challenges; some of these relevant to this study 
include:  
• A lack of links with traditional institutions; 
• Inadequate exploration and incorporation of traditional and local knowledge; 
• Inadequately addressing the issue of land rights, instead providing for soft 
rights – e.g. 15 years lease;  
• Differences in world views between outsiders and local people; 
• The strategy is not adaptive in its approach (lacking components of 
seasonality); 
• Results in disempowerment of households; and 
• Lack of devolution of authority. 
 
The picture in practice has to a large extent been different, in the sense that in 
southern Africa, CBNRM has mainly focused on the management and use of wildlife 
(Arntzen et al. 2003; Jones and Muphree, 2004).  For example, CBNRM in Botswana 
has tended to promote and support the use of wildlife (e.g. Chobe Enclave 
Community Trust, the Khwai Community Trust, Okavango Kopano Mokoro Trust, 
etc.) rather than promoting and supporting flexibility in livelihood strategies.  Data on 
38 CBOs covered in the 2003 CBNRM Status Report (CBNRM National Forum, 
2003) revealed that 18 (44%) CBOs were involved in wildlife-related CBNRM, 6 
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(15%) on cultural tourism, 6 (15%) on marketing of veld products, with the remaining 
10 (26%) on other activities (e.g. photographic safaris), which strictly speaking are 
also related to wildlife activities. Although most of the management plans drawn up 
by the CBOs refer to multiple use of the allocated CHA, the CBOs in reality tend to 
concentrate on fewer activities (mostly wildlife activities), as the most active 
Government service provider in the field has been the Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks. 
 
There have also been problems with regards to devolution of authority (Fabricius, 
2004; Jones, 2003; Hulme and Murphree, 2001). In Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, government sets quota and issues permits and commissions, and approves 
management plans for most uses of wildlife. Jones (2003) argues that in Botswana 
and Zambia, communities tend to be passive recipients of the quota as well as the 
associated income, without engaging in active management as the state retains 
considerable management authority. Murphree (2003) argues that devolution which 
separates responsibility from authority is fatal to institutions, that in fact devolution 
enhances resilience by firstly promoting institutional diversity and secondly opening 
doors for localised civil science by giving space for mistakes, experiments, learning 
and adaptation. The existing literature on CBRNM in southern Africa suggests that 
the desired level of devolution has not been reached. 
 
Another problem associated with CBNRM has been with regards to the programme’s 
disempowerment of households. CBNRM has both a development and conservation 
goal; however, although CBNRM has been able to generate income at the collective 
level, it has failed to contribute to income at a household level as there have been 
problems with income distribution at this level (Jones and Murphree, 2004; Hulme 
and Murphree, 2001). Giving an example of Zimbabwe, Bond (2001) states that in the 
few cases where household dividends have been distributed, the financial benefit per 
household declined from US$19.40 in 1989 to US$4.90 in 1996. Bond concluded that 
in most areas, wildlife was not financially significant at the household level. Where 
wildlife income is high and the human population is low, the household income can 
be significant. 
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Some have argued that, whereas income to households might be low in absolute 
terms, its significance becomes clear when one considers the economic circumstances 
of the beneficiaries (Arntzen, 2003; Jones and Murphree, 2004). In Namibia, the 
average income in subsistence farming households is estimated at US$200/year 
(Ashley and Barnes, 1996). In areas of remote northwest Botswana, average 
household income is estimated around US$52 a month and the poverty datum line 
(PDL) for a family of 7 at US$202 (Arntzen, 2003). In one CBNRM area in northwest 
Botswana, the wildlife income from trophy hunting divided per household per month 
amounts to around 87% of the estimated average household income or 23% of the 
estimated PDL. Arntzen therefore concludes that such revenue is highly significant in 
proportion to local income and needs.  
 
This analysis is problematic in the sense that the factors that are being used to put the 
point across are all sources of livelihood that make a direct contribution to household 
livelihood income, whereas revenue from CBNRM is hardly ever shared at household 
level: Therefore, even though in statistical terms the revenue amounts to the figures 
quoted above, it does not make up 87% of the average household income. The income 
is often sitting in bank accounts or spent on infrastructure, operations of the CBOs etc. 
At most the analysis above points out CBNRM’s potential to contribute to and 
improve livelihood security and standards.  
 
This potential, however, remains untapped in Botswana, and the question at this point 
is, why is this the case? Is it a question of security of tenure/rights? According to 
Jones (2003), CBNRM in southern Africa typically bestows resource rights on local 
communities, but not land rights, which is a critical weakness. Security of tenure over 
land is an important foundation for sustainable management of land and resources by 
local communities (Jones, 2003). 
 
Sullivan (2002) warns that if per capita income from community based wildlife-
tourism initiatives remains low, it is unlikely that people will view wildlife as an 
alternative to their usual means of livelihood. Instead it might be anticipated that 
people will direct their income and/or increased decision-making power derived from 
CBNRM towards livelihoods over which they have direct control and ownership, and 
through which they are more likely to raise their individual material standards of 
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living (Sullivan, 2002; Murombedzi, 1999). Failure to deliver benefits (both financial 
and intangible) would also jeopardise the internal legitimacy of the new institutions 
associated with CBNRM (Jones, 2003). 
 
A deeper awareness in policy and planning of local knowledge and practice may 
foster culturally resonant, ecologically appropriate and socially inclusive dialogue 
regarding resource use issues (Sullivan, 1999). Developing national conservation 
objectives appropriate for the local context implies a shift in approach that 
acknowledges the existence and value of cultural knowledge relating to a range of 
natural resources other than large mammals (ibid). 
 
This brings us to the crux of this study, which seeks to highlight the challenges of 
CBNRM vis-à-vis the Basarwa, who, like other indigenous and ethnic minorities 
around the world, are largely marginalised (Suzman, 2001a, b).  
6.3 CBNRM in the context of Basarwa 
6.3.1 The CBNRM Draft Policy 2001 
 
The CBNRM Draft Policy (2001) is an example of a new move towards community 
participation in resource management (cf. Chapter 2). In fact one of the principles of 
the policy as stated in Chapter 2 is to give communities the incentive to engage in 
sustained development activities. CBNRM is defined in the draft Policy as: 
“a development approach that supports natural resource conservation. The 
approach alleviates rural poverty by empowering communities to manage 
natural resources for long term social, economic and ecological benefits. 
CBNRM advances identified national engines of growth such as tourism, 
wildlife, forest and veld products that rely upon a healthy environment for 
profits” 
 
Sections 2.3.1, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 make reference to CBNRM in the study sites.  
 
The procedures for wildlife-based CBNRM projects is firstly to embark on land use 
planning, whereby the Department of Wildlife and National Parks determine the best 
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use for Wildlife Management Areas and Controlled Hunting Areas (for example, 
hunting, photographic safaris or multiple use purposes). Following this process, land 
and resource management plans are prepared following participatory methods. 
Communities are then required to have an established management entity in the form 
of a community trust in order to get quotas and a resource use lease from the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Land Board (Bolaane, 2001; 
Arntzen, 2003; Boggs, 2004). Having been given a head lease and wildlife quota, 
communities are often encouraged to enter into joint venture agreements with private 
sector companies for consumptive and non-consumptive resource use (Boggs, 2004). 
The official guidelines on this type of arrangement describe two models, Joint 
Venture Agreements and Joint Venture Partnerships (which involves the merging of 
both parties’ assets). These are described in the table below according to Bolaane 
(2001). 
 
Table 12: Joint venture options  
Joint venture agreements Joint venture partnerships 
Option 1 
• The community and the safari company 
do not merge assets; 
• Community sub-leases its head lease to 
the private company, giving the company 
sole exclusive rights for hunting and 
photographic ventures depending on the 
identified land uses; 
• Land rental and quota fee are paid to the 
community; and 
• The community benefits from 
employment opportunities and the 
development of associated enterprises of 
services. 
 
Option 1 
• No rental fees are paid by the safari 
company, although they will have a lease 
agreement with a community for a 
number of years; 
• Operator supplies all facilities, marketing 
and management, and trains and employs 
local people; 
• Supports local enterprises that 
complement his/her activities; and 
• Community supplies local building 
materials and guide services, and are 
actively engaged in managing resources 
while also learning about the tourist 
industry. 
Option 2 
• Community can sub-lease part of their land 
leased from the land board (for example, 
for purposes of establishing a lodge); and 
• Community receives income from 
community operated venture (e.g. hunting, 
game viewing, photographic safaris etc.). 
 
Option 2 
• Safari company provides expertise, 
infrastructure and equipment, and the 
community provides land, natural 
resources and labour; and 
• All revenues and costs are shared by 
both the private company and 
community. 
Option 3 
• Safari companies sub-leases land from 
the community and provide their services 
at an agreed daily rate per tourist. 
 
Option 3  
• A community that wishes to act as a 
safari operator can develop their area for 
tourism; 
• They hire the services of, or offer equity 
to, a skilled management company which 
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markets and runs the business; and 
• Community provides most of the labour 
and the tourist facilities while the 
managing company provides expertise at 
a market rate. 
 
Bolaane (2001) argues that to date only the first option of the Joint Venture 
Agreement has been introduced in Botswana. 
 
Veld product-based CBNRM projects on the other hand, may operate without any 
special permission for as long as the project does not harvest grapple (devils claw) 
and any other veld products governed by the 1974 Agricultural Resources 
Conservation Act (Arntzen, 2003). 
 
6.3.2 Current policy barriers to Basarwa reorganisation 
 
CBNRM has brought economic development to previously marginalised communities 
(Arntzen, 2003). Although Suzman (2001a) argues that for the San who retain access 
to land (such as those in Khwai and Xaxaba, who are already involved in CBNRM 
projects) options exist for them to profit from the sustainable use of natural resources 
or tourism, Taylor (2002) draws us to the fact that the inhabitants of these areas have 
generally found it difficult to engage effectively with an industry that is controlled far 
from their locality. Taylor attributes this to the reality that despite some of Botswana’s 
most remote areas also becoming lucrative sites of capitalist production through the 
growth of the tourism industry, the very same rural regions have remained areas of 
economic deprivation, especially if one looks into the benefits that accrue to the local 
inhabitants.   
 
The Basarwa within and on the edges of the Okavango Delta have been affected by 
the growth of conservation and tourism, and the competing demands these have made 
on land and wildlife in their area (Taylor, 2002). Mbaiwa (2004) has narrowed this 
situation down to the practice of ‘enclave tourism’, which in the Okavango Delta is 
characterised by foreign ownership of tourism facilities, repatriation of funds and a 
failure to effectively contribute to poverty alleviation in the district. 53.8% of the 
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tourism facilities in the Okavango Delta are foreign owned, 27.7% are jointly owned 
and 18.5% are owned by citizens (Mbaiwa, 2002). 
 
Despite the wealth being generated in their area, the daily tasks associated with 
searching for a livelihood often remains as difficult as ever for many of its inhabitants 
(Taylor, 2002). To the elderly members of the Xaxaba community, CBNRM has 
replaced subsistence hunting, which not only fitted their lifestyle but was the central 
marker of their identity. They argue that CBNRM basically means having to depend 
on Government welfare. During my fieldwork many echoed the phrase “re a Sheta” 
(direct translation – we are struggling) in reference to searching for a livelihood, as 
indicated in Chapter 4. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the Basarwa not only rely on a diversity of livelihood 
strategies associated with wildlife, they are also faced with an array of challenges that 
most of their neighbours and fellow citizens do not encounter to the same degree 
(Taylor, 2002; Suzman, 2001a, b; Saugestad; 1998). These difficulties are 
summarised by Taylor (2002) and Suzman (2001a) as: 
 
• Direct – restrictions on hunting as a result of legislation; 
• Indirect – difficulties in pursuing alternative livelihood strategies in wildlife 
areas or being viewed as lacking the requisite skills for employment; 
• Suffered as a direct result of conservation policies pursued by Government 
which has led to their relocation and reduced access to land and natural 
resources; 
• High levels of poverty and dependency on welfare in the form of food aid or 
pensions; 
• Low levels of basic literacy; 
• Weak representation in political or administrative structures, and limited 
capacity to advocate their own interest at a national, regional or local level; and 
• A sense of social and political alienation from the mainstream, compounded in 
some instances by social discrimination and prejudice. 
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For the above reasons, CBNRM programmes targeting the Basarwa need to deal with 
the specific needs and issues of these communities. Different strategies are needed, 
and these will require the various practitioners and Government agencies providing 
support to Basarwa communities to put in more effort and come up with innovative 
approaches. 
 
Using the Khwai Model of CBNRM, whereby the community chose to retain their 
lease as opposed to following the joint-venture approach employed by other 
communities, Bolaane (2001) concludes that unless the issues of land tenure, resource 
ownership, and the politics of relocation and ethnicity are addressed, enterprise 
development and the success of CBNRM will be handicapped in some communities. 
Furthermore, unless more recognition and value is attached to other forms of capital 
such as local ecological knowledge, the position of communities as partners in 
enterprises will remain weak and therefore CBNRM will fail to achieve its goals. In 
an attempt to guard against further marginalisation, the Khwai community attempted 
to restrict membership; however, this was viewed by the DWNP officials as 
discriminating against non-Basarwa and therefore the community was denied their 
wildlife quota. Thus an alternative model was blocked, indicating the inflexible nature 
of the policy and those responsible for its implementation. 
 
Apart from VTC members, most of the residents of Xaxaba who were interviewed 
about CBNRM did not seem to fully understand what it was about, or even how they 
should be involved in decisions about how the money from CBNRM projects should 
be spent. One of the old women we interviewed stated, “It is not our money, it is for 
developments [referring to infrastructural development] in the village”. What I 
observed during my last stay in Xaxaba was that the elderly members of the 
community did not attend VTC public meetings, and thus gained only second-hand 
information on what the affairs of the VTC were. By the time this information 
reached them it was either incomplete or distorted. 
 
6.3.2.1 The impact of CBNRM on the Basarwa’s traditional livelihood practices and 
values 
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CBNRM, as stated earlier, is supposed to have a livelihoods focus. It is therefore 
important to look at how well the formal CBNRM initiatives build on traditional/local 
livelihood strategies. An additional element of the policy barriers is the impact of 
CBNRM on traditional livelihood practices, which is mainly characterised by the lack 
of recognition of these practices and a conscious incorporation of these into the 
CBNRM programmes that target the Basarwa. In the previous chapter I highlighted 
key adaptations that enabled the Basarwa to cope with climatic variations and periodic 
fluctuations in resources, which were (also see Madzwamuse and Fabricius, 2004); 
• Flexibility in group sizes; 
• Mobility and flexibility in the use of resources; 
• Flexibility in leadership structures; 
• Detailed knowledge of local ecological system and appropriate skills; and 
• Sharing networks 
 
In its current form CBNRM ignores the need for both flexibility in resource use and 
mobility as a response mechanism to seasonal fluctuation in resources. The animals 
on the hunting quota can only be hunted during the hunting season, which is April-
October. CBNRM has therefore replaced subsistence seasonal hunting with once-off 
hunting and failed to provide a substitute for food security at the household level 
(Talyor, 2002; Hitchcock and Masilo, 1995b). With regards to wildlife, for instance, 
CBNRM has been heralded for reducing ‘poaching’ incidences; however, some 
researchers argue that for communities that previously had Special Game Licences, 
CBNRM has made hunting into a hidden activity (Twyman, 2000; Taylor 2002). With 
the move to CBNRM in 1996, SGLs were cancelled and replaced by an annual quota 
given to the village as a whole (Hitchcock and Masilo, 1995a; Taylor, 2002). 
According to Taylor (2002), the number of animals is, however, lower than the sum 
of animals listed on the SGL holders of the village. For example, the sum of animals 
listed on the SGL held by the members of the Khwai community yielded a potential 
215kg per person compared to 57 kg from the village quota. Many of the Basarwa 
households are therefore dependent on the social welfare for food, which Taylor 
(2002) argues has reduced the quantity and diversity of gathered food, as most of the 
food handed out comprises of carbohydrates. Diversity and flexibility are critical for 
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adaptive management, and these are strategies which were employed by the Basarwa. 
Uncertainty is inevitable for communities that rely directly upon natural resources for 
their livelihood. CBNRM, however, fails to take into account temporal fluctuations in 
livelihood assets. 
 
As stated in Madzwamuse and Fabricius (2004) land remains a major determinant of 
the natural, physical and financial capital available to the Basarwa. The loss of their 
traditional lands is the most immediate threat to their resilience, their identity, and 
their ecological knowledge. Extensive use (in the form of access to large territories of 
land) is a prerequisite for adaptive management by the Basarwa and central to 
mobility as a coping strategy. Due to loss of access to previous territories mobility is 
no longer an option for Basarwa communities. CBNRM should however ensure the 
people’s access to lands within parks – for example through co-management 
agreements. These co-management arrangements would require intensive 
participation of the communities involved as opposed to passive participation which 
currently characterises CBNRM in Botswana. The current CBNRM strategy is 
unfortunately based on a weak and broad definition of co-management that is 
synonymous with participatory, collaborative, joint or multi-party management 
(Castro and Nielsen, 2001), and falls short of intensive user participation over 
managing a specific resource (Holm, et al. 2000).  
 
With regards to local institutions, the Basarwa’s institutions were characterised by 
mainly flexibility in leadership structures and the employment of local ecological 
knowledge. The replacement of traditional institutions by institutions such as the 
Village Trust Committee, which can only operate within the rules of the Department 
of Wildlife and National Parks (which issues the wildlife quota), and the tribal Land 
Boards (which issue community leases to use the land), results in weakened local 
capacity of the social and ecological systems to build resilience. The rules in these 
institutions are not flexible and hence do not allow for adaptation, which hinders 
resilience in ecological and social systems. Resilience and adaptive natural resource 
management go hand-in-hand. Gunderson (1999) summarises this point by stating 
that if there is no resilience in the ecological system, or flexibility among stakeholders 
in the coupled social system, then one simply cannot manage adaptively. The reverse 
is also true: if there is no adaptive management then resilience is jeopardised, as there 
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will be no mechanisms for innovation in order for the social and ecological systems to 
transcend disturbance. As Folke et al. (1998) argue, once flexibility is lost the linked 
social–ecological system becomes more vulnerable to surprise and crisis.  
 
The Basarwa have been forced to abandon some of the tried and tested traditional 
practices they had in place for natural resource management. One such practice was 
the use of fire, which the residents of Khwai and Xaxaba noted was used to open up 
river channels that were blocked by reeds (discussed in Chapter 5). This not only 
allowed water to flow downstream, but also improved feeding habitat for wild 
animals, and thus opened up areas for hunting. According to Folke et.al (1998), the 
example above is an illustration of the way in which many traditional societies nurture 
sources of ecosystem renewal by creating small-scale disturbance.  A similar example 
is the nomads of Sahelian Africa, who function as a disturbance by following the 
migratory routes of herbivores from one area to another (Niamir-Fuller, 1998). Alcorn 
and Toledo (1998) describe how, through the milpa system in Mexico, disturbance is 
introduced in a forest system to encourage forest regeneration. They state that the 
milpa script enables people to manipulate a forest ecosystem’s renewal cycle to 
produce a crop of maize without disrupting the renewal of the forest. By planting in 
the forest, forest processes are slowed down for a few years in a particular space so 
that a crop can be grown. Alcorn and Toledo (1998) argue that farmers know that in 
an ideal milpa cycle, new fields are cleared in the high forest, but also know that 
milpa can be done in secondary forest re-growth in height, provided that only one 
crop is taken, so that the system’s regenerative capacity is not disturbed. The 
traditional use of fire by the Basarwa to regenerate growth and open up river channels 
is now illegal in Botswana, which the residents of Khwai argue has resulted in 
blocking the flow of water in their part of the Delta.  
 
As highlighted in the introduction chapter and the introduction to this chapter, the 
Basarwa’s land rights and security of tenure have been adversely affected by land 
policies and tenurial regimes that were developed on the basis of practices and 
traditions of dominant social groups, such as ethnic Tswana and European 
colonialists. Ng’ong’ola (1997) argues that the failure to acknowledge and 
accommodate within the law some of the unique and distinctive features of Basarwa 
land tenure and land use has been at the core of the problem of marginalisation of 
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these people. CBNRM has done very little to correct the situation, as the participating 
communities tenure rights remain insecure. Although this position is not unique to the 
Basarwa they are more affected than others as their extent of dispossession is at a 
much larger scale. Arntzen (2003) points out that if community rights are not secure 
then it has implications for the investment and growth strategies that communities can 
pursue. For example, it is unlikely that the private sector will be interested in joint 
ventures if the community rights are not secure.  
 
Despite the mainstreaming of livelihood studies into rural development efforts, such 
studies have tended to focus on the material aspects of securing a reasonable 
subsistence and have often failed to make explicit the symbolic importance of how 
different aspects of livelihoods are constituted and how these semiotic aspects affect 
material strategies (Taylor, 2002). Stevens (1997) argues that often the ways of life of 
indigenous peoples are tightly linked to particular territories and places, and to 
specific ecosystems and natural and cultural resources. Taylor (2002) states that while 
notions such as social resources/capital in the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods 
Framework imply a recognition of salience and social bonds and norms in considering 
livelihoods, they stop short of taking into account the wider social and political 
contexts that give varied meanings to different livelihood options (this is what other 
scholars have referred to as the political capital), thus shaping local possibilities 
within them. This so-called symbolism is often the central marker of the very social 
capital that CBNRM institutions depend on for their success. Government policies, 
such as the CBNRM and Tourism Policies, encourage the use of wildlife and other 
natural resources for commercial purposes. This could threaten the religious value of 
the natural resources, as these are increasingly seen as a means of generating income. 
There is therefore a need to interrogate the impacts of the current CBNRM 
programme on the non-tangible values that communities attach to natural resources 
and factor these in. Taylor (2002) further argues that struggles over material resources 
often involve struggles over the symbolisms that define and legitimate relationships 
between resources and people, that in fact symbolic value that people attach to 
resources is as important as the other values. 
 
These challenges faced by the Basarwa are shared by several other groups of 
indigenous peoples across the world. How does the issue of the Basarwa compare to 
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other indigenous groups? What lessons can be drawn from their experiences in order 
to inform CBNRM projects targeting the Basarwa? The next section attempts to 
address these questions. 
 
6.3.3 he barriers that indigenous, mobile peoples and ethnic minorities elsewhere 
face 
 
Existing literature on other groups similar to the Basarwa makes reference to ethnic 
minorities or simply minorities, indigenous peoples, first peoples, marginalised 
peoples, local and traditional communities, and indigenous peoples. Therefore, for 
purposes of comparison, I cite the wealth of literature that makes reference to groups 
in the above category. Besides the Basarwa sharing the same qualities that the groups 
in the above categories have, they are, according the Dana Declaration 2002, the 1992 
UN Declaration on Minorities and the ILO Convention 169 on indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples: 
• Numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the state; 
• A non-dominant position in the social, political and economic sense; 
• Possess ethnic and linguistic characteristics different from the rest of the 
national population; and 
• Have distinct cultures and economic production methods to those of the 
dominant society. 
 
According to the Dana Declaration (2002), mobile peoples are faced with: 
• A threat to their livelihoods due to linked human population dynamics, 
unsustainable consumption patterns, climate change, and global and national 
economic forces, which also threaten the conservation of biodiversity; and  
• Discrimination-their rights, including the rights of access to natural resources, 
are often denied, and conventional conservation practices insufficiently 
address their concerns. 
 
In the Dana Declaration, mobile peoples are defined as:  
“A subset of indigenous and traditional peoples whose livelihoods depend on 
extensive common property use of natural resources over an area, who use 
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mobility as a management strategy for dealing with sustainable use and 
conservation, and who possess a distinctive cultural identity and natural 
resource management system” 
 
In many parts of the world, the lands of indigenous peoples are the best and often the 
last remaining places of rich biological diversity (Stevens, 1997). Indigenous people 
have developed patterns of resource use and resource management that reflect 
intimate knowledge of local geography and ecosystems, and contribute to the 
conservation of biodiversity through such practices as protecting particular species as 
sacred/totems, developing land-use regulation and customs that limit and disperse the 
impacts of subsistence use such as seasonal mobility (Madzwamuse and Fabricius, 
2004; Berkes, 1999; Stevens, 1997). As a result of the environmental condition of 
indigenous lands, these have been sought after as sites for national parks, World 
Heritage sites, international biosphere reserves, and other types of protected areas 
(Stevens, 1997). 
 
The protected area system has resulted in a displacement of large numbers of 
indigenous people across the world. Negi and Nautiyal (2003) state that in India alone 
protected areas have displaced some 600 000 tribal people and forest dwellers. 
 
I will begin by looking at the issues of the San in the region. San communities in 
southern Africa have suffered as a direct result of conservation policies pursued by 
national governments (Suzman, 2001a). These have often resulted in the relocation of 
San communities from their traditional territories and subsequent loss of access to 
natural resources. Some of these policies, which particularly affect the Basarwa in 
Botswana are highlighted, in the introduction to this chapter. Examples highlighted by 
Hitchcock (1996) include: 
• In South Africa, !Khomani San were evicted from their traditional lands in 
order to establish the KGNP; 
• In Namibia, San were either forced to move or were severely restricted in their 
activities through the formation of the Etosha National Park, Kaudum Game 
Reserve, and West Caprivi Game Reserve ; 
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• In Botswana, Basarwa communities in Nata, the CKGR and the Moremi Game 
Reserve in Ngamiland have had to cope with the imposition of coercive 
conservation strategies pursued by the GOB; and 
• In Zimbabwe, the small Matebeleland San population lost access to hunting 
and veld foods through the establishment of the Hwange National Parks. 
 
In some cases CBNRM has been viewed as some form of redress; however, Suzman 
(2001a) suggests that, in the case of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, an arguably 
disproportionate sum of donor cash has been invested in CBNRM at the expense of 
other possible development initiatives on behalf of San Communities. Suzman argues 
that the attention given to CBNRM is disproportionate because CBNRM is presently a 
strategy available only to the few San communities that still maintain access to 
sufficient land and natural resources to make this sort of programme viable. Since the 
majority of the San live in areas where they lack de-jure rights to land, CBNRM is 
simply not an option available to them. Perhaps in such cases co-management of 
protected areas remains the only option. The point, however, is that CBNRM 
programmes on their own will not solve all the problems facing Basarwa and other 
indigenous communities. CBNRM therefore needs to be coupled with other initiatives 
that target education, health and other development aspects. 
 
Co-management agreements among states, indigenous peoples and other stakeholders 
provide an avenue for dealing with natural resource conflicts in a participatory and 
equitable manner (Sneed, 1997). Even though later on in this chapter I argue that co-
management of protected areas is a potential solution to the issues of the Basarwa, 
one has to be mindful of what is stated by Castro and Nielsen (2001), which is that 
experience shows that co-management regimes can set into motion other new forms 
of conflicts or cause old ones to worsen. In practice, the result may not be power-
sharing but rather strengthening the state control over resource policy, management 
and allocation, and further marginalisation of communities (Sullivan, 2002; Castro 
and Nielsen, 2001; Sneed, 1997). Furthermore, a major problem is the difficulty of 
integrating the management styles of traditional and state resource systems (Sneed, 
1997). Negi and Nautiyal (2003) state that there has been in reality few attempts to 
involve indigenous people in the process of managing protected areas, as most 
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initiatives have failed to go beyond rhetoric and treated local people as passive 
beneficiaries. 
 
Looking at the struggles of indigenous peoples, Castro and Nielsen (2001) point out 
that many of the co-management arrangements are born out of conflict involving the 
struggle of indigenous people to resist state and private resource appropriation, to 
defend their locally based livelihoods, and to maintain their cultural identities. The 
Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1997) acknowledges the 
pervasive role of conflict in establishment of its numerous co-management regimes 
(ibid). A history of conflict between European settlers and the Maori in New Zealand 
fought in courts saw a progression from rough equality, to denial and assimilation, to 
a special place of Maori in New Zealand, and to limited rights of self-determination 
and management of land and natural resources (Nettheim, et al. 2002). Negotiated 
claims have returned some lands to the Maori as well as providing economic 
compensation for the historical loss of those lands, and provided the Maori with a 
large share of the New Zealand commercial fisheries (ibid). Another example is the 
conflict between the Van Gujjars in India and the Forest Department over the rights of 
the community to the Rajaji National Park, which resulted in the development of a 
community forest management in protected areas plan (Dangwal, 1999). This conflict 
can be viewed as a crisis that leads to reorganisation and renewal in the form of policy 
reform. 
 
Castro and Nielsen (2001) argue that politically and economically disadvantaged rural 
groups, including indigenous people, often face great difficulties in negotiating 
agreements with the state and other powerful stakeholders. Although they may have 
substantial legal, economic, political and moral grounds for pursuing their case, such 
groups generally hold a very weak position in terms of their capacity to carry out 
negotiations (ibid). In the case of the Van Gujjars community discussed above, 
although the group itself was in a weak political position they were successful as a 
result of receiving assistance from the Rural Litigation and Entitlements Kendra, a 
local NGO coupled with the local people initiating change themselves (Dangwal, 
1999).  
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In the case of the Basarwa they have to first and foremost win the struggle of being 
recognised as indigenous peoples by the Government of Botswana and having 
legitimate claims over their ancestral lands. This has proved to be very difficult; the 
transition of the RADP from Bushman Development Programme has been viewed by 
many as an indication of the Botswana Government’s reluctance to deal with the issue 
of Basarwa as an ethnically distinct and marginalised group as well as from a cultural 
perspective (Suzman, 2001a; Saugestad, 1998; Wily, 1994). As stated earlier in this 
chapter, Khwai’s attempt to build a CBNRM initiative around their cultural identity 
received very little support from Government and other support organisations 
(Bolaane, 2001). 
6.4 How can policies be adapted to promote the reorganisation of the 
Basarwa? 
 
Despite the above weaknesses, the current environmental governance arena in the 
country offers an opportunity for the co-management of natural resources.  Security of 
tenure, and receiving benefits from natural resources, are critical variables for 
successful community involvement (Castro and Nielsen, 2001). 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the vulnerabilities that the Basarwa are faced with – quite central 
being alienation from land and natural resources over the years. New policies and 
strategies in Botswana are, however, beginning to recognise the importance of 
community involvement and participation in the use and management of natural 
resources. These can be viewed as providing the Basarwa with the opportunity to 
enter the reorganisation phase.  
 
In several instances, policies adopted in both Botswana and Namibia have effectively 
(but not explicitly) discriminated against the Basarwa due to their illiteracy, different 
cultural outlook, poverty, different land use strategies, political disorganisation, and 
relative inability to access state services. Current policy interventions in both 
Botswana and Namibia do not adequately address the main causes of Basarwa 
marginalisation, largely because the problem has been solely perceived as a socio-
economic problem instead of addressing questions pertaining to cultural identity, 
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secure access to land and political relations (Suzman, 2001a, and b). This area needs 
more attention and support by the Government and its agencies. 
 
In Botswana and Namibia, there is a clear need to motivate for a substantial 
adjustment in policy in order to meaningfully improve the status of the Basarwa 
relative to others; moreover these adjustments will require the recognition of an ethnic 
component to Basarwa social, economic and political marginalisation (Suzman, 
2001a; 2000; Saugestad, 1998; and Gordon, 1992).  In support of the above view, 
Riddell (2002) states that, as a result of the failure to define and agree on the 
definition of both indigenous peoples and minority peoples, a number of states do not 
recognise minorities as distinct and separate. Therefore, the minorities are not 
recognised in law; and if they are not recognised in law, it is difficult to promote and 
advance their rights.  It is therefore imperative that the Governments of Botswana and 
Namibia acknowledge these differences and deal with the issues of the Basarwa 
accordingly. The result of the failure to do so to date have been indicated in the 
previous section as resulting in weakened social resilience, which in turn threatens 
ecological resilience. 
 
Suzman (2001b), however, argues that greater scope exists in the pursuit of San rights 
issues within a framework of human rights, as opposed to making reference to 
international agreements pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples, as the term 
indigenous is problematic in the context of southern Africa. With regards to the rights 
of minorities, there needs to be a focus not merely on equality before the law but on 
the need for some sort of preferential treatment for minorities in order for them to be 
treated such that equality of opportunity can become a reality (Riddell, 2002). This in 
terms of CBNRM calls for open mindedness on the part of governments to different 
models of CBNRM, e.g. the model followed by the Khwai community, which has so 
far received very little support (Bolaane, 2004).  Although the Government of 
Botswana has been reluctant to pursue this approach (Suzman 2001b; Saugestad, 
1998; Willy, 1994), it is viewed that:  
“special rights do not constitute privilege as they are rooted in the rule of 
equal enjoyment just as is non discrimination….If group rights are rejected 
and preferential treatment denied, the equal enjoyment of human rights of 
minorities will not be realised” (Alfredsson, 1998, quoted in Riddell, 2002 p9) 
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 Riddell (2002) argues that often there is a focus on land rights issues in debates about 
furthering the development of indigenous peoples. However, recent work reviewed by 
Plant (1998) indicates that there are significant numbers of indigenous peoples whose 
livelihoods are no longer dependent on land and agriculture or other traditional ways 
of making a living. Increasingly they will need to find means of ensuring their 
livelihoods within the market economy. Taylor (2000 and 2002) reveals that, contrary 
to popular belief about the Basarwa being hunter–gatherers, the Basarwa in the 
northern sandveld of the Okavango pursue livelihoods in three realms: cash, livestock 
and wildlife. It is evident that all three are not only intimately interconnected but also 
that aspects of each of them are essential to the way Basarwa construct their 
livelihood strategies (ibid). The study that this thesis is based on also revealed that 
financial capital and human capital are increasingly becoming important for the 
livelihood strategies of the Basarwa communities. 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the diversified livelihood strategies that the residents 
of Khwai and Xaxaba are engaged in as risk-spreading strategy. Whereas land 
remains important, they are exploiting job opportunities in the tourism sector as well 
as investing in human capital in the form of educating their children to enable them to 
seek jobs elsewhere. Taylor (2002) further argues that interventions that try to replace 
one type of livelihood with another are unlikely to be successful, an example being 
the initial narrow focus on the commercialisation of wildlife in CBNRM. The 
challenge therefore is to develop CBNRM programmes that further strengthen the 
various livelihood assets. 
 
The above therefore implies that, although the land issue may be critical, as argued 
earlier, a much more multifaceted approach will be required to address the issue of 
Basarwa livelihoods. This view is further confirmed by Riddell’s (2002) analysis of 
the literature on development, poverty elimination and minorities, which comes to the 
conclusion that it will become increasingly important to target initiatives aimed at the 
development of indigenous peoples away from narrow and ethnically based goals, and 
concentrate on ways that indigenous peoples can benefit from engaging in markets 
that they are already involved in, and address those factors that put them at a 
disadvantage in such engagements.  
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 In the case of the Basarwa, such factors include low literacy levels, lack of land rights, 
extreme poverty and dependency on welfare, weak representation in political 
structures, social and political alienation (Madzwamuse and Fabricius, 2004; Suzman, 
2001b; Taylor, 2001; Saugestad, 1998). Therefore, as pointed out by Suzman (2001a) 
and Mbaiwa (2004), for CBNRM to be successful it has to be combined with other 
empowerment and development strategies, or be broadened to incorporate other 
resources that the communities are making use of. 
 
Suzman (2001a) argues that, in the context of development, flexibility and 
participation are closely related concepts. For a programme to be meaningfully 
participatory, it must be flexible enough to accommodate what may be unpredictable 
target community responses and desires. It should also be flexible enough to allow for 
the beneficiaries of any programme to respond creatively to any new challenges or 
problems that may arise. This is particularly important for Basarwa communities, in 
which the cultural gap between development agents and target communities is often 
the cause of conflict and confusion (ibid). Suzman suggests that in order to ensure the 
longer-term success of these initiatives, greater emphasis should be placed on the 
identification and development of other strategies for income generation within a 
biodiversity conservation framework. One way of achieving this is by expanding on 
development schemes based on the sustainable exploitation of veld products often 
referred to as non-timber products (e.g. the devils claw) (Suzman, 2001a) and cultural 
tourism (Mbaiwa, 2004). This would point towards addressing a much broader issue 
of improving the recognition of the value of natural resources by acknowledging both 
the direct provision value and the income value that local communities attach to 
natural resources. Although a few resources (such as wildlife) have seen an increase 
in their value, the same is not the case for most of the resources that communities rely 
on. The value of natural resources is generally poorly reflected in resource prices 
(Arntzen, 2003). Shackleton and Shackleton (2004) rightfully argue that resource 
management interventions need to focus on the role of all natural resources in local 
livelihoods, suggesting that such an approach will ensure that the CBNRM agenda is 
guided by local priorities and needs rather than conservationist paradigms and 
interests. 
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An analysis of the livelihood strategies of the Basarwa in Khwai and Xaxaba revealed 
one important aspect being seasonality of resources, and the accompanied changes in 
livelihood strategies in order to respond to this aspect. Linking this to the issue of 
empowering households, it must be pointed out that income from CBNRM needs to 
fill a gap during periods when alternative resources are at their scarcest. 
 
Seasonal mobility was another coping strategy, a principle and practice which 
CBNRM needs to draw upon in order to deal with the reality of the need to be flexible 
with exclusive rights to resources in a designated WMA/conservancy. Currently, 
CBNRM focuses on single communities and not on relations between communities; 
there is thus a danger of ignoring access rights by outsiders and exacerbating conflicts 
(Niamir-Fuller, 2004). Very often, single communities cannot buffer the effects of 
dryland variability with their own resources, and livestock may need to move outside 
the boundaries, e.g. in drought years (ibid). Sullivan (1999) argues that Damara 
herders can travel substantial distances to gather resources from ancestrally known 
locations where they consider themselves to have access and usufructuary rights, and 
it is important that these rights are represented and protected in CBNRM. Sullivan 
implies that the lack of such recognition effectively means the objectives of 
participation, empowerment, conservation and rural development are not achieved. In 
other words, CBNRM needs to reflect the spatial nature of resource distribution and 
the overlapping access rights of various communities. In order to be sustainable, 
social systems and property rights regimes need to be at proper scales and concordant 
with the characteristics of the ecological systems they refer to and at proper scales 
(Constanza and Folke, 1996). 
 
In Chapter 5, I made reference to conflicts that are arising in Khwai as a result of new 
institutions; however, going back to the adaptive renewal cycle, we are reminded of 
how conflict or any form of crises can in fact provide opportunities for reorganisation 
and constructive growth (Castro and Nielsen, 2001). 
 
Another important point concerns the roles of local ecological knowledge and local 
institutions. The sustainability of CBNRM initiatives depends upon the continued 
strengthening and maintenance of local ecological knowledge and traditional coping 
strategies of the Basarwa communities. Sullivan (1999) argues that a lack of focus on 
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details of how people currently use and manage natural resources results in an 
untapped potential of the value for biodiversity conservation of associated knowledge 
regarding these resources. Communities bring significant knowledge resources to the 
table and these resources have been consistently undervalued in the past (Taylor, 
2000a). This situation will have to be corrected in order for community based 
initiatives to be successful.  
 
An additional problem identified is that where there are CBRNM initiatives, these 
tend to be the only development initiative that is being pursued, whereas CBNRM 
was in fact intended to provide new options for communities to generate additional 
income at both the community and individual level (Suzman, 2001a). CBNRM cannot 
solve all the problems that pertain to Basarwa. It therefore needs to be viewed within 
the broader framework of rural development. The Revised Rural Development Policy 
already has a community strategy and provides a framework for building synergies 
with other programmes, in order to deal with the broader challenges that face the 
Basarwa. 
 
Riddell (2002) cautions that the field of development has been dogged with “flavour 
of the month” approaches, which are only too quick to discard tried and tested 
approaches in the quest of using innovative ones. Linking to the theory of adaptive 
management it is important to emphasise the need for learning at various levels, both 
social and institutional. Riddell calls for a multi-faceted approach to development 
processes, which minimises the risk of neglecting and marginalising other important 
factors that contribute to development while concentration on the emerging issues.  
Roper et al. (1996), quoted in Riddell (2002), however, emphasise that, on the 
question of minority rights and the rights of indigenous peoples, a legal framework 
guaranteeing basic human rights and establishes secure rights to land and other 
resources is an essential first step to development, the second step being the 
enforcement of that legal framework. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 explains how the Basarwa traditionally had diverse and flexible livelihood 
strategies, which were constantly adapted to suit the changes in their harsh 
environments. The Basarwa have, however, been forced to change these as a result of 
an introduction of policies, legislation and formal institutions founded on principles of 
the dominant Tswana agro-pastoral society (see chapters 1 and 2). The changes 
brought about by the land policy in Botswana led to an encroachment of livestock and 
non-Basarwa peoples into Basarwa territory. Further, the Basarwa in Ngamiland have 
been affected by the erection of cordon fences to control foot-and-mouth disease, as 
these have cut the migratory routes of some wildlife species. As a result of 
conservation laws and the establishment of national parks and game reserves, the 
Basarwa of Xaxaba and Khwai found themselves cramped into smaller areas of land 
that could not accommodate seasonal mobility, and hunting and gathering as 
livelihood strategies. Conservation regulations have also restricted access to natural 
resources, hence reducing their buffering capacity to absorb and transcend 
disturbance.  
 
The replacement of traditional management systems by government regulations and 
institutions has had a negative impact not only on wildlife but also on Government’s 
relations with rural communities. The introduction of protected areas in lands that 
were formerly communal further alienated communities. The result has been a 
concentration of wildlife populations into smaller areas of land, and often (as in the 
case of the Delta) increased wildlife encroachment into human settlements. 
Uncertainty and risk has increased as a result of legislative restrictions on access to 
land and hunting. New policies are, however, beginning to recognise the importance 
of community involvement in natural resources management. An example is the 
CBNRM Policy (draft), which uses local institutions as vehicles for community 
participation in resource management. Although it must be noted, that while the 
Government of Botswana has tended to give communities the responsibility to 
manage natural resources, it has not always given them the authority to make this 
possible through CBNRM. 
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Chapter 5 revealed that the buffering systems in Khwai and Xaxaba are gradually 
being eroded through limitations imposed by policies and legislation as opposed to 
natural disasters. These policies and legislation are based on conventional resource 
management, which blocks out disturbance and results in a high magnitude of 
surprise; this surprise often takes the form of natural disasters, such as the habitat 
destruction that is a consequence of the overpopulation of elephants in the northern 
part of Botswana. The restriction on the use of fire has resulted in vegetation 
blockage, which Scudder et al. (1993) attribute to the shifts in water flows. The 
Khwai residents argued that this stops water from reaching the lower streams. The 
residents of Xaxaba, on the other hand, noted that vegetation blockage makes 
travelling through the water channels to other islands for gathering difficult. However, 
evolving systems require policies and actions that not only satisfy social objectives 
but, at the same time, also encourage a continually modified understanding of 
evolving conditions, and provide flexibility for adaptation to surprises. Science, 
policy and management then need to become inextricably linked in order to achieve 
the adaptive management of resources (Berkes and Folke, 1998, emphasis added). 
This seems to be the missing link in the various policies that govern natural resource 
management in Botswana. 
 
Extensive use (in the form of access to large territories of land) is a prerequisite for 
adaptive management by the Basarwa. In the past, their access to large territories and 
their adaptive strategies encouraged seasonal mobility. Now, with limited/restricted 
access to their former territories, they can no longer engage in seasonal mobility. The 
end result is that they are increasingly dependent upon government handouts for their 
livelihoods. CBNRM has failed to take this aspect on board. 
 
Through CBNRM, Government has given communities the responsibility for 
managing natural resources, but not the authority to make this practical. Community 
rights are not recognised in our legal system, thus leaving the rights of communities 
unprotected and these communities powerless in terms of controlling access to natural 
resources in their areas. For these reasons, communities are struggling to practice 
adaptive resource management, a practice that this research demonstrates still has a 
role to play and that could make an important contribution to ecosystem and social 
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management if given the opportunity to do so. Again this is an area that remains 
largely untapped in CBNRM projects. 
 
To make this possible, policy must satisfy social objectives whilst allowing continual 
modifications and flexibility for adaptation to surprises (Gunderson 1999). Valuable 
lessons can be learnt from traditional management practices that promoted flexibility 
and diversity in order to accommodate the seasonality of resource availability and the 
variable social and ecological systems. Adaptation and flexibility make room for the 
learning process and for policies that are suitable to needs at a local level. Although 
some learning occurs regardless of the management approach, adaptive management 
is structured to make that learning more efficient (Gunderson, 1999). In other words, 
if the policies affecting natural resource management in Botswana were adaptive, 
policies such as the TGLP would have long been adjusted to minimise the negative 
impacts they have had on communities, such as the Basarwa, relying directly on 
natural resources for their livelihoods. 
  
The common-sense logic of adaptive management emphasises learning by doing, and 
its elimination of the barrier between research and management resembles traditional 
resource management systems. Both rely on feedback and learning, and on the 
progressive accumulation of knowledge, often over many generations in the case of 
traditional systems. 
 
Disturbance is endemic to ecosystem development, a part of the adaptive renewal 
cycle (explained in Chapter 2); Holling et al. (1998) argue that there are social 
systems that have developed mechanisms to interpret signals of disturbance and other 
phenomena of ecosystem change, and to actively adapt to them. Ecological 
knowledge is critical in this adaptive process. The generation, accumulation and 
transfer of ecological knowledge within and between human generations make it 
possible for a society to be alert to changes in resource abundance and ecosystem 
dynamics. Traditional ecological knowledge is a dynamic process of continuous and 
active adaptation to resource and ecosystem change (Berkes and Folke, 1998). 
Intervention at policy level needs to be geared towards building the resilience of 
social and ecological systems. According to Gunderson (1999), the resilience of the 
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system provides the ability to cope or adapt in a world characterised by crises and 
shifting stability domains, and for managers to affordably fail and learn. In a nutshell, 
if there is no resilience in the ecological system, or flexibility among stakeholders in 
the coupled social system, then adaptive management will be impossible (ibid).  
Policies geared towards promoting adaptive management would seem appropriate for 
highly complex livelihood strategies dependent on social and ecological systems. 
Adaptive management has been promulgated as an integrated, multidisciplinary 
approach for confronting uncertainty in natural resource issues (Holling 1978, Walters 
1986). It is adaptive because it acknowledges that managed resources will always 
change as a result of human intervention; that surprises are inevitable; and that new 
uncertainties will emerge. Through active learning, similar to the traditional learning 
process of the Basarwa, uncertainty is winnowed away. CBNRM programmes should 
therefore leave enough room for flexibility to allow different communities to adapt 
the initiatives to their local needs. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This thesis set out to explore the links between the Basarwa communities and natural 
resources in terms of their livelihood strategies. Using the adaptive renewal cycle and 
the sustainable rural livelihoods framework, the underlying assumption of this thesis 
was that the livelihood strategies are constantly renewed and adapted to promote 
resilience in the ecological and social systems of the communities under study.  
 
The adaptive renewal cycle suggests that social and ecological systems go through a 
cycle of adaptive renewal; going through the stages of exploitation, conservation, 
release and reorganisation. For a system to go through the full cycle it has to be 
resilient, that is to have the capacity to transcend disturbance. The sustainable rural 
livelihoods frameworks was therefore used to provide an in-depth understanding of 
the factors that either strengthen or build resilience in the case of the Basarwa 
communities, which allows for their social systems to go through the full cycle.  
 
In order to provide a summary of the research findings, these will be arranged along 
the research questions. The two main research questions were; 
• What effects has the shift of management of natural resources from the 
communities to Government had on the natural resource use by the Basarwa? 
• What are the emerging opportunities that are presented by the CBNRM Draft 
Policy and what are the implications that this policy has on the livelihoods of 
the Basarwa? 
 
I look at what the emerging answers have been to the questions that I set out to 
address. 
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7.1 The effects of shifting management of natural resources from 
Communities to Government on the Basarwa 
 
The key thesis assumption was indeed confirmed by the research findings only in so 
far as the traditional livelihood strategies of the Basarwa are concerned. In 
contemporary times the Basarwa are faced with several challenges that weaken their 
resilience and hence hamper adaptive renewal of livelihood strategies. The stages that 
the Basarwa have undergone in the adaptive cycle are as follows; 
 
The stage marked by seasonal mobility (pre 1968) – described in chapters 4 and 5: 
This period was characterised by short periods of aggregation, followed by rapid 
social re-organisation and mobility. Groups disbanded and aggregated in response to 
the seasonal changes in resource availability, mainly water and wild foods. 
Traditional ecological knowledge, which acted as the memory of the system, and 
which had evolved over many generations, enabled them to anticipate and predict 
periods of shortages and abundance and respond timely. The Basarwa rapidly and 
proactively moved from K to α through Ω and back in response to ecological change. 
Renewal cycles were short, and traditional ecological knowledge, natural resources 
and social capital played a major role in their lives. This traditional lifestyle was 
extremely resilient and adaptable. 
 
The second phase was marked by sendentism as a result of major policy shifts that 
took place between 1968-1992, which caused their loss of ancestral territories, loss of 
access to wildlife resources, loss of mobility, and out-competition by other ethnic 
groups. This presented the Basarwa with new types of crises that they had no 
experience with handling. Their traditional knowledge and management systems were 
irrelevant for dealing with these challenges. Their livelihood strategies were 
determined by external forces and external events. Without the political capital, 
political say and authority to make choices and decisions, which are crucial for 
reorganisation, they were locked into the release phase (Ω) and were hence incapable 
of responding to challenges and change. 
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Chapter 5 outlines the current phase that the Basarwa are at, which is the 
reorganisation phase (1992 – present). The Basarwa had undergone a ‘flip’ (α), and 
have moved into a new stable state from which they are unlikely to escape in the near 
future. This change, from an adaptive society that relied almost exclusively on social 
and natural capital, to a sedentary one that relies on multiple sources of income, 
mainly from tourism and government grants, is leaving the Basarwa at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to other groups in Ngamiland. They are also at the mercy of 
processes over which they have no control and have little room for proactive decision 
making and strategising. This situation is unlikely to change unless appropriate 
policies are developed to respond to the unique issues of communities such as the 
Basarwa.  
 
Vulnerabilities facing the Basarwa 
 
This study has shown that the Basarwa in the Okavango Delta are vulnerable to 
shocks, surprises and externalities, due to: 
• Climatic and ecological variability: the Delta is prone to periodic floods, 
which in some cases flood the homes and crop fields of the residents of 
Xaxaba and Khwai. Furthermore, the presence of permanent waters attract a 
wide variety and large numbers of wildlife, which cause crop damage and are 
sometimes responsible for personal death and injury. 
• Power and politics: The Basarwa are peripheral to the political environment of 
Botswana, and thus do not have a strong influence on the decision-making 
process and policy formulation. As a result, they passively receive policies and 
regulations, many of which have criminalised their traditional land use and 
natural resource management practices -  
o Hunting restrictions have resulted in a negative impact on household 
food security as well as the very fabric of their cultural identity. 
o Restrictions on movement have curtailed seasonal mobility as a 
livelihood strategy. Linked to this issue is access to natural resources 
as private concessions and the Moremi Game Reserve surround the 
communities in the two study sites. 
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o In addition to restricted access to resources the Basarwa are faced with 
competition for available resources with non-Basarwa groups that are 
in a much better political and economic situation. This is mainly with 
respect to competition for land and natural resources (as a result of the 
amendment of the Tribal Land Act of 1968 which gives all citizens the 
right to acquire land and settle in any part of the country), competition 
for employment, as well as ‘business’.  
o The above has resulted in conflict within the community especially in 
the Khwai community which has been largely viewed as a threat to the 
CBNRM initiative. 
o A breakdown in the intergenerational transfer of knowledge is one of 
the issues that make up the vulnerability complex of the Basarwa. As 
most of the young children spend time away from home in boarding 
schools distant from their homes, they cannot partake in the daily 
chores and therefore cannot learn the skills appropriate for the local 
livelihood strategies. Cultural continuity, which ensures that 
communities continue to be equipped with the right skills for the 
livelihood strategies appropriate to their environment is therefore lost. 
 
• Global and local economic trends: As the Basarwa of this study rely on the 
tourism industry for much of their financial capital, these communities are 
vulnerable and directly exposed to the market forces affecting this industry. 
o The Basarwa in the Okavango Delta largely occupy the unskilled 
labour market which tends to be highly variable, the most predictable 
income being in the form of Government welfare. 
 
Resilience and livelihood strategies 
 
Having identified the vulnerabilities, I sought to understand the resilience maintaining 
livelihood strategies that the Basarwa have evolved in response to ecological 
uncertainties; the coping strategies that the Basarwa have for dealing with the new 
sources of vulnerability introduced by contemporary political and economic 
developments in Botswana and the rest of the world. Finally I sought to assess the 
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impact of these coping strategies on their livelihood assets and the social-ecological 
system that they are part of. 
 
This study concentrated on those coping strategies that enable the Basarwa of Khwai 
and Xaxaba to adapt to their changing political, social and natural environments not 
just to survive but rather to build resilience. These in the long term become adaptive 
strategies through their continued practice. The underlying assumption here was that 
social systems that lack ecological knowledge and understanding are less likely to 
implement appropriate management practices, and may lose resilience and 
adaptability to such an extent that they can only slowly recover from periods of stress 
and surprises. 
 
The key findings were: 
 
That the Basarwa’s traditional livelihood strategies were sophisticated and closely 
linked to their belief system, with internally controlled institutions. These have been 
replaced by livelihood strategies that are dependent on external factors in the form of 
government driven strategies and economic trends, which are all weakening the 
resilience of the Basarwa communities. 
 
Past coping strategies, which are examples of management strategies based on 
ecological knowledge and governed closely by social mechanisms, were found to be: 
o Mobility and flexibility in the use of resources 
o Flexibility in group size 
o Detailed knowledge of the local ecological system and appropriate 
skills to capitalise on this knowledge; and 
o Sharing networks 
 
Some of these have been replaced by contemporary strategies which are operated 
within the confines presented above under the vulnerability context. A summary of 
the key findings is provided below. 
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• Coping strategies are no longer as complex as they used to be; contemporary 
Basarwa communities rely more on diversification and combination of 
livelihood strategies rather than mobility and flexibility in group size. 
• New institutions for monitoring and regulating natural resource use have been 
established in the form of Community Trusts – these have largely replaced 
traditional institutions. 
o The operations of these institutions do not exploit the full potential of 
traditional practices and institutions. In the case of the Khwai 
community, where they were employing traditional rules to govern the 
collection of thatching grass, the community is still faced with a 
challenge of ensuring that these rules apply to non-members of the 
community as the traditional rules are not supported by the present 
legislation. 
• Livelihood strategies and options are seasonal; for instance, the dry season 
when there is not much to harvest in the veld coincides with the peak tourism 
season where employment opportunities are on the increase. Income from the 
tourism sector was found to be highly irregular. 
• Natural resources remain central to the livelihood strategies of the Basarwa as 
they provide material for the Mokoro (valuable property for tour guides), palm 
trees for the flourishing basket market, wild food, thatching grass and reeds, 
all of which facilitate access to financial capital. This indicates a continued 
link between the social and ecological systems of the Basarwa in Khwai and 
Xaxaba. 
• As a result of conservation laws and the establishment of national parks and 
game reserves, the Basarwa of Xaxaba and Khwai find themselves cramped 
into smaller areas of land that could not accommodate seasonal mobility and 
hunting and gathering as a livelihood strategy. 
• Conservation has also reduced the Basarwa’s access to land and hence 
reducing their buffering capacity to transcend disturbance. 
 
The conclusion I draw after analysing the vulnerability and the current livelihood 
strategies of the Basarwa in Ngamiland is that change does not always affect local 
people negatively. They are overall relatively in a better position than those on the 
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south-western part of the country. They have better cash income opportunities within 
the vicinity of their settlements due to the flourishing tourism industry. However, I 
draw the conclusion that financial capital is more unpredictable than natural capital. 
 
They furthermore have the potential to benefit from wildlife-based CBNRM due to 
the large wildlife numbers in their areas. Although they have access to less land than 
they had in the past, their loss of land is relatively not as severe as other Basarwa such 
as those in the Kgalagadi and Gantsi districts.  
 
The issue then becomes how change can be managed such that the issues raised above 
are addressed and thus building the resilience of the Basarwa livelihood strategies. 
For this I draw on the conclusions with regards Chapter 6 of this study. 
 
7.2 Implications and Opportunities presented by the CBNRM Policy 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the emergence of a promising phase with opportunities mainly in 
the form of the CBNRM Draft Policy. However, in order to allow for a progression 
through the various stages of the adaptive renewal cycle, the issues raised as marking 
the vulnerability complex of the Basarwa and in the preceding section will need to be 
addressed. In addition to the above issue are the CBNRM specific issues below.  
 
• The residents of Khwai alluded to the fact that the management of natural 
resources had become difficult because the present communities are made up 
of people from different areas with different norms, values and practices. This 
cripples the resilience of social institutions, as people who do not share 
common norms and values and kinship ties are grouped under one settlement 
and expected to function as a community. 
• CBNRM in Botswana has tended to promote and support the wildlife-based 
activities (e.g. Chobe Enclave Community Trust, the Khwai Community 
Trust, Okavango Kopano Mokoro Trust, etc.) rather than promoting and 
supporting flexibility in livelihood strategies. 
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• Income from the CBNRM initiatives has failed to make an impact at a 
household level; in both Khwai and Xaxaba the elderly and orphaned remain 
poverty stricken.  
• Issues of land tenure, resource ownership, the politics of relocation and 
ethnicity are not addressed, which handicaps the success of CBNRM in 
communities that lack land rights. 
• Furthermore, unless more recognition and value is attached to other forms of 
capital, such as local ecological knowledge, the position of communities as 
partners in enterprises will remain weak and therefore CBNRM will fail to 
achieve its goals. 
• CBNRM has done very little to address the issue of security of tenure, as the 
participating communities’ tenure rights remain insecure. Although this 
position is not unique to the Basarwa, they are more affected than others as 
their extent of dispossession is at a much larger scale. 
• The current CBNRM strategy is unfortunately based on a weak and broad 
definition of co-management that is synonymous with participatory, 
collaborative, joint or multi-party management (Castro and Nielsen, 2001), 
and falls short of intensive user participation over managing a specific 
resource.  
• CBNRM is largely being implemented in isolation from other rural 
development initiatives. 
• CBNRM fails to recognise overlapping resource rights. 
• Like similar studies carried out in the region on CBNRM, this study notes that 
Government has through CBNRM partially decentralised the responsibility to 
manage natural resources but fallen short of decentralising the authority to 
ensure that the communities can actively manage their natural resources. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
This study has shown that traditional communities have always practised adaptive 
management. As an emerging concept for new initiatives such as the formalised 
CBNRM programmes, there is therefore potential to tap into these practices and make 
them part and parcel of the way that these initiative are run. 
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 The loss of their traditional lands is the most immediate threat to their resilience, their 
identity and their ecological knowledge. Extensive use (in the form of access to large 
territories of land) is a prerequisite for adaptive management by the Basarwa and 
central to mobility as a coping strategy. Due to loss of access to previous territories, 
mobility is no longer an option for Basarwa communities.  
 
• CBNRM should, however, ensure the people’s access to lands within parks – 
for example through co-management agreements. These co-management 
arrangements would require intensive participation of the communities 
involved as opposed to passive participation, which currently characterises 
CBNRM in Botswana. 
• The Government of Botswana should acknowledge the unique issues that face 
the Basarwa and their land tenure systems and reflect them in the national 
policies and legislation. Failure to do so has resulted in their land rights being 
unprotected as well as weakened social resilience, which in turn threatens 
ecological resilience. 
• For the above reasons, CBNRM programmes targeting the Basarwa need to 
deal with the specific needs and issues of these communities. Different 
strategies are needed, and these will require the various practitioners and 
Government agencies providing support to Basarwa communities to put in 
more effort and come up with innovative approaches. 
• The value of local ecological knowledge needs to be recognised, especially 
when negotiating partnerships between communities and governments, private 
sector, NGOs etc. Failure to recognise this value will result in the position of 
communities as partners in enterprises remaining weak and therefore CBNRM 
will fail to achieve its goals. 
• CBNRM should incorporate indigenous/traditional knowledge. 
• Diversification and combining livelihood strategies and flexibility in pursuing 
different livelihood options is central to the coping mechanisms of Basarwa 
communities, therefore CBNRM needs to support that diversification rather 
than usurping other livelihood strategies. In order for this to be achieved, 
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CBNRM needs to be implemented within the broader framework of rural 
development. 
• CBNRM needs to further strengthen the various livelihood assets in order to 
build resilience of the communities’ livelihood strategies. 
• In order for CBNRM to be successful it has to be combined with other 
empowerment and development strategies, or be broadened to incorporate 
other resources that the communities are making use of. In the case of the 
Basarwa, CBNRM programmes need to work hand in hand with development 
initiatives that tackle the following issues: low literacy levels; lack of land 
rights; extreme poverty and dependency on welfare; weak representation in 
political structures; and social and political alienation. 
• The above therefore implies that, although the land issue may be critical, as 
argued earlier a much more multifaceted approach will be required to address 
the issue of Basarwa livelihoods. 
• Practitioners and Government need to retain an open mind about various 
forms of CBNRM Programmes which are more responsive to the local setting. 
• CBNRM needs to reflect the spatial nature of resource distribution and the 
overlapping access rights of various communities. 
• Income from CBNRM needs to fill a gap during periods when alternative 
resources are at their scarcest. This would ensure that benefits from CBNRM 
respond to the fluctuating nature of household income.  
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ANNEX 1: 
 
Question Guide for Focus Group Discussions  
 
Section 1: To establish the Basarwa land use systems, looking at the physical use 
of space (land) and the environmental and social factors which influence land 
use. 
 
1. How would you describe your land use system? i.e what was land primarily 
used for?  
2. Which territories belonged to your people?  
3. How have your systems of land use changed? 
4. Can you remember key historical events that caused major changes for you? 
5. Who owns this land and the resources on it? Please elaborate. Who owns it 
legally? Who owns it morally? Do you have any anecdote or story to illustrate 
this? 
6. What rights does your community have? Who has most rights? And who the 
least?  
7. What was the relationship with other non-Basarwa land users with regards 
access to your traditional territories? 
8. Does your community have rights over this land you occupy? 
9. What is your understanding of these rights? 
10. Who was or is in charge of making decisions in relation to land use and 
natural resource utilisation? 
11. What influenced land use in your communities? 
12. Would you say you have resource tenure rights? 
13. If not how does this affect local management of resources? 
14. What is your understanding resource tenure rights? 
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Section 2: Local Natural Resource Management Systems of the Basarwa 
 
1. How much does the community rely on hunting and gathering? 
2. What resources occur in your area? 
3. When are these available? 
4. Where do they occur? 
5. Which of these resources do you hunt or gather? 
6. How do you access these resources? 
7. What management system do you have in place? 
8. Why do you have these management practices? 
9. How are these management practices kept in place? 
10. Have they undergone any changes? Please elaborate. 
11. What influenced or caused these changes? 
12. Are you able to detect disturbance in your environment? 
13. What indicators do you look out for? 
14. What is used as indicators of a healthy natural environment? 
15. In a situation of disturbance or loss of biodiversity, what is done in order 
to restore the environment? 
16. Have your adaptive strategies changed in any way? 
17. Were social sanctions parts of traditional resource management? Please 
elaborate. 
18. Were there any incentives for sound resource use? Please elaborate. 
19. What is the cause of the change in your adaptive strategies? 
20. What natural resources do you use during a period of abundance? 
21. What of during a bad period? 
22. How are ecologically sound management practices maintained? 
Use stories and anecdotes. 
 
Section 3: The effects of the Government policies and structures on the 
Basarwa's natural resources related livelihood practices? 
1. Are you aware of any Government Policies and Laws on wildlife conservation 
and management? 
2. How do these laws affect your people? How have these laws influenced your 
land use and natural resource management systems? 
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3. Does your community benefit from wildlife resources in this area?  How does 
the community benefit? 
4. Are you aware of government policy of creating wildlife management area 
and controlled hunting areas? 
5. Where are the CHAs and WMAs in your area? 
6. Is the location of these CHAs and WMAs related in any way to your 
traditional territories? 
7. Does the Moremi Game Reserve and other national parks and game reserves 
around you benefit your community? Please elaborate. 
8. Do these protected areas conflict with any activities of the community? 
9. Do you have any CBNRM initiatives in your community? What projects have 
you planned for? 
10. How do you plan to manage the resources that your projects will be dependent 
on? 
11. How much does your management plan rely on traditional knowledge and 
traditional management systems? If it does not rely on TMS, why is that? 
12. Who would you rely on for assistance and why? Do you have any influence on 
the quota setting by the DWNP? 
13.  What type of changes has CBNRM brought to your community? 
14. What type of benefits have accrued to you from the Tourism industry? 
Elaborate. 
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Question Guide: Key Informant Interviews 
 
1. Is land use conflict a problem in this area? If yes, what is the nature of this 
conflict? 
2. Does the community have resource rights? Please elaborate.  
3. What institutions are in place to regulate access to resources? 
4. Is poverty prevalent in this settlement? If yes, what would you say is the cause 
of this plight? 
5. What in your opinion do you see as important for the livelihoods of the 
community in this settlement? 
a. resource rights (land and natural resources) 
b. education 
c. cash income 
6. Please elaborate on your response, for instance when in the year is cash 
income most important? 
7. What are the income opportunities for the community in this area? 
8. Do Government policies and regulations influence the livelihood strategies of 
the San communities in this area? Please elaborate. i.e. which policies? 
9. Does the community benefit from the protected areas such as game reserves 
and national parks around them? 
10. Do communities influence Government policy? How? 
11. Do you think CBNRM is likely to benefit this community? Please elaborate. 
12. Does this community have the necessary institutional structures for CBNRM 
to be successful? Please elaborate. 
 
 
